A Monte Carlo Study of Time Varying Coefficient (TVC) Estimation

A number of recent papers have proposed a time-varying-coefficient (TVC) procedure that, in theory, yields consistent parameter estimates in the presence of measurement errors, omitted variables, incorrect functional forms, and simultaneity. The key element of the procedure is the selection of a set of driver variables. With an ideal driver set the procedure is both consistent and efficient. However, in practice it is not possible to know if a perfect driver set exists. We construct a number of Monte Carlo experiments to examine the performance of the methodology under (i) clearly-defined conditions and (ii) a range of model misspecifications. We also propose a new Bayesian search technique for the set of driver variables underlying the TVC methodology. Experiments are performed to allow for incorrectly specified functional form, omitted variables, measurement errors, unknown nonlinearity and endogeneity. In all cases except the last, the technique works well in reasonably small samples. © 2018, The Author(s)

Bank cooperation and banking policy in a monetary union: A political-economy perspective on EMU

Why do large European banks lobby for monetary union? We show in a game-theoretic model that montary union can trigger a change in the structure of the market for international banking transactions with asymmetric effects on profits: large banks are induced to cooperate internationally and gain from European Monetary Union (EMU), while small banks are likely to lose. Monetary union can be interpreted as a device for large banks to push small banks out of the market for cross-border financial services. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996European Monetary Union, interest groups, banking policy, bank cooperation, E5, F3, G2,

The Long-run Properties of the Demand for M3 in South Africa

No abstract available