Why the Realist-Instrumentalist Debate about Rational Choice Rests on a Mistake

Within the social sciences, much controversy exists about which status should be ascribed to the rationality assumption that forms the core of rational choice theories. Whilst realists argue that the rationality assumption is an empirical claim which describes real processes that cause individual action, instrumentalists maintain that it amounts to nothing more than an analytically set axiom or ‘as if’ hypothesis which helps in the generation of accurate predictions. In this paper, I argue that this realist-instrumentalist debate about rational choice theory can be overcome once it is realised that the rationality assumption is neither an empirical description nor an ‘as if’ hypothesis, but a normative claim

The current state of hospital-based emergency medicine in Germany

Germany has a long tradition of having physicians, often anesthesiologists with additional training in emergency medicine, deliver prehospital emergency care. Hospital-based emergency medicine in Germany also differs significantly from the Anglo-American model, and until recently having separate emergency rooms for different departments was the norm. In the past decade, many hospitals have created “centralized emergency departments” [Zentrale Notaufnahme (ZNAs)]. There is ongoing debate about the training and certification of physicians working in the ZNAs and whether Germany will adopt a specialty board certification for emergency medicine

Why is Behavioral Game a Game for Economists? : The concept of beliefs in equilibrium

The interdisciplinary exchange between economists and psychologists has so far been more active and fruitful in the modifications of Expected Utility Theory than in those of Game Theory. We argue that this asymmetry may be explained by economists' specific way of doing equilibrium analysis of aggregate-level outcomes in their practice, and by psychologists' reluctance to fully engage with such practice. We focus on the notion of belief that is embedded in economists' practice of equilibrium analysis, more specifically Nash equilibrium, and argue that its difference from the psychological counterpart is one of the factors that makes interdisciplinary exchange in behavioral game theory more difficult.Peer reviewe

Getting Acquainted with Kant

My question here concerns whether Kant claims that experience has nonconceptual content, or whether, on his view, experience is essentially conceptual. However there is a sense in which this debate concerning the content of intuition is ill-conceived. Part of this has to do with the terms in which the debate is set, and part to do with confusion over the connection between Kant’s own views and contemporary concerns in epistemology and the philosophy of mind. However, I think much of the substance of the debate concerning Kant’s views on the content of experience can be salvaged by reframing it in terms of a debate about the dependence relations, if any, that exist between different cognitive capacities. Below, in Section 2, I clarify the notion of ‘content’ I take to be at stake in the interpretive debate. Section 3 presents reasons for thinking that intuition cannot have content in the relevant sense. I then argue, in Section 4, that the debate be reframed in terms of dependence. We should distinguish between Intellectualism, according to which all objective representation (understood in a particular way) depends on acts of synthesis by the intellect, and Sensibilism, according to which at least some forms of objective representation are independent of any such acts (or the capacity for such acts). Finally, in Section 5, I further elucidate the cognitive role of intuition. I articulate a challenge which Kant understands alethic modal considerations to present for achieving cognition, and argue that a version of Sensibilism that construes intuition as a form of acquaintance is better positioned to answer this challenge than Intellectualism

Nucleosome mobilization by ISW2 requires the concerted action of the ATPase and SLIDE domains

The ISWI family of ATP-dependent chromatin remodelers represses transcription by changing nucleosome positioning. The interactions with extranucleosomal DNA and the requirement of a minimal length of extranucleosomal DNA by ISWI mediate the spacing of nucleosomes. ISW2 from Saccharomyces cerevisiae, a member of the ISWI family, has a conserved domain called SLIDE (SANT-like ISWI domain), whose binding to extranucleosomal DNA ~19 bp from the edge of nucleosomes is required for efficiently pushing DNA into nucleosomes and maintaining the unidirectional movement of nucleosomes, as reported here. Loss of SLIDE binding does not perturb ATPase domain binding to the SHL2 site of nucleosomes or its initial movement of DNA inside of nucleosomes. ISW2 has therefore two distinct roles in mobilizing nucleosomes, with the ATPase domain translocating and moving DNA inside nucleosomes, and the SLIDE domain facilitating the entry of linker DNA into nucleosomes