O uso da condicionalidade na promoção da democracia : um contributo em torno da abordagem da União Europeia

Tese de mestrado, Política Comparada, Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa, 2009O projecto que aqui apresentamos tem como objectivos explorar não apenas aimportância dos factores internacionais na promoção da democracia, mas sobretudoanalisar o papel das intervenções externas, em particular daquelas que se enquadram noâmbito da condicionalidade política, impondo requisitos para a cooperação. De formabreve, a promoção da democracia será aqui entendida como o conjunto de relaçõesexternas e actividades de cooperação que contribuem para o desenvolvimento econsolidação da democracia em países terceiros.O objecto de investigação a que aqui nos reportamos refere-se à análise das medidas decondicionalidade da União Europeia, desde a sua origem até ao presente. Apesar dapluralidade de intervenientes e de estratégias existentes, centramo-nos nacondicionalidade, enquanto elemento associado à promoção da democracia, devido àsua relevância como factor ligado às dimensões internacionais dos processos dedemocratização, visto que tem gerado atitudes ambivalentes por parte de diversosactores face à sua aplicabilidade e eficácia.Apesar da literatura ter privilegiado as dimensões endógenas dos processos dedemocratização é cada vez mais reconhecida e analisada a influência das dimensõesinternacionais. No nosso caso, procurámos analisar os instrumentos e as medidas decondicionalidade positivas e negativas, discutindo igualmente alguns dados relativos aEstados em que foi aplicada a cláusula de suspensão da cooperação por violação dosprincípios democráticos e dos direitos humanos.Em suma, a evidência sugere que a União Europeia, apesar de ter sido uma organizaçãopioneira em alguns aspectos da implementação de condições políticas como aassociação de cláusulas relacionadas com o respeito por princípios democráticos emacordos de cooperação e ter feito um investimento crescente a este nível tem aplicado acláusula de suspensão sobretudo em 'Estados falhados', onde o passado de relações decooperação é já extenso (países África, Caraíbas e Pacífico), o que levanta algumasreservas face aos impactos daquelas políticas de cooperação e do êxito de um discursomarcado pela ênfase na eficiência, solidariedade e 'diálogo construtivo'.The project presented here possess as main objectives the analysis of the importance of international dimensions of the promotion of the democracy namely the role of externalinterventions designed in a political conditionality framework. In brief, our conceptualnotion of promotion of democracy is concerned with cooperation initiatives and externalrelations that contribute to the consolidation and development of democracy in thirdcountries.This research topic relates to conditionality measures adopted by the European Union(EU), since its origins to the present. There are multiple agents and strategies, but wefocus on conditionality, as an element that can contribute to the promotion ofdemocracy, due to its relevance in what concerns the international dimensions ofdemocratization. We should also remind that this is not a consensual and stabilisedsubject, emerging doubts about its applicability and efficacy.Although recognising the importance of the research and literature produced regardinginternal dimensions of democratization, we will focus mainly in the influence ofexternal dimensions. In this case, we will proceed presenting the EU conditionalitymeasures and instruments. In order to do so we will explore some data concerning theStates where the suspension clause was applied. The measures taken are due toviolations of democratic principles and human rights abuses.In sum, the evidence suggests that the European Union, despite being a pioneer in somedomains of the implementation of political conditions application of democraticclauses in cooperation agreements and also increasing the investments at this level, weshould note that the suspension clause was mainly applied to the so called 'failedStates', where exists an extended past of diplomatic and cooperation relations with EU(ACP countries), emerging many doubts (and possibly scepticism) towards this type ofcooperation policies and discourse centred on efficiency, solidarity and 'constructivedialogue'

Reconfiguring economic democracy: generating new forms of collective agency, individual economic freedom and public participation

We seek to advance debate and thinking about economic democracy. While recognising the importance of existing approaches focused upon collective bargaining and workplace organisation, we articulate a perspective that emphasises the importance of individual economic rights, capabilities and freedoms at a time when established norms and protections at work are in retreat in many parts of the world. We outline a framework where both individual rights to self-government of one’s own labour, as well as the right of all citizens to participate in economic decision-making, are emphasised. The framework identifies a set of underlying principles, prerequisites, critical spheres for intervention, progressive institutional arrangements, and policies in pursuit of an expanded agenda around economic democracy. In this way, economic democracy potentially empowers individuals and creates the basis for generating new and sustainable alliances that challenge elite dominance in contemporary capitalism

Culture on the Rise: How and Why Cultural Membership Promotes Democratic Politics

Abstract Selectively using Tocqueville, many social scientists suggest that civic participation increases democracy. We go beyond this neo-Tocquevillian model in three ways. First, to capture broader political and economic transformations, we consider different types of participation; results change if we analyze separate participation arenas. Some are declining, but a dramatic finding is the rise of arts and culture. Second, to assess impacts of participation, we study more dimensions of democratic politics, including distinct norms of citizenship and their associated political repertoires. Third, by analyzing global International Social Survey Programme and World Values Survey data, we identify dramatic subcultural differences: the Tocquevillian model is positive, negative, or zero in different subcultures and contexts that we explicate. Keywords Political culture . Civic participation . Citizenship . Voluntary organizations The world is changing, arguably more rapidly and profoundly in recent decades than since the Industrial Revolution. Manufacturing is in deep decline; the percent of manual laborers has fallen by over half in most industrial countries since the 1950s. This in turn has transformed the political party system, as unions decline and left parties seek new social bases. All sorts of new civic groups emerge with global NGOs, the Internet, blogs, and new media/engagement strategies. Yet most thinking and theorizing about society and politics lags. Most of our models of civic groups, participation, and democracy come from an industrial era where class politics and party conflict dominated analysis. And as we think more globally, and look at broader patterns to help reframe the North American/European experience, what is "established" grows less clear. Approximately at the same time as the post-industrial political transformation in the West, the post-1989 transition to democracy in Eastern Europe led analysts to ask a question most ignored in the West-what are the conditions for democracy to flourish? To answer this, political scientists rediscovered Alexis de Tocqueville. Chief among them was Robert D. Putnam, who in Bowling Alone enshrined Tocqueville as "patron saint" of the social capital approach to emphasize the civic Int J Polit Cult Soc DOI 10.1007/s10767-013-9170-7 F. C. da Silva (*) : T. N. Clark : S. Cabaço University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal e-mail: [email protected] T. N. Clark e-mail: [email protected] S. Cabaço e-mail: [email protected] virtues of participation in voluntary social organizations Yet, if we break out participation into its components, we find dramatic differences from the "bowling alone" story. Voting and participation in general politics has declined in many countries since the 1980s, as has been widely reported. But barely noted is the rise of the arts and culture in these same years, even though some World Values Survey items suggest massive increases in arts and culture participation in various countries. 1 This is all the more surprising given its ubiquitous character. From mayors' agendas for urban renewal to the general population's practices, the arts have become a major area of political interest, economic investment, and self-realization in most developed countries. This global rise of arts and culture has been largely ignored until now for two main reasons. On one hand, most studies on the arts are case studies whose authors have not sought to explore the broader and the political implications of arts participation. 2 On the other hand, leading quantitative studies of arts and culture participation tend to focus on the traditional arts (live theater, symphony concerts, visiting museums) and omit such new activities as playing in a small band and many digital arts (graphic design, video, web and interactive design, animation). Still, there is by no means consensus here: rather many if not most writings on the arts suggest a decline rather than growth in recent decades. The main resolution of this conflict is to focus on what types of art and culture. The more established "high" art like classical music concerts, opera, and museum attendance show stability or decline in many countries. This has led to a sense of crisis in many arts organizations, like the U.S. National Endowment for the Arts which commissioned multiple studies. Many showed the classic decline of the "benchmark" high arts, but Novak- 1 Data from World Values Survey of national samples of citizens in each country. Question: A066. "Please look carefully at the following of voluntary organizations and activities and say…which if any do you belong to? Education, Arts, Music or Cultural Activities." In Canada, a study on citizens' preferences regarding federal spending points in the same direction, by finding that one of the few items that show significant change between 1994 and 2010 is support for "arts and culture," which climbed from 15 to 30 %. See http://www.queensu.ca/cora/_files/fc2010report.pdf 2 Most studies on the arts are case studies whose authors have not sought to explore the broader and the political implications of arts participation: see, e.g. Silva et al. This article discusses the political implications of what we call "the rise of culture." The rise of arts and culture, far from being an anomaly, is part and parcel of a much broader and deeper set of changes in an emerging form of politics lived by many, especially younger persons. It is a strategic research site where our litmus test results flag much broader and deeper changes, if we look. Culture can be about politics as well as personal identity. It can be part of one's job, but is more likely part of consumption-in a world where political candidates in their campaigns and actions stress consumption issues increasingly. Arts and culture may have some direct economic implications, but is more generally about meaning and value. For some in a secular but idea and image-driven world, music and books and their related activities replace the church and god and the functions of religion in earlier eras. For young persons breaking with their families and religious and work backgrounds, a charismatic singer like Madonna or Bruce Springsteen is more than entertainment. A reading group discussing Nietzsche, Marx, or Baudrillard can transform its members' thinking. While sympathetic towards the hermeneutically inspired "cultural turn" in American sociology, we seek to complement it with cross-national surveybased data, as this is the only way to capture broad, global sociopolitical changes. Analysts have sought to capture these profound sociopolitical changes with labels like postindustrial society, the knowledge economy, the third way, neo-liberalism, the creative class or economy, the consumer society, post-modernism, and more. What these have in common is stressing that the rules of many past models no long seem to work or demand qualification. How do any others specifically link to the growing salience of culture and the arts in the past few decades (see Our past work documented elements of this structural socioeconomic change as the rise of the "new political culture" (henceforth NPC). This original blend of social liberalism and fiscal conservatism was first identified in the 1970s urban America. What drives the shift toward the NPC? Seven general elements have been suggested to help understand the emergence of the NPC: (1) the classic left-right dimension has been transformed; immigration, women, and many new issues no longer map onto one single dimension; (2) social and fiscal/economic issues are explicitly distinguished, work no longer drives all; (3) social and cultural issues like identity, gender, morality, and lifestyle have risen in salience relative to fiscal/economic issues; (4) market individualism and social individualism grow: people seek to mark themselves as distinct from their surroundings; (5) the post-war national welfare state loses ground to federalist and regionalist solutions; parties, unions, and established churches are often replaced by new, smaller organizations that may join into social movements; (6) instead of rich vs. poor, or capitalisms vs. socialism, there is a rise of issue politics-of the arts, the environment, or gender equality-which may spark active citizen participation on one such issue, but each issue may be unrelated to the others; and (7) these NPC views are more pervasive among younger, more educated and affluent individuals, and societies. Citizens changed first in these respects, and leaders and analysts widely ignored these deep changes; many still do. But no longer do clientelism and class politics dominate politics as they did a few decades back. They are challenged by all manner of "reformers," some of whom relate to this new political culture. Many local and national political leaders came to adopt a NPC agenda in Europe, Asia, and Latin America, like Bill Clinton or Tony Blair or Antanas Mockus. In the 1990s, with the acceleration of economic globalization and the digital revolution (encompassing technological innovations such as the Internet, mobile phones, and personal computers), the shift from production to consumption started to capture the attention of social scientists. Two research questions, in particular, have been pursued. First, Culture on the Rise how and why is the growing prevalence of NPC associated with the replacement of class politics by issue politics? Second, how and why is the development of the NPC associated with the rise of consumption politics and the importance of amenities (for instance, in driving local development)? Behind these questions is the hypothesis that the rejection of hierarchy and welfare paternalism are in favor of horizontal, issue-politics increase as societies become more post-materialist, NPC. The article is organized as follows. We start by describing the analytical model, where we explain the main assumptions and research hypotheses behind this study. This includes a justification of our conceptual choices ("Research Design and Data Collection"). Next, we present our research design. Here, we discuss the main methodological issues we faced in conducting data analyses ("Findings"). We then present our findings ("Conclusion"). Specifically, we discuss the impact of our seven "contextual variables" in the relationship between cultural membership and democratic politics: these include three political cultures (class politics, clientelism, the new political culture) and four cultural traditions (Eastern religions, Orthodox Christianism, Catholicism, and Protestantism). Finally, we conclude the article by pointing out some of the most important implications of the current rise of culture, both for the purposes of policy making and for the social scientific research of politics. Analytical Model As noted above, the simpler patterns that have been widely used (like the decline in voting or bowling alone) do not hold consistently if we break out participation into separate issue areas, age groups, and countries. To make sense of these apparent disparities demands a subtler analytical model. If we look closely, we find that arts and culture are powerfully tied to other aspects of democratic life. But specifics vary by political cultures that follow disparate rules of the game. To clarify these patterns, we have extended past modeling about democratic politics to investigate impacts of culture, as follows. We include the core independent and dependent variables used by past analysts of citizen participation, but with two critical additions. First, we break out cultural participation from other content types of social participation-religious, community, and professional voluntary organizations-and compare its impacts to those of these other types. Second, we explore how these effects shift across political cultures. These two changes generate dramatic differences from most past work. The central path we explore is how cultural participation, here defined as membership in organizations by type as surveyed in the World Values Surveys (more below), impacts democratic politics. In turn, our conception of democratic politics includes political practices (protest, vote), norms of citizenship (citizens' beliefs about what makes one a "good citizen"), and attitudes (social and political trust). We hypothesize that the impact of cultural membership on each of these components of democratic politics will not be homogeneous; rather, it will vary by context. We analyze the impact of cultural membership on democratic politics in several ways. First, we consider direct effects of the standard socioeconomic variables (sex, age, education, income, and left-right self-positioning). Second, we compare the impact of cultural membership with the impact of other types of voluntary organizations, religious, professional, and community. Next, we analyze how these patterns shift across contexts, political cultures, and traditions (shown at the bottom of Silva et al. Dependent Variables Let us begin by explaining our conception of democratic politics. 4 Much civil society research has developed under the influence of Putnam's well-known jeremiad: civic participation is said to be in decline since the 1960s, with serious implications for the health of democracy. We suggest that this decline covers only part of what has happened in the last half a century. Another part of the change is a structural differentiation of political participation patterns accompanying the generational shift, societal value change, and socioeconomic modernization in dozens of countries around the world since the 1960s. Political repertoires of younger cohorts are larger than those of their predecessors (e.g., Tilly 2006, pp. 30-59). Our stress on expanded democratic repertoires joins the structural differentiation to overcome a narrow and conservative understanding that informed part of the communitarian revival of Tocqueville in the 1990s. For example, even Welzel, Inglehart, and Deutsch's recent discussion of elitechallenging repertoires shows a bias towards protest activities. Strikes, which enjoy constitutional protection in virtually all consolidated democracies, are excluded from their model under the grounds of their alleged "violent" nature To make our conception of democratic politics more empirically realistic and theoretically sound, we consider three broad categories of democratic political participation. First, we include voting and political campaigning, 5 the traditional mechanisms of political participation in representative democracies whose symbolic and non-instrumental functions have become recently re-appreciated. Second, we explore the work of Putnam, Kenneth Newton, Francis Fukuyama, and others in considering citizens' attitudes of trust in each other (social or interpersonal trust) and in the government and other institutions (political trust). 6 Third, we analyze elite-challenging modes of political mobilization. 7 This last category includes nonconventional political actions such as participation in demonstrations, signing petitions, writing political commentary in blogs, or boycotting certain products for ethical reasons. Together with voting and trust, protest is one of the three dimensions of democratic politics our model seeks to explain. If we no longer consider the New England, town meeting model of civic participation as the sole yardstick of democratic politics, but we include all three types just listed, we find no general decline in political participation. While some forms of political action become less popular (e.g., voting in certain countries), others are growing, and still others have emerged in recent years (e.g., political blogs or online petitions) (Dalton 2007). Whereas we try to overcome the conservative bias of the Putnam-Tocqueville model by enlarging what counts as democratic participation to include protest activities along with trust and voting, we try to avoid its parochialism by enlarging the scope of norms of citizenship with which it operates. Norms of citizenship encompass the values and representations individuals have of their relation with democratic authorities qua citizens. What are the civic virtues that one should exhibit to be considered an exemplary citizen? The existing literature, both in political theory 4 We thus restrict our analysis to democratic countries. Our list of 42 democratic countries is based on the Polity Score. Details of the indicators that constitute the index and the criteria for the classification of countries, according to the information, are available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. 5 "Representative democracy" is an index composed of the following variables: "voted in last election" and "political action: attend political meetings or rally" (source: International Social Survey Programme 2004). 6 "Social trust" is an index composed by the variables: most people can be trusted; do you think people try to take advantage of you ((1) "can't be too careful," (2) "most people can be trusted"). Trust in political institutions corresponds to the variable confidence in the government (1 "none at all" to 4 "a great deal") (source: World Values Survey 1999Survey -2004 see, e.g., Rothstein and Stolle 2008). 7 "Protest" is an index composed by the following variables: political action-sign petition; joining boycotts; attending lawful demonstrations; joining unofficial strikes; and occupying buildings and factories. They have three-point scale: 1, "would never do"; 2, "might do"; and 3, "have done" (source: World Values Survey 1999 Culture on the Rise and empirical political science, is often insensitive to the variety of normative understandings regarding citizenship. For example, neo-republicanism often suggests that there is one ideal set of civic virtues: in the civic republican tradition back to Cicero, Harrington, and Machiavelli, contemporary political theorists try to deduce the civic virtues that the citizens of contemporary nation-states should strive toward (e.g., Pettit 2000). In the empirical tradition, albeit less philosophically sophisticated than their fellow political theorists, political scientists are arguably more sensitive to the heterogeneous nature of the normative fabric of citizenship. Hence, empirically oriented political scientists such as Dalton 8 "engagement," 9 and "solidarity" 10 norms of citizenship. In addition, we use a second cleavage that has received some theoretical treatment in recent years Contextual and Independent Variables In what follows, we discuss the several contextual 12 and independent variables in our model of the impact of cultural membership in democratic politics, as well as the axioms behind each of them. The model's first axiom concerns socioeconomic development. Democratic politics is associated with higher levels of income and education and younger individuals. 13 To be able to 8 The "duty-based" norm is an index composed by the following WVS variables: give authorities information to help justice; future changes: greater respect for authority; national goals: maintaining order in nation; and also by ISSP 2004 variables: good citizen: always vote in elections, never try to evade taxes, always obey laws, and serve in the military. 9 The "engagement" norm is an index composed by the following WVS variables: politics important in life; reasons to help: in the interest of society; discuss political matters with friends and also by ISSP 2004 variables: good citizen: keep watch in government; active in associations; understand other opinions; choose products with ethical concerns; and help less privileged in the country/in the world. 10 The "solidarity" norm is an index composed by the following WVS variables: importance of eliminating big income inequalities; reasons for voluntary work: solidarity with poor and disadvantaged; and ISSP 2004 variables: rights in democracy: government respect minorities; access to adequate standard of living; and tolerance of disagreement. 11 In the case of the ethnic/civic norm axis (identity and civic norms), we only have information in the World Values Survey in one variable. In the absence of other options, we maintain it in our analysis in these circumstances. In the ISSP 2004, there was no information available on this normative dimension. The WVS variable is: how proud of nationality (civic norm: not very/not at all proud). 12 Both NPC and CP are statistical indexes composed by World Values Survey items (fourth wave, described below). The different political cultures are multidimensional phenomena so a single indicator cannot measure them adequately. The means of the NPC and CP indexes were calculated across all respondents. In the analysis, the filtering criterion was inclusion of the observations that scored above the average value. The results from the regression estimates were then compared to each dominant political culture. For clientelism, due to the lack of available survey data, the measure was the index provided by Worldwide Governance Indicators (in this case, all respondents received the corresponding national Silva et al. form an opinion and express it coherently, to show interest in affairs that transcend the immediate private sphere, and to make political claims in public are all instances of p

Improved clinical investigation and evaluation of high-risk medical devices: the rationale and objectives of CORE-MD (Coordinating Research and Evidence for Medical Devices)

: In the European Union (EU) the delivery of health services is a national responsibility but there are concerted actions between member states to protect public health. Approval of pharmaceutical products is the responsibility of the European Medicines Agency, whereas authorizing the placing on the market of medical devices is decentralized to independent 'conformity assessment' organizations called notified bodies. The first legal basis for an EU system of evaluating medical devices and approving their market access was the medical device directives, from the 1990s. Uncertainties about clinical evidence requirements, among other reasons, led to the EU Medical Device Regulation (2017/745) that has applied since May 2021. It provides general principles for clinical investigations but few methodological details-which challenges responsible authorities to set appropriate balances between regulation and innovation, pre- and post-market studies, and clinical trials and real-world evidence. Scientific experts should advise on methods and standards for assessing and approving new high-risk devices, and safety, efficacy, and transparency of evidence should be paramount. The European Commission recently awarded a Horizon 2020 grant to a consortium led by the European Society of Cardiology and the European Federation of National Associations of Orthopaedics and Traumatology, that will review methodologies of clinical investigations, advise on study designs, and develop recommendations for aggregating clinical data from registries and other real-world sources. The CORE-MD project (Coordinating Research and Evidence for Medical Devices) will run until March 2024; here we describe how it may contribute to the development of regulatory science in Europe

Culture on the Rise: How and Why Cultural Membership Promotes Democratic Politics

Selectively using Tocqueville, many social scientists suggest that civic participation increases democracy. We go beyond this neo-Tocquevillian model in three ways. First, to capture broader political and economic transformations, we consider different types of participation; results change if we analyze separate participation arenas. Some are declining, but a dramatic finding is the rise of arts and culture. Second, to assess impacts of participation, we study more dimensions of democrat ic politics, including distinct norms of citizenship and their associated political repertoires. Third, by analy zing global International S ocial Survey Programme and World Values Survey data, we identify dramatic subcultural differences: the Tocquevillian model is positive, negative, or zero in differen t subcultures and contexts that we explicate

Cidade e Cidadania. Governação urbana e participação cidadã em perspectiva comparada

No abstract available

Population-level effects of clam harvesting on the seagrass Zostera noltii

Seagrass declines have been reported worldwide, mostly as a consequence of anthropogenic disturbance. In Ria Formosa lagoon, southern Portugal, the intertidal meadows of Zostera noltii are highly disturbed by clam harvesters. The most common technique used to collect the clams consists of digging and tilling the sediment with a modified knife with a large blade. Here we present both descriptive and experimental evidence of the negative effects of clam harvest on the Z. noltii populations of Ria Formosa. A comparison between disturbed and undisturbed meadows suggests that clam harvesting activities change the species population structure by significantly reducing shoot density and total biomass, particularly during August, when the harvest effort is higher. Experimental harvest revealed a short-term impact on shoot density, which rapidly recovered to control levels during the following month. An experimental manipulation of rhizome fragmentation revealed that plant survival is reduced only when fragmented rhizomes are left with 1 intact internode. Shoot production and rhizome elongation and production of fragmented rhizomes having 2 to 5 internodes were not significantly affected, even though growth and production were lower when only 2 internodes were left. Experimental shoot damage at different positions along the rhizome had a significant effect on plant survival, rhizome elongation, and production only when the apical shoot was removed. Our results show that clam harvest can adversely affect Z. noltii meadows of Ria Formosa while revealing a low modular integration that allows the species to rapidly recover from physical damage

Generations and Gender Survey study profile

The Generations and Gender Survey (GGS) is a panel study on families, life course trajectories and gender relations. The GGS is part of the Generations and Gender Programme (GGP), a unique research infrastructure providing open access data to registered researchers. We will be focusing on the GGS waves that were already collected. With large samples per country, the GGS microdata provides researchers with a key resource to examine changes in family life, inter-generational and gender relations. The analysis of these trends is at the core of the research produced in several social science disciplines and the GGS data users have extensively used it to better understand topics such as the transition to adulthood, partnership formation and dissolution, fertility, gender roles and caring responsibilities. In the first part of this study profile, we focus on the design features of the GGS (data collection and adjustment, panel maintenance, and coverage) and subsequently we provide an overview of the organisational setup and outputs of the GGP. In the last part we reflect on the opportunities and challenges ahead of the next round of data collection