Manhood constructions among engaged African American male collegians: influences, experiences, and contexts

The manhood constructions and collegiate experiences of twenty-four engaged African American men enrolled across twelve, four-year colleges were explored. The purpose of this study was to inform colleges about the ways in which these men construct their manhood. The manifestations of these constructions in African American college men\u27s behavior, enrollment, and campus engagement were also investigated. The participants, who represented a range of college engagement, were enrolled in colleges that are situated across the nineteen southern and border states of the United States of America. The institutional selection matrix was further disaggregated according to predominant population (HBCU, HWI) and institutional funding type (public, private). A qualitative research approach was used to forward this study. Specifically, a combination of grounded theory, phenomenological, and case study methodologies examined the nexus between African American manhood and collegiate experiences. The combined research methods were applied to data gleaned from face-to-face interviews that lasted over two hours. Six trustworthiness techniques support the following emergent themes of manhood constructions and collegiate experiences: (1) self-expectations (2) relationships and responsibilities to family (3) worldviews and life philosophies (4) double-consciousness (5) institutional recognition (6) constructing faculty/student relationships (7) mentoring and supporting (8) bridging campus and community. Respondents reported differences in the ways in which they were treated and engaged in historically black and white institutions, also reinforcing various manhood constructs. Emerging divergent perspectives informed a grouping of these men into the following manhood typologies: (1) sexualizer (2) transgressor (3) misogynist and (4) self-actualizer. The manhood typologies were presented in this dissertation research to further highlight the complexities, underscore the pressures, and draw attention to the ways in which society, and its sundry contexts, further complicates these men\u27s manhood constructions. Implications are included for the following higher education areas: (1) institutional climate (2) student mentoring (3) faculty development (4) student enrichment (5) contextual cross-pollinations by race and gender. Implications for theory and research are also presented

WATER REPELLENT RENDERINGS FOR THE DAMP-PROOFING OF MONUMENTS

The global transitional justice tool kit—involving the use of criminal prosecutions, amnesties, and other mechanisms to address past human rights abuse—has become a primary means for thwarting future human rights violations and consolidating democracy. Nevertheless, evidence on the consequences of transitional justice remains mixed and amenable to contradictory interpretations. Existing studies fail to adequately address issues of selection, the difference between short- and long-term effects of transitional justice mechanisms, and qualitative and quantitative differences in state practices. This article uses a new database of transitional justice mechanisms to address these concerns and test propositions from realist, constructivist, and holistic approaches to this set of policy issues. We find, among other things, that prosecutions increase physical integrity protections, while amnesties increase the protection of civil and political rights. Our analysis suggests that different transnational justice policies each play a potentially positive, but distinct, role in new democracies and in decreasing violations of human rights

ethical reasons and political commitment

Political commitments to resist oppression play a central role in the moral lives of many people. Such commitments are also a source of ethical reasons. They influence and organize ethical beliefs, emotions and reasons in an ongoing way. Political commitments to address oppression often contain a concern for the dignity and well-being of others and the objects of political commitments often have value, according to ideal moral theories, such as Kantian and utilitarian theory. However, ideal moral theories do not fully explain the ethical reasons political commitments engender. First, ideal moral theories do not explain the normative priority that agents give to politically committed ethical reasons. Their profound effect on a politically committed agent’s ethical deliberation and choice and the precedence they are given over other ends cannot be wholly understood through the moral obligations within ideal theories. Second, although politically committed reasons are valuable in ideal theory for the benefits they bring to others, they are not fungible with other reasons ideal theory would regard as having equal ethical value. A person might substitute another beneficial humanitarian aim for that to which she is politically committed and nevertheless regard herself as having done a morally wrong thing for failing or betraying her commitment. Politically committed ethical reasons are also motivated and informed by the social location of agents and their relationship to structures of oppression. Although there are universal ethical reasons to oppose oppression, this means that some of a person’s actual ethical reasons will be irreducibly particular

An argument for the use of Aristotelian method in bioethics

The main claim of this paper is that the method outlined and used in Aristotle's Ethics is an appropriate and credible one to use in bioethics. Here “appropriate” means that the method is capable of establishing claims and developing concepts in bioethics and “credible” that the method has some plausibility, it is not open to obvious and immediate objection. It begins by suggesting why this claim matters and then gives a brief outline of Aristotle's method. The main argument is made in three stages. First, it is argued that Aristotelian method is credible because it compares favourably with alternatives. In this section it is shown that Aristotelian method is not vulnerable to criticisms that are made both of methods that give a primary place to moral theory (such as utilitarianism) and those that eschew moral theory (such as casuistry and social science approaches). As such, it compares favourably with these other approaches that are vulnerable to at least some of these criticisms. Second, the appropriateness of Aristotelian method is indicated through outlining how it would deal with a particular case. Finally, it is argued that the success of Aristotle's philosophy is suggestive of both the credibility and appropriateness of his method.</p

Affective Experience, Desire, and Reasons for Action

What is the role of affective experience in explaining how our desires provide us with reasons for action? When we desire that p, we are thereby disposed to feel attracted to the prospect that p, or to feel averse to the prospect that not-p. In this paper, we argue that affective experiences – including feelings of attraction and aversion – provide us with reasons for action in virtue of their phenomenal character. Moreover, we argue that desires provide us with reasons for action only insofar as they are dispositions to have affective experiences. On this account, affective experience has a central role to play in explaining how desires provide reasons for action

Transforming Post-Secondary Education in Mathematics

In this manuscript, I introduce and describe the work of mathematicians and mathematics educators in the group Transforming Post-Secondary Education in Mathematics (TPSE Math or TPSE, pronounced "tipsy", for short). TPSE aims to coordinate and drive constructive change in education in the mathematical sciences at two-year colleges, four-year colleges, and universities across the nation. It seeks to build on the successes of the entire mathematical sciences community. This manuscript reviews the events that led to the founding of TPSE Math and articulates its vision and mission. In its first phase with national events, TPSE found broad consensus with the mathematical sciences community on the challenges facing the community. Learning from educational transformations experiences in other scientific fields, and with the support of the Mathematical Advisory Group of 34 mathematical sciences department chairs and leaders, TPSE moves into a second phase focused on action. This is a snapshot in time, and TPSE's ongoing activities will continue to be documented and disseminated. The piece concludes with a reflection of the impact that my involvement in this work has had on my career.Comment: 17 page

Rationality as the Rule of Reason

The demands of rationality are linked both to our subjective normative perspective (given that rationality is a person-level concept) and to objective reasons or favoring relations (given that rationality is non-contingently authoritative for us). In this paper, I propose a new way of reconciling the tension between these two aspects: roughly, what rationality requires of us is having the attitudes that correspond to our take on reasons in the light of our evidence, but only if it is competent. I show how this view can account for structural rationality on the assumption that intentions and beliefs as such involve competent perceptions of downstream reasons, and explore various implications of the account

Are intuitions about moral relevance susceptible to framing effects?

Various studies have reported that moral intuitions about the permissibility of acts are subject to framing effects. This paper reports the results of a series of experiments which further examine the susceptibility of moral intuitions to framing effects. The main aim was to test recent speculation that intuitions about the moral relevance of certain properties of cases might be relatively resistent to framing effects. If correct, this would provide a certain type of moral intuitionist with the resources to resist challenges to the reliability of moral intuitions based on such framing effects. And, fortunately for such intuitionists, although the results can’t be used to mount a strident defence of intuitionism, the results do serve to shift the burden of proof onto those who would claim that intuitions about moral relevance are problematically sensitive to framing effects

Why Moral Expertise Needs Moral Theory

Discussions of the nature or possibility of moral expertise have largely proceeded in atheoretical terms, with little attention paid to whether moral expertise depends on theoretical knowledge of morality. Here I argue that moral expertise is more theory-dependent than is commonly recognized: Moral expertise consists, at least in part, in knowledge of the correct or best moral theory, and second, that knowledge of moral theory is essential to moral experts dispensing expert counsel to non-experts. Moral experts would not be moral experts absent knowledge of moral theory, nor could they play the testimonial role we would expect them to play in moral inquiry and deliberation absent such knowledg

Action, Knowledge and Embodiment in Berkeley and Locke

Embodiment is a fact of human existence which philosophers should not ignore. They may differ to a great extent in what they have to say about our bodies, but they have to take into account that for each of us our body has a special status, it is not merely one amongst the physical objects, but a physical object to which we have a unique relation. While Descartes approached the issue of embodiment through consideration of sensation and imagination, it is more directly reached by consideration of action and agency: whenever we act upon the world, we act by moving our bodies. So if we can understand what an immaterialist such as Berkeley thinks about agency, we will have gone a fair way to understanding what he thinks about embodiment. §1 discusses a recent flurry of articles on the subject of Berkeley’s account of action. I choose to present Berkeley as a causal-volitional theorist (realist) not because I think it is the uniquely correct interpretation of the texts, but because I find it more philosophically interesting as a version of immaterialism. In particular, it raises the possibility of a substantive account of human embodiment which is completely unavailable to the occasionalist. §2 articulates an apparent philosophical problem for Berkeley qua causal-volitional theorist and show that Locke was aware of a related problem and had a solution of which Berkeley would have known. §3 distinguishes two interpretations of Berkeley’s famous denial of blind agency–as the assertion of a weak representational condition or a strong epistemic one–and provide evidence that there was a well-established debate about blind powers in the seventeenth century which took the metaphor of blindness as indicating an epistemic rather than merely representational failing. What remains to do in §4 is to consider whether Berkeley, with his own peculiar commitments, could in fact accept this account of agency