The cost of conformity to good governance : Board design and compensation

Altres ajuts: Acord transformatiu CRUE-CSICResearch question/issue: Albeit the fact that the "one-size-fits-all" corporate governance model has been mostly discarded, the debate on what constitutes a well-governed firm has converged toward a set of practices that comprise what we refer to as the global good governance norm. Whereas extant research has focused mainly on the benefits of good governance, we build on neo-institutional theory to explore how firm conformity or nonconformity to this global norm is associated with the cost of board governance, captured as board compensation. Research findings/insights: Using a fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) of firms listed in the Stockholm Stock Exchange, we find that the configurations of board practices conforming to the global good governance norm are associated with higher board compensation than those that score low on conformity. Based on our findings, we deduce four archetypical board design strategies jointly shaped by two central forces: the pressure toward conformity to the good governance norm and the extent of governance discretion, denoting firm agentic behavior. Theoretical/academic implications: First, our study highlights that conformity to the global good governance norm is accompanied with higher costs than nonconformity. Second, while most of the extant research discusses conformity and agentic behavior as two opposing forces, we uncover that they simultaneously co-exist in board governance, stressing their interconnectedness. Practitioner/policy implications: Conformity to the global good governance norm influences the strategic choices of board designs and the costs associated with such choices

The board's functional emphasis : a contingency approach

Cross-sectional comparisons of costs for municipal services have become more and more common. This article aims to show that these comparisons do not give a true and fair view due to lack of harmonisation in the accounting standards within the local government sector. The article is based on a survey of Swedish water and sewage enterprises. Emphasises has been put on transactions that affects the cost of depreciation and cost of capital tied up in assets

Cooperation between university and society through research : the Kristianstad University research platform "Enterprising"

In this paper I will discuss some issues concerning cooperation between academia and society in the context of the establishment of a cooperative research platform at Kristianstad University in Sweden. The platform aims at developing scientific knowledge and practical utility through cooperation between the university‟s resources, mainly its faculty, and practise in society, be it individuals or organizations, be it private, public or voluntary organisations

The board's functional emphasis : a contingency approach

Cross-sectional comparisons of costs for municipal services have become more and more common. This article aims to show that these comparisons do not give a true and fair view due to lack of harmonisation in the accounting standards within the local government sector. The article is based on a survey of Swedish water and sewage enterprises. Emphasises has been put on transactions that affects the cost of depreciation and cost of capital tied up in assets

Ownership strategy : a holistic and praxis oriented view on corporate governance

Swedish municipalities are sometimes using wholly owned corporations in order to conduct certain municipal operations. They have, however, been criticised for being passive owners. This paper presents a development of the concept of ownership strategy, with the aim of reconciling the fragmented field of corporate governance. The concept is empirically developed in order to explore the ownership strategies of municipal owners. From data collected through a survey from Swedish municipalities, it is showed that the municipalities to a certain extent act in accordance to rational ownership strategies.The work this paper represents was funded by The Swedish Association of Local Authorities and performed at Rådet för KommunalEkonomisk Forskning och Utbildning (KEFU) (The Council for Research and Training in Municipal Economics in Lund). Anna Stafsudd assisted with data collection. The paper has been presented at the 6 thInternational Conference: Public and Private Partnerships, 6 - 9 June, The University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands.</p

Why is there no relationship between ownership concentration and performance in Sweden?

Ever since Adam Smith there has been a contention that dispersed ownership in a joint stock company is accompanied by low firm performance. This belief has reached its theoretical hights in agency theory. The aim of the paper is to show that mthe contention has to be developed in order to be more attuned with empirical data. It will be argued 1.) That the influence of ownership structure upon performance is mediated through mechanisms inside the firm, the strategy being the most prominent; 2.) That performance has to be divided into profit and risk, and into firm performance, using accounting data, and market performance, using share market performance data; 3.) That the ownership structure is not exclusively a factor that influences the firm, but that the firm and its strategy influence the ownership structure through attracting certain shareholders and repulse others; 4.) That ownership structure is but one mechanism of several corporate governance mechanisms and that performance is ultimately influenced by the mix of the mechanisms; and 5.) Those institutional differences, such as culture, traditions, legislation and history, influence the opportunity set of corporate governance structures and therefore the relative importance of ownership structures in influencing the performance of the firm. A data set from Sweden and from the hard years of 1990 is used in order to empirically support the statements

Corporate governance through the creation of a managerial class

The aim of the paper is to broaden the field of corporate governance from the behaviour of managers and structures influencing the behaviour, to the creation of the managerial class. This is accomplished through the use of theories from the  organisational level, explaining selection of managers, and including the macro  level  concept of hegemony, supporting the enforcement of preference similarity within the class of managers

Governance strategy : turning governance into action

Corporate governance (CG) needs to acknowledge the intentional part of governance, where an actor of governance uses the set of corporate governance mechanisms in order to influence the agent to create a performance that will satisfy the interest of the principal. This paper offers a conception of this activity through the concept of governance strategy. The concept is derived within the context of agency theory and applied to two empirical organisations seldom investigated in CG research: the organisation of a riding school in a democratic not-for-profit association and the organisation of multinational corporations in a business group.The project is financed by The Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation. An earlier version was presented at the Academy of Management Conference, Atlanta. Georgia, August 11-16, 2006. The paper has benefited from comments by Elin Smith, Kristianstad University.</p