211 research outputs found

    Reservoir Mechanics

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    Reservoir Mechanic

    The American Reaction to Germany\u27s Annexation of Austria

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    Germany\u27s annexation of Austria in March 1938 was the cumulation of almost twenty years of Austrian dissatisfaction with the Treaty of Saint Germain, the lack of consistent political and economic support by the western democracies and the international instability of the 1930s. All these factors worked in favor of pro-Anschluss Germans and Austrians and to the handicap of the allies. Once Adolf Hitler came to power, he drastically changed German policy toward Austria. Anschluss had special significance for Hitler and his decision to abandon an evolutionary revision of Austria\u27s political status to one of radical expansionism and annexation proved fatal to the independence of Austria. Naturally, Germany\u27s forced union with Austria drew world-wide attention and protest. Among the nations to object to Anschluss was the United States. Approaching the Anschluss, the United States had many domestic problems, which dictated what foreign policy the American government could pursue. The isolationists dominated not only the Middle West, but the entire nation and Congress as well. President Roosevelt could not endanger his secure political position over a controversial foreign policy. However, at the end of 1937, the President decided to challenge isolation, advocating a gradual acknowledgment of America\u27s role as a world power. Only six months after Roosevelt\u27s Quarantine Speech, Germany annexed Austria. The overt German action caused great concern in Washington, and even though the American reaction is significant, historians have not adequately focused on this event. Most importantly, Anschluss aided the passage of Roosevelt\u27s naval rearmament program. The President also established an international organization responsible for Austrian refugees in the aftermath of the Austro-German Union. Though Roosevelt did not desire an unnecessary rift between Germany and the United States, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes refused to sell helium to Germany, causing increased tension between Germany and the United States. Roosevelt was a pragmatic and skillful politician. He knew the isolationists would not support a rift with Germany over Anschluss. Moreover, given the weak American economy, the State Department desired to continue normal economic relations with the Germans. Though Anschluss caused no sudden change in the foreign policy of the United States, Germany\u27s annexation of Austria did affect and shape American policy. It compelled the United States to criticize the increasing lawlessness of Germany and formulate a foreign policy in order to respond more forcefully to Hitler\u27s aggressive foreign policy. After Anschluss, Secretary of State Hull, in his National Press Club address, stated that America opposed international lawlessness and blind isolationism, supported rearmament and was ready to cooperate with governments who opposed blatant violators of treaties and human rights. After Anschluss the American position evolved more clearly. Although the United States Congress remained strongly isolationist, the public began to take notice of Germany\u27s aggressive expansionism and the press declared itself as overwhelmingly anti-German. The German-American relationship rapidly atrophied. America disliked German aggression and chastised Nazi disregard for international law. When reacting to Anschluss, the United States government tried to underscore these principles within the constraints of internal difficulties, and the opposition of a large anti-New Deal coalition and the isolationists. Roosevelt feared an isolationist backlash in unison with anti-New Deal Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats. However, as best expressed by Secretary of State Hull, the Administration was now ready to prepare the way for a more active United States foreign policy in order to meet the combined threat of Germany, Italy and Japan

    The American Reaction to Germany\u27s Annexation of Austria

    Get PDF
    Germany\u27s annexation of Austria in March 1938 was the cumulation of almost twenty years of Austrian dissatisfaction with the Treaty of Saint Germain, the lack of consistent political and economic support by the western democracies and the international instability of the 1930s. All these factors worked in favor of pro-Anschluss Germans and Austrians and to the handicap of the allies. Once Adolf Hitler came to power, he drastically changed German policy toward Austria. Anschluss had special significance for Hitler and his decision to abandon an evolutionary revision of Austria\u27s political status to one of radical expansionism and annexation proved fatal to the independence of Austria. Naturally, Germany\u27s forced union with Austria drew world-wide attention and protest. Among the nations to object to Anschluss was the United States. Approaching the Anschluss, the United States had many domestic problems, which dictated what foreign policy the American government could pursue. The isolationists dominated not only the Middle West, but the entire nation and Congress as well. President Roosevelt could not endanger his secure political position over a controversial foreign policy. However, at the end of 1937, the President decided to challenge isolation, advocating a gradual acknowledgment of America\u27s role as a world power. Only six months after Roosevelt\u27s Quarantine Speech, Germany annexed Austria. The overt German action caused great concern in Washington, and even though the American reaction is significant, historians have not adequately focused on this event. Most importantly, Anschluss aided the passage of Roosevelt\u27s naval rearmament program. The President also established an international organization responsible for Austrian refugees in the aftermath of the Austro-German Union. Though Roosevelt did not desire an unnecessary rift between Germany and the United States, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes refused to sell helium to Germany, causing increased tension between Germany and the United States. Roosevelt was a pragmatic and skillful politician. He knew the isolationists would not support a rift with Germany over Anschluss. Moreover, given the weak American economy, the State Department desired to continue normal economic relations with the Germans. Though Anschluss caused no sudden change in the foreign policy of the United States, Germany\u27s annexation of Austria did affect and shape American policy. It compelled the United States to criticize the increasing lawlessness of Germany and formulate a foreign policy in order to respond more forcefully to Hitler\u27s aggressive foreign policy. After Anschluss, Secretary of State Hull, in his National Press Club address, stated that America opposed international lawlessness and blind isolationism, supported rearmament and was ready to cooperate with governments who opposed blatant violators of treaties and human rights. After Anschluss the American position evolved more clearly. Although the United States Congress remained strongly isolationist, the public began to take notice of Germany\u27s aggressive expansionism and the press declared itself as overwhelmingly anti-German. The German-American relationship rapidly atrophied. America disliked German aggression and chastised Nazi disregard for international law. When reacting to Anschluss, the United States government tried to underscore these principles within the constraints of internal difficulties, and the opposition of a large anti-New Deal coalition and the isolationists. Roosevelt feared an isolationist backlash in unison with anti-New Deal Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats. However, as best expressed by Secretary of State Hull, the Administration was now ready to prepare the way for a more active United States foreign policy in order to meet the combined threat of Germany, Italy and Japan

    Synovial fibroblasts: key players in rheumatoid arthritis

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    Rheumatoid arthritis (RA) is a chronic autoimmune-disease of unknown origin that primarily affects the joints and ultimately leads to their destruction. The involvement of immune cells is a general hallmark of autoimmune-related disorders. In this regard, macrophages, T cells and their respective cytokines play a pivotal role in RA. However, the notion that RA is a primarily T-cell-dependent disease has been strongly challenged during recent years. Rather, it has been understood that resident, fibroblast-like cells contribute significantly to the perpetuation of disease, and that they may even play a role in its initiation. These rheumatoid arthritis synovial fibroblasts (RASFs) constitute a quite unique cell type that distinguishes RA from other inflammatory conditions of the joints. A number of studies have demonstrated that RASFs show alterations in morphology and behaviour, including molecular changes in signalling cascades, apoptosis responses and in the expression of adhesion molecules as well as matrix-degrading enzymes. These changes appear to reflect a stable activation of RASFs, which occurs independently of continuous exogenous stimulation. As a consequence, RASFs are no longer considered passive bystanders but active players in the complex intercellular network of R

    Cell culture and passaging alters gene expression pattern and proliferation rate in rheumatoid arthritis synovial fibroblasts

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    INTRODUCTION: Rheumatoid arthritis synovial fibroblasts (RASF) are key players in synovial pathophysiology and are therefore examined extensively in various experimental approaches. We evaluated, whether passaging during culture and freezing has effects on gene expression and cell proliferation. METHODS: RASF were passaged for up to 8 passages. RNA was isolated after each passage and cDNA arrays were performed to evaluate the RNA expression pattern during passaging. In addition, doubling time of the cells was also measured. RESULTS: From passages 2-4, mRNA expression did not change significantly. Gene expression in RASF started to change in passages 5-6 with 7-10% differentially expressed genes. After passages 7-8, more than 10% of the genes were differentially expressed. The doubling rate was constant for up to 5 passages and decreased after passages 6-8. After freezing, gene expression of the second passage is comparable to gene expression prior to freezing. CONCLUSIONS: The results of this study show, that experiments, which examine gene expression of RASF and shall reflect or imitate an in vivo situation, should be limited to early culture passages to avoid cell culture effects. It is not necessary to stop culturing SF after a few passages, but to keep the problems of cell culture in mind to avoid false positive results. Especially, when large-scale screening methods on mRNA level are used. Of note, freezing does not affect gene expression substantially
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