The Curious Case of Formal Theory in Political Science: How Did It Emerge as a Discipline, Why Its Existence Is a Sign of a Failure, and Why the Science of Politics Is Not Possible Without It?

American political science has evolved a subfield which is commonly referred to as formal theory. Political scientists identify themselves as specializing in formal theory, departments advertise faculty positions in formal theory and put together formal theory subfields that offer undergraduate and graduate curricula. The roots of the field can be traced to Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes’ message, however, seems to have been utterly ignored by the social science. William Riker’s second launch of “Hobbesian advice”, in 1950’s and 60’s, proved more successful and put the field of formal theory on the map of political science. Yet, the very existence of the formal theory field can be seen as the failure of both Hobbes and Riker. There seems to be a continuing need for teaching social scientists why they should construct a proper science and how they should do it. This paper is an attempt to meet this need. I believe that the future science of politics will have to follow in the footsteps of Hobbes and Riker. And so will other social sciences. My point in the paper is not new; the way I make it, is

Some Problems With Judging Rationality

The gap between game-theoretic predictions and actual choices people make in, for instance, gaming experiments has been over-interpreted as evidence against rationality of players. I consider a version of the ultimatum game and examine its equilibria under different assumptions about players’ preferences. Using standard notions of rationality I show that the discrepancy between the “normative” and the “descriptive” cannot be established by a simple comparison of what is predicted by the equilibrium choices and the actual choices people make

Some Problems With Judging Rationality

The gap between game-theoretic predictions and actual choices people make in, for instance, gaming experiments has been over-interpreted as evidence against rationality of players. I consider a version of the ultimatum game and examine its equilibria under different assumptions about players’ preferences. Using standard notions of rationality I show that the discrepancy between the “normative” and the “descriptive” cannot be established by a simple comparison of what is predicted by the equilibrium choices and the actual choices people make

Evolutionary Equilibria: Characterization Theorems and Their Implications

Evolutionary game theory, Evolutionarily stable strategies, Evolutionary equilibria, Evolution of cooperation, Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD), Tit For Tat (TFT),