The Rise and Fall of the Ebro Water Transfer

This article analyzes the Ebro inter-basin transfer, which was the main project of the Spanish National Hydrological Plan. The Ebro transfer was prompted by pervasive pressures, scarcity and degradation of Southeastern basins in Spain. The heated policy debate on the Ebro transfer, highlights the difficulties of achieving a sustainable water management, because of the conflicting interests of stakeholders and regions. Alternatives to the Ebro transfer show that, acceptable outcomes combine demand and supply measures. Nevertheless, implementation could be difficult and requires compensation to farmers, otherwise an excessive burden on farmers would be met by social opposition leading to the failure of measures

What drives information dissemination in continuous double auction markets?.

In this paper, we investigate further the way information disseminates from informed to uninformed traders in a market populated by heterogeneous boundedly rational agents. In order to achieve the goal, a computer simulated market where only a small fraction of the population observe the risky asset's fundamental value with noise was constructed, while the rest of agents try to forecast the asset's price from past transaction data. The paper departs from previous studies in that the risky asset does not pay a dividend every period, so agents cannot learn from past transaction prices and subsequent dividend payments. The main finding is that information can potentially disseminate in the market as long as: (1) informed investors' trades tilt transaction prices in the fundamental path direction; and (2) the median investor's expectation is very responsive to transaction prices. Otherwise, markets may display crashes or bubbles. It is found that the first condition requires a minimal amount of informed investors, and is severely limited by short selling and borrowing constraints.

PRICE DYNAMICS, INFORMATIONAL EFFICIENCY AND WEALTH DISTRIBUTION IN CONTINUOUS DOUBLE AUCTION MARKETS

This paper studies the properties of the continuous double auction trading mechanishm using an artificial market populated by heterogeneous computational agents. In particular, we investigate how changes in the population of traders and in market microstructure characteristics affect price dynamics, information dissemination and distribution of wealth across agents. In our computer simulated market only a small fraction of the population observe the risky asset’s fundamental value with noise, while the rest of agents try to forecast the asset’s price from past transaction data. In contrast to other artificial markets, we assume that the risky asset pays no dividend, so agents cannot learn from past transaction prices and subsequent dividend payments. We find that private information can effectively disseminate in the market unless market regulation prevents informed investors from short selling or borrowing the asset, and these investors do not constitute a critical mass. In such case, not only are markets less efficient informationally, but may even experience crashes and bubbles. Finally, increased informational efficiency has a negative impact on informed agents’ trading profits and a positive impact on artificial intelligent agents’ profits.

Price dynamics, informational efficiency and wealth distribution in continuous double-auction markets.

This paper studies the properties of the continuous double-auction trading mechanism using an artificial market populated by heterogeneous computational agents. In particular, we investigate how changes in the population of traders and in market microstructure characteristics affect price dynamics, information dissemination, and distribution of wealth across agents. In our computer-simulated market only a small fraction of the population observe the risky asset's fundamental value with noise, while the rest of the agents try to forecast the asset's price from past transaction data. In contrast to other artificial markets, we assume that the risky asset pays no dividend, thus agents cannot learn from past transaction prices and subsequent dividend payments. We find that private information can effectively disseminate in the market unless market regulation prevents informed investors from short selling or borrowing the asset, and these investors do not constitute a critical mass. In such case, not only are markets less efficient informationally, but may even experience crashes and bubbles. Finally, increased informational efficiency has a negative impact on informed agents' trading profits and a positive impact on artificial intelligent agents' profits.Artificial financial markets; Information dissemination; Artificial neural networks; Heterogeneous agents;

Language teachers’ perceptions toward the use of the “Tlamatini” educational model UVP in their teaching practice

"Following an Educational Model has become essential for most institutions as it provides input not only for students’ profiles but also for teachers’ daily practice. The approach of Universidad del Valle de Puebla provides the opportunity to develop the most suitable competencies for students to deal with their professional field following a humanistic and constructivist philosophy. This study used a qualitative approach to explore the strengthened teachers’ perceptions toward the UVP Educative Model in their daily teaching practice as well as the model’s opportunity areas to work on. A cross-sectional instrument was done in order to collect teachers’ and administrators’ perceptions and suggestions toward the model they were immersed in. Furthermore, focus groups interviews were conducted with teachers from the different learning areas at the university. After analyzing the data, the findings were presented so that the participants expressed their confirmation or refutation. It was intended that by expressing UVP teachers’ perceptions and expectations, viable alternatives and suggestions would emerge to improve the university’s model, programs, and teachers’ teaching practice"

Ecologismo profundo y utilitarismo de intereses como marcos teóricos que justifican la existencia de los derechos de los animales

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Price dynamics, informational efficiency and wealth distribution in continuous double auction markets

This paper studies the properties of the continuous double auction trading mechanishm using an artificial market populated by heterogeneous computational agents. In particular, we investigate how changes in the population of traders and in market microstructure characteristics affect price dynamics, information dissemination and distribution of wealth across agents. In our computer simulated market only a small fraction of the population observe the risky asset's fundamental value with noise, while the rest of agents try to forecast the asset's price from past transaction data. In contrast to other artificial markets, we assume that the risky asset pays no dividend, so agents cannot learn from past transaction prices and subsequent dividend payments. We find that private information can effectively disseminate in the market unless market regulation prevents informed investors from short selling or borrowing the asset, and these investors do not constitute a critical mass. In such case, not only are markets less efficient informationally, but may even experience crashes and bubbles. Finally, increased informational efficiency has a negative impact on informed agents' trading profits and a positive impact on artificial intelligent agents' profits