Spatial Clustering of Housing Construction in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area: An Application of Spatially Clustered Fixed-Effects and Spatially Correlated Random-Effects Models

We proposed two types of econometric models, a spatially clustered fixed-effects model (SCFEM) and a spatially correlated random-effects model (SCREM), to examine area-based panel data. We investigate what factors influence housing construction in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area, incorporating unobservable factors, local regulatory differences in housing development and spillovers of local public or private goods, which may cause spatial clustering or correlation of housing construction. The SCFEM is a type of fixed-effects model where a cluster has the same effects, so that we have to find which areas constitute a cluster. The issue of finding clusters can be regarded as a problem of model selection from too many possible models. We adopt an aggregate prediction error as a model selection criterion, which is estimated by a resampling method, namely leave-one-out cross-validation. We showed by simulations that the estimated parameters of concern are more efficient than the within estimates. The SCREM is a model where the random-effects are spatially correlated. We use the concentrated maximum likelihood method for the estimation. The unobservable area-effects are large in the east, west and north areas of the TMA but small in the south, where regulations against development are more severe than in the other areas. Clusters are found in huge citiescluster-effects model, housing construction, area-based panel data, spatial correlation, spillover effects

A WAY TO SELL GOODS WITH NETWORK EXTERNALITIES

There are a lot of goods which have network externalities. While the number of players who have such a good is small, they may not get enough utility from the goods. That is, players have an incentive to delay their decision, when they purchase the goods with network externalities. Delay causes negative effects on players' utility, so equilibrium with delay is inefficient. We propose a way to settle this problem using a kind of call option. If we use the way and some conditions are satisfied, all players purchase the good and the delay decreases in equilibriumNetwork externality, strategic delay, coordination game

Subgame-perfect free trade networks in a four-country model

Goyal and Joshi (2006, Int Econ Review) apply the notion of ``pairwise stable networks" introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996, J Econ Theory) to a model of free trade network formation, and show that (i) every pairwise stable network is either complete or almost complete (with all countries except one forming direct links), and (ii) the complete network maximizes global welfare. In this note, we use essentially the same model as their model with four countries, and investigate which network is more likely to be realized than others by considering a dynamic process introduced by Jackson and Watts (2002, J Econ Theory).free trade network, network formation, subgame-perfect equilibrium

Experiments on Optimal Unemployment Insurance : Online Experiments with Real-Effort Tasks through CrowdFlower

本研究はオンライン実験を通じてHopenhayn and Nicolini (1997)による最適失業保険の下での個人の職探し行動が失業期間に応じてどのように変化し、Auturkyと比較してどの程度その強度が変化するかについて考察した。得られた結果として、第1に、最適失業保険、Auturkyのどちらのトリートメントでも、理論での想定とは異なり、被験者の職探しの努力水準は失業期間が長くなればなるほど低下していくことが分かった。これは、標準的な選好では起こりえないことで、個人が何らかの形で現在バイアスを有していることの証左であることが分かった。第2に、任意の失業期間を固定して、最適失業保険での努力水準とAuturkyでの努力水準を比較すると前者が常に上回っていたが、これは統計的に有意な差ではなかった。以上の2つの結果を総合的に捉えると、個人が現在バイアスを有しているため、Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997)によって想定されているほどの効果は得られないことが確認されたといえる。本研究は、平成25年関西大学若手研究者育成経費において、研究課題「最適失業保険の効率性とモラル・ハザードについての経済実験」として研究費を受け、その成果を公表するものである

A Two-Step Subsidy Scheme to Overcome Network Externalities in a Dynamic Game

Many goods have network externalities. When the number of agents possessing such goods is small, the agents may not gain sufficient utility from the goods. Agents then have an incentive to delay their purchasing decisions. Such delays have negative effects on the agents' utility, so equilibrium with delays is inefficient. We propose a method of resolving this problem using a two-step scheme with participation fees and subsidies. If this method is used, and certain conditions are satisfied, all agents purchase the good and the delay in equilibrium decreases.