Balancing, Proportionality, and Constitutional Rights

In the theory and practice of constitutional adjudication, proportionality review plays a crucial role. At a theoretical level, it lies at core of the debate on rights adjudication; in judicial practice, it is a widespread decision-making model characterizing the action of constitutional, supra-national and international courts. Despite its circulation and centrality in contemporary legal discourse, proportionality in rights-adjudication is still extremely controversial. It raises normative questions—concerning its justification and limits—and descriptive questions—regarding its nature and distinctive features. The chapter addresses both orders of questions. Part I centres on the justification of proportionality review, the connection between proportionality, balancing and theories of rights and the critical aspects of this connection. Part II identifies and analyses the different forms of proportionality both in review, as a template for rights-adjudication, and of review, as a way of defining the scope and limits of adjudication

The Influence of International Law on the International Movement of Persons

Many migration theories identify ‘the law’ as a significant constraint on the international movement of persons. While this constraint often operates through national migration legislation, this study examines the influence of international law in shaping contemporary patterns in the international movement of persons at the macro level. The analysis begins with an examination of the long-established power of a State to regulate cross-border movement of persons as an inherent attribute of State sovereignty, together with the accepted limitations on a State’s power to control entry and exit. Yet, international law reaches well beyond the movement of people across borders. The development of international human rights law has been a key constraint on state action in the United Nations era by also regulating the treatment of migrants within a State’s borders. The study considers how international law has responded to current migration issues, including: protection of migrant women and children; suppression of smuggling and trafficking of people; labour migration; and environmental migration. As in other areas of international society, there has been a proliferation of institutions through which international migration law is made and enforced. The most prominent among them are the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), but the establishment of other entities with overlapping mandates has given rise to calls for a new international migration regime based on streamlined institutional arrangements. The study concludes that international law is an imperfect framework for regulating the international movement of persons because it has developed in a piecemeal fashion over a long time to deal with issues of concern at particular points in human history. Yet, despite its shortfalls, international law and its associated institutions unquestionably play a most important role in constraining and channeling state authority over the international movement of persons

Model International Mobility Convention

While people are as mobile as they ever were in our globalized world, the movement of people across borders lacks global regulation. This leaves many refugees in protracted displacement and many migrants unprotected in irregular and dire situations. Meanwhile, some states have become concerned that their borders have become irrelevant. International mobility—the movement of individuals across borders for any length of time as visitors, students, tourists, labor migrants, entrepreneurs, long-term residents, asylum seekers, or refugees—has no common definition or legal framework. To address this key gap in international law, and the growing gaps in protection and responsibility that are leaving people vulnerable, the "Model International Mobility Convention" proposes a framework for mobility with the goals of reaffirming the existing rights afforded to mobile people (and the corresponding rights and responsibilities of states) as well as expanding those basic rights where warranted. In 213 articles divided over eight chapters, the Convention establishes both the minimum rights afforded to all people who cross state borders as visitors, and the special rights afforded to tourists, students, migrant workers, investors and residents, forced migrants, refugees, migrant victims of trafficking and migrants caught in countries in crisis. Some of these categories are covered by existing international legal regimes. However, in this Convention these groups are for the first time brought together under a single framework. An essential feature of the Convention is that it is cumulative. This means, for the most part, that the chapters build on and add rights to the set of rights afforded to categories of migrants covered by earlier chapters. The Convention contains not only provisions that afford rights to migrants and, to a lesser extent, States (such as the right to decide who can enter and remain in their territory). It also articulates the responsibilities of migrants vis-à-vis States and the rights and responsibilities of different institutions that do not directly respond to a right held by migrants

A quantitative approach to proportionality

none1noThis chapter is meant to address the extent to which value-based reasoning—as involved in balancing and proportionality—may include quantitative reasoning, according to arithmetic constraints. Relying on some work on cognitive and evolutionary psychology, it is argued that processing non-symbolic approximate magnitudes is a fundamental cognitive capacity, which is deployed also when we are reasoning with goals and values. A model is developed for determining the impact of alternative choice on multiple values, assessing the utilities so produced and merging these utilities into an overall evaluation, which may be used in comparisons. The model is applied to assessing legislative choice on rights and social values, according to proportionality. Finally, it is shown how proportionality assessments may be constrained by the requirement of consistency with precedents.noneSartor, GiovanniSartor, Giovann