Biscop, Sven

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Ghent University Academic Bibliography

Nº 35 - FEBRUARY 2010> >  P O L I C Y  B R I E FI S S N :  1 9 8 9 - 2 6 6 7Sven BiscopOf Greeks and Romans:The EU, US and Security Strategy in a Multipolar World >> In relation to overarching security strategy, the EU and US havehad high expectations of each other since President Obamatook office. These expectations have not been fully satisfied. Some con-vergence has been forthcoming, as part of a ‘resetting’ of transatlanticstrategic relations. But the EU needs to set its own priorities more clear-ly and proactively if it is to make a success of this new opportunity forthe transatlantic relationship. GREAT EXPECTATIONS ‘Five years on from the adoption of the European Security Strategy, theEU carries greater responsibilities than at any time in its history’, reads theopening sentence of the December 2008 Report on the Implementation ofthe European Security Strategy. The European Council adopted that reportdutifully rather than enthusiastically. The Irish ‘no’ vote to the LisbonTreaty of June 2008, the Georgian war and the financial crisis all con-spired to nullify any new energy behind the EU’s international role.When Barack Obama was inaugurated as President of the United States,the EU was not fully ready to react and reciprocate the revived Americandesire for multilateralism and true cooperation with ‘friends and Allies’.This led to disappointment in the US. But in the spirit of mutual good-will prevalent since former President Bush’s departure, Washingtonshowed understanding of the EU’s internal difficulties and patiently await-ed the tortuous progress towards the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. Now that the President of the European Council and the High Represen-tative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy have been appointed and aThis policy brief is part of a jointproject by FRIDE, CEPS and theHeinrich Böll Foundation. 2OF GREEKS AND ROMANS:THE EU, US AND SECURITY STRATEGY IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD strengthened foreign policy machinery is being putinto place, US expectations are high. The choice ofHerman Van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton,unknown to most American observers, provokedmostly negative reactions, however. Yet, one couldask those same observers how many Europeanswho do not specialise in US politics had heard ofBarack Obama before he became a serious con-tender in the primaries, or how many in bothEurope and America had heard of Hu Jintao beforehe became President of China. Americans must beforgiven though for placing too great an emphasison the President – who unlike the US President isactually a chairman – and not enough on the HighRepresentative. The latter is partly Europe’s ownfault for not using the rather more obvious title ofForeign Minister.Americans should thus judge the post-Lisbon EUon the results of its actions. But Europeans must beaware that if expectations are high today and theUS genuinely interested in partnership, this may betheir last opportunity to prove themselves a realpartner. Otherwise they risk irrelevance. In its rela-tions with the US, the EU must choose whether tocontinue to play the part of the ancient Greeks tothe US’s Romans. The Greeks produced great playsand marvellous statues, but looked to Rome for aforeign and security policy. A TALE OF TWO CITIES With Lisbon in place and unprecedented popular-ity scores for Obama in Europe, Brussels andWashington can use the current momentum torevitalise their strategic partnership, but only ifthey rebalance the transatlantic relationship. Bothsides must also take into account that the only wayof keeping this relationship viable is for the EU tobecome a fully-fledged strategic actor, and for theUS to accept it as such. On the US side, the Obama administration seemsmore willing than previous governments to acceptEuropean integration, including in the field offoreign and even security and defence policy. Butbetween the lines of repeated American calls forburden-sharing, one often detects the assumptionthat this European capacity will be used in theservice of American strategy. Although that wasthe case during the Cold War, when US leader-ship was ultimately always accepted, the assump-tion no longer automatically holds true. Therehave always been differences in interests and pri-orities, but with the end of the Cold War and thedisappearance of the existential threat that madethe US security guarantee vital, the EU gained thepolitical margin of manoeuvre to define and pur-sue its own priorities. This it did, notably inadopting its own 2003 European Security Strate-gy. The fundamental factor therefore is not who isoccupying the White House – even though thenegative effects of some of the Bush administra-tion’s policies certainly accelerated this evolution– but the gradual emergence of the EU as a strate-gic actor in its own right; a new structural factorin the transatlantic relationship. It is not theAmericans, but the Europeans that have changed. A viable transatlantic partnership must be flexible.In a multipolar world, the EU must be free to inter-act flexibly with all global actors. Nevertheless, theUS will obviously remain the closest to Europe. Thedirect EU-US partnership therefore must be morecomprehensive and more operational, so Europeansand Americans have a forum jointly to discuss glob-al foreign affairs challenges. But they will sometimesagree to disagree, without that creating doubt aboutthe partnership as such. This political partnershipmust be much more than the current ‘summitry’.Perhaps permanent bodies are in order; in any caseEuropeans must speak to the US as the EU. The implication is that within such a politicalpartnership, NATO will become more of a tech-nical, executive body. It has already lost much ofits centrality as a forum for debate betweenEurope and North America. If the EU and the USdecide to act together militarily, they will useNATO, but primary decision-making is betweenthe EU and the US, de facto the two ‘pillars’ ofthe Alliance. In recent years it is increasingly inthe EU that Europeans take the primary politicaldecision on whether to act in a given crisis. If mil-itary action is decided upon, the secondary deci->>>>>>P O L I C Y  B R I E F  -  Nº 35 - FEBRUARY 20103sion is to choose the operational framework: theEU’s Common Security and Defence Policy(CSDP), NATO or the UN. That choice will always be a tailored decision,based on which partners want to go along andwhich organisation is best suited to the crisis athand – reality is too complex for a fixed divisionof labour to work. It is also in the context ofCSDP that European military capabilities mustbe further developed, notably via the ‘PermanentStructured Cooperation’ pro-vided by the LisbonTreaty. Europeans have a capability pro-blem,caused by the fragmentation of their defenceefforts, which only they can solve, throughincreased cooperation and pooling. In short, theUS does need not to ‘beware Greeks bearing gifts’:a more autonomous and more integrated EU willtruly be a more capable EU. HARD TIMES On the EU side therefore, the time has now cometo live up to both American expectations and toits own rhetoric and translate the ambitious Euro-pean Security Strate-gy – in reality aforeign policy strate-gy – into a proactivepolicy. Becoming afully-fledged strate-gic actor requiresidentifying specificEU interests anddefining concreteobjectives in a num-ber of priority areas,in order to directpolicies and actions. On that basis, the EU mustproactively engage the US, abandoning its usualreactive stance. On many of these issues, Euro-peans and Americans have different views, but onmany of them the EU has something to offer. It isup to the EU to bring its assets to the table anddebate with the US, so as to come up with jointpolicies based on common interests betweenequal partners. In a multipolar world, EU-UScooperation is more necessary than ever, or theAtlantic community will face some hard times. A top priority for the EU is its immediate neigh-bourhood. What is the desired end-state of theEuropean Neighbourhood Policy? Can onlydemocracy create a consensual value-based com-munity and thus safeguard EU interests, or willdemocratisation create such upheaval that EUinterests would be damaged? Only when EU inter-ests are clear can a true strategic partnership withRussia be pursued. In view of their proximity andmutual dependence in the energy field, Brusselsand Moscow have no option but to establish a closeworking relationship. The EU should not fear Rus-sia, nor should it be in favour of everything thatRussia is against. Brussels must make policy in linewith its interests and priorities. If it can do so inpartnership with the US, it will be all the moreeffective. Obama’s outstretched hand on nucleardisarmament certainly is important in this regard.So too is NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen’sconstructive stance. But NATO can only ever be acomplementary actor in this respect; the EU hasthe means to conclude a package deal covering allaspects of relations with Russia. Enlargement is a second priority. A successfulinstrument so far, further enlargement will deter-mine the EU’s geopolitical position. It cannot pro-ceed without strategic debate. If the accession ofIceland and eventually the Balkan countries – andperhaps one day Norway and Switzerland – is rela-tively uncontroversial, membership for Belarus orUkraine would play a determining role in relationswith Russia. Membership for Turkey wouldexpand the EU into a whole new geographic area.Unless the EU aims to duplicate the UN, enlarge-ment is a finite instrument in any case. Whetherfurther enlargement is still necessary requires acareful assessment of the strategic pros and cons,something which the US must understand. Third, as a strategic actor, the EU must also con-sider its regional objectives further afield. A reluc-tance to discuss interests and join up the differentEuropean presences, from aid and trade to diplo-macy, has so far undermined policies towards Cen- >>>>>>‘The EU must choose whether tocontinue to play the part of the ancient Greeks to the US’s Romans’.tral Asia, the Gulf and Africa. Other regions too,such as Asia, Latin America and the Arctic, need athorough assessment of EU interests to determinewhether or not its presence should be stepped up.The US will have to take into account that trueburden-sharing may imply accepting an EU role inareas where perhaps until now its presence has beenrather limited. Fourth, EU institutional objectives need to bedefined. The EU must sharpen its view on the mul-tilateral architecture, reconciling reform – whichwill imply fewer seats and votes for Europe in favourof the ‘emerging powers’ – with increased effective-ness of EU representation. If the growing promi-nence of the G20 has the positive effect ofrecognising the increasing power of the BRICs(Brazil, Russia, India, China), this can only be atemporary fix, pending reform of the permanentmultilateral institutions. Is the US willing to sign upto comprehensive institutional reform, and indeedto ‘effective multilateralism’, that is to more enforce-able international rules? These views should informa truly strategic use by the EU of its partnershipswith the BRICs, the existence of which too oftenseems more important than their content. Ratherthan objectives in their own right, the strategic part-nerships are instruments to further effective multi-lateralism. The EU should identify shared interestswith each of its strategic partners, in order to estab-lish in a number of priority areas effective practicalcooperation with those that share its interests in thatspecific domain, with the ultimate aim of institu-tionalising those forms of cooperation and linkingthem up with the permanent multilateral institu-tions. Is the US willing to engage in such a strategyof ‘socialisation’ with the EU, or will it bypass theEU as it did at the Copenhagen climate summit? Finally, conflict resolution and crisis managementare obvious priorities. A White Book should defineEurope’s ambition as a global security provider.Regardless of whether in a specific case Europeansdeploy under the flag of CSDP, NATO or the UN,a definition is needed of which types of operationsEuropean forces must be capable of; which regionsand scenarios require intervention; and the scale ofthe effort to be devoted to these priorities. The EUhas played a leading role in the negotiations withIran – now is not the time to abandon that, but tocontinue its proactive involvement and engagewith the US. Now is also the time to try to revivethe Quartet and forge joint initiatives to further theMiddle East Peace Process. And now is the time forEU countries to think strategically about what theyseek to achieve in Afghanistan, rather than passive-ly awaiting US decisions. CONCLUSION The US rightly has great expectations of the EU,especially now that the Lisbon Treaty has enteredinto force. Washington should not hesitate toencourage the more Atlantic-oriented EU mem-bers to make the fullest possible use of the newTreaty provisions. The choice for Washington iseasy: continue to work with a divided Europe,which is easy to steer, but which has limited capa-bilities to bring to the table; or stimulate a strongerand more united Europe, which will undoubtedlydemand a greater say in decision-making, but withwhich true burden-sharing will be possible. WithLisbon in place, the EU no longer has an excusenot to translate its ambitious Security Strategy intoreal strategic actorness. The most successful Romanempire was Byzantium, the rulers of which calledthemselves ‘Romaioi’ – in Greek. Prof. Dr. Sven Biscop is Director of the Security& Global Governance Programme at Egmont –Royal Institute for International Relations inBrussels, and Visiting Professor at the College ofEurope (Bruges) and at Ghent University.4OF GREEKS AND ROMANS:THE EU, US AND SECURITY STRATEGY IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD >>>>>>e - m a i l : fride@fride.orgwww.fride.org

Of Greeks and Romans: the EU, the US and security strategy in a multipolar world

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Of Greeks and Romans: the EU, the US and security strategy in a multipolar world

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