Voting over economic plans

We review and provide motivation for a one-sector model of economic growth in which decisions about capital accumulation are made by a political process. If it is possible to commit for at least three periods into the future, then for any feasible consumption plan, there is a perturbation that is majority-preferred to it. Furthermore, plans that minimize the maximum vote that can be obtained against them yield a political business cycle. If it is impossible to commit, voters select the optimal consumption plan for the median voter

Spin flip probability of electron in a uniform magnetic field

The probability of a spin flip of an electron is calculated. It is assumed that the electron resides in a uniform magnetic field and interacts with an incoming electromagnetic pulse. The scattering matrix is constructed and the time needed to flip the spin is calculated.Comment: 4 pages, 0 figure

U.S. Securities Law for International Financial Transactions and Capital Markets

This book review assesses Guy P. Lander\u27s two-volume work on U.S. Securities Law for International Financial Transactions and Capital Markets. The review finds Landers’ volumes reliable and complete, believing that they will be utilized in much the same manner and with the degree of regularity with which such established treatises as the Lipton and Steinberger work, Takeovers & Freeze-Outs, are consulted. The present state of U.S. securities laws and their application to international transactions are presented in a logical and instructive fashion. The material is presented with clarity, but without oversimplification

Subsidization Competition: Vitalizing the Neutral Internet

Unlike telephone operators, which pay termination fees to reach the users of another network, Internet Content Providers (CPs) do not pay the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) of users they reach. While the consequent cross subsidization to CPs has nurtured content innovations at the edge of the Internet, it reduces the investment incentives for the access ISPs to expand capacity. As potential charges for terminating CPs' traffic are criticized under the net neutrality debate, we propose to allow CPs to voluntarily subsidize the usagebased fees induced by their content traffic for end-users. We model the regulated subsidization competition among CPs under a neutral network and show how deregulation of subsidization could increase an access ISP's utilization and revenue, strengthening its investment incentives. Although the competition might harm certain CPs, we find that the main cause comes from high access prices rather than the existence of subsidization. Our results suggest that subsidization competition will increase the competitiveness and welfare of the Internet content market; however, regulators might need to regulate access prices if the access ISP market is not competitive enough. We envision that subsidization competition could become a viable model for the future Internet

Standards for Library Services to People in Institutions

published or submitted for publicatio