Du karo istorijos šaltiniai iš Lietuvos tarpukariu

Source publication

Significance of German World War II fortifications in the defence of Klaipėda City in 1944-1945

Straipsnyje analizuojama Vokietijos kariuomenės sukurtų fortifikacinių kompleksų reikšmė karinių veiksmų, vykusių tarp Vokietijos ir Sovietų Sąjungos pajėgų dėl Klaipėdos miesto 1944 m. spalį – 1945 m. sausį, laikotarpiu. Pagrindinis dėmesys skiriamas Vokietijos karinio jūrų laivyno priešlėktuvinių ir pakrantės artilerijos baterijų sistemai Klaipėdoje bei Vokietijos kariuomenės 1944 m. antrojoje pusėje tarp Šiaulių ir Klaipėdos miestų sukurtam gynybos ruožui, susidedančiam iš penkių gynybinių linijų. Siekiant įvertinti Klaipėdos priešlėktuvinių ir pakrantės artilerijos baterijų sistemos bei gynybinių linijų, įrengtų tarp Šiaulių ir Klaipėdos miestų, reikšmę, šių objektų panaudojimo susirėmimų metu atvejai (atsižvelgiant į sudėtį, lokalizaciją, šūvių nuotolius ir kitus techninius aspektus) išryškinami bendrame Vokietijos ir SSRS kariuomenių pajėgų karinių veiksmų 1944 m. spalį – 1945 m. sausį kontekste. Esminiai žodžiai: Klaipėda, Antrasis pasaulinis karas, fortifikacija, pakrantės artilerijos baterijos, priešlėktuvinės artilerijos baterijos, gynybinės linijos.The article analyses the significance of the fortification complexes created by the German army in the period of the military actions between the German and the USSR forces for the city of Klaipėda from October 1944 to January 1945. The study focuses on the system of antiaircraft and coastal artillery batteries of the German Navy in Klaipėda and the defence section between the cities of Šiauliai and Klaipėda created by the German army in the second half of 1944. In order to assess the significance of these objects in the defense of Klaipėda city, the cases of their use and effectiveness during the battles are highlighted in the general context of the military actions of the German and the USSR forces during the period from October 1944 to January 1945. Until the beginning of October 1944, the German army had established a fortified defensive sector between the cities of Šiauliai and Klaipėda, consisting of five defensive lines – the Venta River defensive line, the Virvytė River defensive line and the East Prussian defensive positions (consisting of three separate defensive lines). The East Prussian defensive positions were perceived by both the German and the Red Army commands as a single defensive system. Coastal and anti-aircraft artillery batteries of the German Navy built in 1939 were also used for the defence of Klaipėda city. By the time active military actions began in October 1944, Klaipėda’s antiaircraft and coastal defence system had been re-equipped and supplemented with new coastal and anti-aircraft artillery batteries. In the final result, the Klaipėda anti-aircraft and coastal defence system consisted of eight anti-aircraft artillery batteries and one coastal artillery battery. The five German defensive lines between Šiauliai and Klaipėda were of varying importance during the October 1944 military actions. During the Red Army offensive of 5–10 October 1944, the Venta River defence line, Virvytė River defence line and the first two lines of the East Prussian defensive positions were broken. These defensive lines did not play any significant role in the military actions for the territory between Šiauliai and Klaipėda. On 10 October 1944, Red Army forces, approaching the city of Klaipėda and the vicinities of the third line of East Prussian defence positions, got into fire range of German Navy anti-aircraft and coastal artillery batteries. The Red Army’s attempts to seise Klaipėda on 10–23 October were unsuccessful. The Red Army command, assessing the reasons for the failure to take the city in October 1944, pointed out, among other reasons, that the failure of the operation was due to the successful and joint action of the artillery of the coastal and anti-aircraft artillery batteries. The third line of the East Prussian defence positions and the Klaipėda anti-aircraft and coastal artillery batteries remained active throughout the siege of Klaipėda until the end of January 1945. The analysis of memories of both German and Red Army‘s soldiers and journals of the Red Army‘s military actions allows drawing conclusions that German Navy antiaircraft – coastal batteries and the third line of the East Prussian defence positions in Klaipėda made a significant contribution to stopping the Red Army assault on the city in October 1944 and played an important role in defending the city of Klaipėda until the end of January 1945. Keywords: Klaipėda, World War II, fortification, coastal artillery batteries, anti-aircraft artillery batteries, defence sections

Du karo istorijos šaltiniai iš Lietuvos tarpukariu | Two Military History Sources from Interwar Lithuania

We hereby draw readers' attention to two historical sources related to the military history of Lithuania in the interwar period. The first document is a brief overview of the military activities of the Lithuanian armed forces that took place in Lithuania in 1919-1923, prepared in 1926. Based on 1927 data (and subsequently improved) in the struggle against three enemies (the Red Army, the Polish armed forces, and the Western Volunteer Army), the Lithuanian armed forces and the Lietuvos šaulių sąjunga (Lithuanian Riflemen's Union) suffered 6,167 casualties in 1919-1923. These included 221 officers, 223 non-commissioned officers, 5,282 privates, and 441 riflemen. Unlike in Estonia and Latvia, no detailed study on the course and the results of these armed conflicts was published in the interwar period in Lithuania, although research was conducted on the issue, and in 1937 the army even commissioned a history of the war of independence for Reserve General Kazys Ladiga. We present a chronological list of the military events of 1919-1923 in Lithuania that was prepared for internal military use for several reasons. First, we are trying to address a problem that historians have so far gone no further into than developing a description of the events. At the same time, we ask what the armed struggle for Lithuanian statehood should be called, and how long it lasted. The terms 'independence wad, 'struggle for independence' and 'wars of independence’ were used simultaneously and synonymously in the interwar period. But none of these terms is used in the published document from 1926. The document is also interesting because its unknown author extends the description of the fighting of 1919-1920, when the most intense battles with the Red Army, the West Russian Volunteer Army and the Polish forces took place, until 1923. Thus, he adds to the previous period the phase of collisions between Lithuanian and Polish paramilitary formations, and armies in the neutral, demilitarised zone. But maybe the war had not finished at all? After all, during the interwar period, Lithuania was at least de jure in a state of war with Poland for two decades, especially since it applied martial law (for internal reasons) (or almost all of this time. Regardless of how we deal with the issues of dating and naming the war of independence, it is clear that neither in 1920 nor in 1923 was the struggle for the desired borders complete. This is evident from the second source, the Lithuanian Armed Forces Operation Plan No 3 'L' (for Lenkija, Poland), approved in 1937. At that time, the Lithuanian armed forces had two more plans at their disposal: No 1 V (for Vokietija, Germany) and No 2 V+L’ (Germany+Poland). The document is interesting and valuable for three reasons. Firstly, it allows us to determine what operational ideas the Lithuanian armed forces had developed in the event of a war with Poland. The plan was approved in 1937, so it is likely that the Lithuanian army would have applied it in March 1938, if the government had ignored Poland's ultimatum and the latter had decided to resort to military force. Secondly, the document reveals the operational concepts of the Lithuanian armed forces, and their general attitude towards warfare in the late 1930s, a period when there were already quite a few senior officers in the Lithuanian armed forces who had studied in West European (mainly French, Belgian and Czechoslovakian) military academies. Thirdly, the document may be a source for analysing why Lithuania did not resist the 1940 Soviet occupation. In the event of an eventual conflict with the Soviet Union, another operational plan had to be carried out, namely Operation Plan 'R'. We know that it was prepared in 1939, but the document itself has not yet been found. However, from information about its preparation, it is clear that Operation Plan 'R' was a slightly modified version of the 'L' plan. So, until the 'R' plan is found, it is logical to refer to the 'L' plan and/or other documents in order to understand its content

Samogitian-Curonian military defensive bridgehead: experiences of the first half of the 20th century

The article analyses the cases of military actions in the territory of Western Lithuania and Latvia from 1915 to 1945. At the same time, attention is paid to the operational plans of the Lithuanian and Latvian military forces in the second half of the 1930s. Using this method of analysis, based on military history research, an alternative defence concept for small countries whose defence depends on allies not only with ground capabilities but also with naval military capabilities and capabilities to conduct air operations, is disclosed. The strategic directions in which armies invade and retreat in the Eastern Baltic region in the first half of the twentieth century are essentially the same. Only changing technologies, capability of mobility and firepower, and growing/increasing opportunities have affected the pace and geography of military action. In 1915, the Russian army did not concentrate its forces in Courland, and through it the German army saw the possibility of manoeuvring in the northern wing. This helped to defeat the enemy on the Venta-Dubysa river line and take advantage of the success and maintain the initiative to occupy the entire territory of Lithuania by the autumn and reach the left bank of the Daugava. These operations influenced the military planning of interwar Lithuania and Latvia. In 1941, the German forces invaded to the east in the same direction as in 1915, the only difference being that the enemy failed to stop them in Samogitia and Courland, although there was some stopping at Raseiniai near Dubysa. In 1944, the Red Army (RA) broke into the Baltic Sea near Palanga – which is what it failed to do in 1919 – forming the Courland pocket, a bridgehead in which German forces, defending the sea with a sea connection to Germany, were cut off for seven months, from 10 October to 9 May 1945. The Curonian Boiler/bridgehead forces surrendered only after the German capitulation. Klaipėda was defended by the German military for more than 3 months: from October 10, 1944 to January 28, 1945, when there was a threat that the land route through the Curonian Spit would be interrupted; they abandoned the city and left it to the Red Army without a battle