Measuring Norms of Income Transfers: Trust Experiments and Survey Data from Vietnam

This paper compares the patterns of income transfers within village communities in the north and south of Vietnam by analyzing household survey and experimental data. The results of household data analysis show private transfers flow from high-income households to low-income households in the south where social safety net is limited. In contrast, private transfers do not correlate with pre-transfer income in the north where public transfers are more widespread. In addition, public transfers crowd out private transfers in the north. We conducted a trust game in both regions and found consistent results. People in the south are more altruistic toward the poor: they send more to the poor without expecting higher repayment. This pattern is consistent with the idea that private norms of redistribution from rich to poor are active in the south, but are crowded out in the north, possibly by communist public institutions, although we observe higher levels of trust and reciprocity in the north

Poverty, politics, and preferences: Field experiments and survey data from Vietnam

We conducted field experiments to investigate how wealth, political history, occupation, and other demographic variables (from a comprehensive earlier household survey) are correlated with risk, time discounting and trust in Vietnam. Our experiments suggest risk and time preferences depend on the stage of economic development. In wealthier villages, people are less loss-averse and more patient. Our research also shows people who participate in ROSCAs (rotating credit associations) are more patient than non-participant, but those who participate in bidding ROSCAs are less patient and more risk averse than those who participate in fixed ROSCAs. Results from a trust game demonstrate both positive and negative effects of communism. Villagers in the South tend to invest more in low-income partners without expecting repayment. On the other hand, people in the north are more trustworthy but do not pass on more money to the poor. Our findings also suggest market activities, like starting a small trade business, are correlated with trust and trustworthiness. We also contribute to experimental methodology by using choices that separate different aspects of risk aversion and time preferences in behavioral economics specifications

Risk and Time Preferences: Linking Experimental and Household Survey Data from Vietnam

We conducted experiments in Vietnamese villages to determine the predictors of risk and time preferences. In villages with higher mean income, people are less loss-averse and more patient. Household income is correlated with patience but not with risk. We expand measurements of risk and time preferences beyond expected utility and exponential discounting, replacing those models with prospect theory and a three-parameter hyperbolic discounting model. Comparable risk parameter estimates have been found for Chinese farmers, using our method

Measuring Norms of Redistributive Transfers: Trust Experiments and Survey Data from Vietnam

This paper compares the social norms of distributive transfers within village communities in the north and south of Vietnam by analyzing household survey and experimental data. The results of household data analysis show private transfers flow from high-income households to low-income households in the south where social safety net is limited. In contrast, private transfers do not correlate with pre-transfer income in the north where public transfers are more widespread. In addition, public transfers crowd out private transfers in the north. We conducted trust game in both regions and found consistent results. People in the south are more altruistic toward the poor: they send more to the poor without expecting higher repayment. This pattern is consistent with the idea that private norms of redistribution from rich to poor are active in the south but are crowded out in the north, possibly by communist public institutions, although we observe a strong overall positive effect of communism on reciprocity in the north.Field experiment; Trust; Vietnam

Can chemotactic effects lead to blow-up or not in two-species chemotaxis-competition models?

This paper deals with the two-species chemotaxis-competition models \begin{align*} \begin{cases} u_t = d_1 \Delta u - \chi_1 \nabla \cdot (u \nabla w) + \mu_1 u (1- u^{\kappa_1-1} - a_1 v^{\lambda_1-1}), &\quad x \in \Omega,\ t>0,\\ % v_t = d_2 \Delta v - \chi_2 \nabla \cdot (v \nabla w) + \mu_2 v (1- a_2 u^{\lambda_2-1} - v^{\kappa_2-1}), &\quad x \in \Omega,\ t>0,\\ % 0 = d_3 \Delta w + \alpha u + \beta v - h(u,v,w), &\quad x \in \Omega,\ t>0, \end{cases} \end{align*} where $\Omega \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ $(n\ge2)$ is a bounded domain with smooth boundary, and $h=\gamma w$ or $h=\frac{1}{|\Omega|}\int_\Omega(\alpha u+ \beta v)\,dx$. In the case that $\kappa_1=\lambda_1=\kappa_2=\lambda_2=2$ and $h=\gamma w$, it is known that smallness conditions for the chemotacic effects lead to boundedness of solutions (Math.\ Methods Appl.\ Sci.; 2018; 41; 234--249). However, the case that the chemotactic effects are large seems not to have been studied yet; therefore it remains to consider the question whether the solution is bounded also in the case that the chemotactic effects are large. The purpose of this paper is to give a negative answer to this question

Resource allocation with spatial externalities: Experiments on land consolidation

This paper compares the performance of a two-sided combinatorial call market, direct negotiation, and double auction for consolidating fragmented land. Experimental results suggest direct negotiation produces higher efficiencies than other mechanisms. The combinatorial call market tends to alleviate the exposure problem, and performs well when 1) swapping is easily agreeable, and 2) the number of subjects and commodities are increased and the initial endowments are unchallenging. The two-sided combinatorial call market, however, suffers from the holdout problem when the number of subjects and commodities is small