Taurek, numbers and probabilities

In his paper, “Should the Numbers Count?" John Taurek imagines that we are in a position such that we can either save a group of five people, or we can save one individual, David. We cannot save David and the five. This is because they each require a life-saving drug. However, David needs all of the drug if he is to survive, while the other five need only a fifth each.Typically, people have argued as if there was a choice to be made: either numbers matter, in which case we should save the greater number, or numbers don't matter, but rather there is moral value in giving each person an equal chance of survival, and therefore we should toss a coin. My claim is that we do not have to make a choice in this way. Rather, numbers do matter, but it doesn't follow that we should always save the greater number. And likewise, there is moral value in giving each person an equal chance of survival, but it doesn't follow that we should always toss a coin.In addition, I argue that a similar approach can be applied to situations in which we can save one person or another, but the chances of success are different

On the possibility of nonaggregative priority for the worst off

doi: 10.1017/S0265052509090116We shall focus on moral theories that are solely concerned with promoting the benefits (e.g., well-being) of individuals and shall explore the possibility of such theories' ascribing some priority to benefits to those who are worse off—without this priority being absolute. Utilitarianism (which evaluates alternatives on the basis of total or average benefits) ascribes no priority to the worse off, and leximin (which evaluates alternatives by giving lexical priority to the worst off, and then the second worst off, and so on) ascribes absolute priority to the worse off (i.e., favors even a very small benefit to a worse-off person over very large benefits to large numbers of better-off people). Neither extreme view, we assume, is plausible

Trading people versus trading time: What is the difference?

BACKGROUND: Person trade-off (PTO) elicitations yield different values than standard utility measures, such as time trade-off (TTO) elicitations. Some people believe this difference arises because the PTO captures the importance of distributive principles other than maximizing treatment benefits. We conducted a qualitative study to determine whether people mention considerations related to distributive principles other than QALY-maximization more often in PTO elicitations than in TTO elicitations and whether this could account for the empirical differences. METHODS: 64 members of the general public were randomized to one of three different face-to-face interviews, thinking aloud as they responded to TTO and PTO elicitations. Participants responded to a TTO followed by a PTO elicitation within contexts that compared either: 1) two life-saving treatments; 2) two cure treatments; or 3) a life-saving treatment versus a cure treatment. RESULTS: When people were asked to choose between life-saving treatments, non-maximizing principles were more common with the PTO than the TTO task. Only 5% of participants considered non-maximizing principles as they responded to the TTO elicitation compared to 68% of participants who did so when responding to the PTO elicitation. Non-maximizing principles that emerged included importance of equality of life and a desire to avoid discrimination. However, these principles were less common in the other two contexts. Regardless of context, though, participants were significantly more likely to respond from a societal perspective with the PTO compared to the TTO elicitation. CONCLUSION: When lives are at stake, within the context of a PTO elicitation, people are more likely to consider non-maximizing principles, including the importance of equal access to a life-saving treatment, avoiding prejudice or discrimination, and in rare cases giving treatment priority based purely on the position of being worse-off

Does the perception of fairness and standard of care in the health system depend on the field of study? Results of an empirical analysis

Background: The main challenge in the context of health care reforms and priority setting is the establishment and/or maintenance of fairness and standard of care. For the political process and interdisciplinary discussion, the subjective perception of the health care system might even be as important as potential objective criteria. Of special interest are the perceptions of academic disciplines, whose representatives act as decision makers in the health care sector. The aim of this study is to explore and compare the subjective perception of fairness and standard of care in the German health care system among students of medicine, law, economics, philosophy, and religion. Methods: Between October 2011 and January 2012, we asked freshmen and advanced students of the fields mentioned above to participate in a paper and pencil survey. Prior to this, we formulated hypotheses. The data were analysed by micro econometric regression techniques. Results: Data from 1,088 students were included in the study. Medical students, freshmen, and advanced students perceive the standard of care significantly as being better than non-medical students. Differences in the perception of fairness are not significant between the freshmen of the academic disciplines; however, they increase with the number of study terms. Besides the field of study, further variables such as gender and health status have a significant impact on perceptions. Conclusions: Our results show that there are differences in the perception of fairness and standard of care between academic disciplines, which might influence the interdisciplinary discussion on health care reforms and priority setting.Leibniz University Hannover/Wege in die Forschung I

Realizace firemní WWW prezentace pomocí dynamicky generovaných stránek

Import 20/04/2006Prezenční výpůjčkaVŠB - Technická univerzita Ostrava. Fakulta strojní. Katedra (352) automatizační techniky a řízen