582 research outputs found
Strategic Choices for the 2020s. Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 122 February 2020
These past few years, the European
Union (EU) has taken various decisions
which, when taken together, amount to a
careful repositioning in international
politics. Let us be bold and call it the
inkling of a Grand Strategy: an idea of the
Union’s shifting place in the great power
relations that determine international
politics. Yet that nascent Grand Strategy
is not equally shared by all EU Member
States or even by all EU institutions, nor
has it yet been incorporated into all
relevant strands of EU policy. If the
implications are not fully thought
through and the repositioning stops here,
the EU as well as the Member States risk
ending up in a permanently ambivalent
position: more than a satellite of the US,
but not a really independent power either.
Such a half-hearted stance would alienate
their allies and partners while tempting
their adversaries. For now, the EU has
done enough to irritate the US but not to
obtain the benefits sought: to further the
European interest and to play a
stabilising role in great power relations.
Will 2020 see the EU and the Member
States muster the courage to fully
implement the choices that they have
already started to make
For a ‘More Active’ EU in the Middle East: Transatlantic Relations and the Strategic Implications of Europe’s Engagement with Iran, Lebanon and Israel-Palestine. Egmont Paper, no. 13, March 2007
The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), calls for the EU to be ‘more active’ in pursuing its strategic objectives. The two probably most salient examples of a ‘more active’ EU are to be found in the Middle East. (2) The ‘EU3’ (France, Germany and the UK) are leading nuclear negotiations with Iran. The EU has taken the lead in reinforcing the UN peacekeeping operation in Lebanon, UNIFIL, as authorized by UNSC Resolution 1701 of 11 August 2006. Over 70% of the enlarged force or 7,600 troops out of 10,800 are provided by the EU27. This engagement clearly fits in with the EU’s interests as defined in the ESS, notably the need ‘to promote a ring of well governed countries […] on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations’, and to avoid ‘a WMD arms race, especially in the Middle East’. The cases of Iran and Lebanon can be seen as positive examples of an EU that is more united and hence ‘more active’. Yet, they also provoke fundamental strategic questions on the ambitions and potential of EU policy towards the region, and of the EU as a global strategic actor. These are questions which the EU inevitably will be confronted with if it continues its ‘more active’ role in the Middle East
Trump, the Middle East, and North Africa: Just Leave Things to the Proxies? Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 125 March 2020
When Trump says that he wants
NATO to take more responsibility in
the Middle East, what he means is that
he wants the European allies to do
more. He is campaigning for reelection
and has promised to bring the
boys (and girls) home for Christmas.
And of course, in Iraq American
troops are less than welcome these
days, after the targeted assassination
of Iranian General Soleimani near
Baghdad airport (3 January 2020). In
late 2019, Trump had already
withdrawn most troops from Syria,
and now the peace agreement with the
Taliban (29 February 2020) will allow
him to draw down the US military
presence in Afghanistan too. And the
US is considering pulling its troops
out of the Sahel as well. What does this
mean for Europe
From Global Strategy to Strategic Compass: Where Is the EU Heading? Egmont Security Policy Brief No, 121 December 2019
Does the EU need a “Strategic Compass” to
guide the implementation of the security and
defence dimension of the European Union
Global Strategy (EUGS)? Does it need a
military strategy perhaps? And what about a
review of the EUGS itself? As Josep Borrell
has assumed the post of High
Representative, various proposals by
Member States and EU institutional actors
are being discussed in Brussels. The wish for
more strategic documents may reflect the
complexity of the challenges that the EU is
facing. It may also result from the inability to
fully implement existing strategies.
Producing new documents can be a way of
forging a deal between Member States on
foreign policy priorities for the next five years.
But it could also be window-dressing,
occupying the machinery and deluding
ourselves that we are active. How to take EU
strategy and its implementation forward
The international security engagement of the European Union : courage and capabilities for a 'more Active' EU : report from the 1st European Strategic Forum, Warsaw 2006
Putting the Core at the Centre The Crisis Response Operation Core (CROC) and the Future of PESCO. Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 119 December 2019
The reader who cannot readily identify the
meaning of CROC (Croque Monsieur?
Croque Madame?) in the context of
European defence can be forgiven. The
flurry of activity in the EU’s Common
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) since
2016 has generated a host of new acronyms
(PESCO, CARD, EDF…), of which the
CROC, the Crisis Response Operation Core,
certainly is among the least known. It
deserves more attention however, for it ought
to be at the centre of efforts to take
Permanent Structured Cooperation forward
Coronavirus and Power: The Impact on International Politics. Egmont European Policy Brief No. 126 March 2020
This will change everything. It is an
understandable feeling. When people
pass through an ordeal, they want to
believe that when all is over there will be
some compensation. Things may indeed
change, but perhaps not as radically as
may seem likely today in the midst of the
crisis – and not all change will be for the
better. What change could the corona
crisis bring to international politics
- …