10 research outputs found
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Non-standard errors
In statistics, samples are drawn from a population in a data-generating process (DGP). Standard errors measure the uncertainty in estimates of population parameters. In science, evidence is generated to test hypotheses in an evidence generating process (EGP). We claim that EGP variation across researchers adds uncertainty: Non-standard errors (NSEs). We study NSEs by letting 164 teams test the same hypotheses on the same data. NSEs turn out to be sizable, but smaller for better reproducible or higher rated research. Adding peer-review stages reduces NSEs. We further find that this type of uncertainty is underestimated by participants
How Does a Development Moratorium Affect Development Timing Choices and Land Values?
American options, Development moratoria, Growth controls, Real options, G13, R52, R58,
Price Discovery in Real Estate Markets: A Dynamic Analysis
Price discovery, REIT returns, NAV returns,
Moral Hazard, Effort Sensitivity and Compensation in Asset-Backed Securitization
One interesting explanation for asset securitization is the managerial agency theory—where securitization of cash flows that are relatively insensitive to managerial effort reduces the noise for cash flows that are sensitive to managerial effort (Iacobucci and Winter, 2005). This paper extends this concept in several ways. First, we differentiate the effects of noise and effort sensitivity on managerial effort and compensation, underscoring the importance of a less noisy environment. We also carefully delineate the conditions under which asset securitization would improve the welfare of managers and shareholders of the originating company. Second, we relax the assumptions regarding the expected income-producing function and the income variance, and further take into consideration the change of the marginal production of income with respect to effort before and after securitization. Third, under a multitask principal-agent model framework, we explore how the relationship between managerial activities on different assets affects the incentive compensation for the manager of the originating company and the joint surplus for shareholder and manager. This is particularly relevant when entire buildings are securitized as opposed to pools of income-generating assets. Finally, we examine the role of the third-party servicer. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006Moral hazard, Effort sensitivity, Managerial compensation, Principal-agent model, Asset-backed securitization,