Tame Circle Actions

In this paper, we consider Sjamaar's holomorphic slice theorem, the birational equivalence theorem of Guillemin and Sternberg, and a number of important standard constructions that work for Hamiltonian circle actions in both the symplectic category and the K\"ahler category: reduction, cutting, and blow-up. In each case, we show that the theory extends to Hamiltonian circle actions on complex manifolds with tamed symplectic forms. (At least, the theory extends if the fixed points are isolated.) Our main motivation for this paper is that the first author needs the machinery that we develop here to construct a non-Hamiltonian symplectic circle action on a closed, connected six-dimensional symplectic manifold with exactly 32 fixed points; this answers an open question in symplectic geometry. However, we also believe that the setting we work in is intrinsically interesting, and elucidates the key role played by the following fact: the moment image of $e^t \cdot x$ increases as $t \in \mathbb{R}$ increases.Comment: 25 page

Parsing Personal Predilections: A Fresh Look at the Supreme Court\u27s Cruel and Unusual Death Penalty Jurisprudence

The now well-known case of Atkins v. Virginia decided that the execution of those with mental retardation constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The more recent case of Roper v. Simmons decided that execution of those who were under the age of eighteen when they committed their crimes also constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Both decisions changed the law that had existed since 1989, when the Court held in Penry v. Lynaugh and Stanford v. Kentucky that executions of members of both classes were not unconstitutional. Writing for the Court in Atkins v. Virginia, Justice Stevens was joined by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. That the majority opinion commanded the support of six justices and not the narrower five, as is often the case of late on the Rehnquist Court, was somewhat unexpected but not wholly surprising. The clear national trend and dialogue had tended toward expressing some discomfort with executing people with mental retardation. More and more legislatures were deciding to ban the execution of people with mental retardation and governors were signing the bills into law. At the same time, more people were questioning the use of capital punishment at all, since so many death row inmates had been exonerated either by DNA or other evidence. The Court in Roper v. Simmons surprised again, in an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy and joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. The five-to-four decision in Roper employed the same Eighth Amendment tests as in Atkins and probably created as much of a stir as that case did. Of the recent decisions though, Atkins provides the best opportunity to revisit the Court’s Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment jurisprudence. It reversed the trend in those cases involving the categorical exemption of classes of offenders from eligibility for the death penalty. I have previously argued that the Court’s “evolving standard of decency” test, the primary portion of the standard for judging the cruel and unusual nature of a punishment, is pro-death and self-fulfilling. For that reason, the Court should not use it as the sole determinant of what is cruel and unusual in the death penalty context. Rather, I have argued that the Court must continue to bring its own judgment to bear on the question, above and beyond what is shown by the evolving standard. But some justices, most notably Justice Scalia, argue that such an approach injects the justices’ personal preferences where they do not belong, into the constitutional determination. A careful review of Atkins shows that Justice Scalia may be right, and that is part of the thesis of this Article. The majority opinion in Atkins and some of the majority justices’ prior opinions arguably betray the injection of some personal views into the constitutional analysis. So perhaps Justice Scalia has a point after all. But Justice Scalia has a long paper trail of very strongly-worded opinions in this area of the law, and he wrote a stinging dissent in Atkins. Careful analysis of that dissent and portions of his other opinions allows one to charge justifiably that Justice Scalia is letting his personal predilections get the better of his constitutional reasoning as well. If both of these lines of analysis are accurate and supportable—that both sides of the debate are injecting their views into the constitutional assessment of the death penalty—the next question becomes which of the two approaches should prevail. The answer to that question should ultimately depend on ideas about democratic values and the Court’s role in constitutional adjudication

Economic Rationality, Risk Presentation, and Retirement Portfolio Choice.

This research studies the propensity of individuals to violate implications of expected utility maximization in allocating retirement savings within a compulsory de- �ned contribution retirement plan. The paper develops the implications and describes the construction and administration of a discrete choice experiment to almost 1200 members of Australias mandatory retirement savings scheme. The experiment �nds overall rates of violation of roughly 25%, and substantial variation in rates, depend- ing on the presentation of investment risk and the characteristics of the participants. Presentations based on frequency of returns below or above a threshold generate more violations than do presentations based on the probability of returns below or above thresholds. Individuals with low numeracy skills, assessed as part of the ex-periment, are several times more likely to violate implications of the conventional expected utility model than those with high numeracy skills. Older individuals are substantially less likely to violate these restrictions, when risk is presented in terms of event frequency, than are younger individuals. The results pose significant questions for public policy, in particular compulsory de�ned contribution retirement schemes, where the future welfare of participants in these schemes depends on quantitative decision-making skills that a signi�cant number of them do not possess.discrete choice; retirement savings; investment risk; household finance; financial literacy

Public perceptions of changing the terminology for low-risk thyroid cancer: A qualitative focus group study

Objectives To investigate public perceptions of overdiagnosis and overtreatment in low-risk thyroid cancer and explore opinions regarding the proposed strategy to change the terminology of low-risk cancers. Design Qualitative study using focus groups that included a guided group discussion and presentation explaining thyroid cancer, overdiagnosis and overtreatment, and proposed communication strategies. Transcripts were analysed thematically. Setting Sydney, Australia. Participants Forty-seven men and women of various ages from a range of socioeconomic backgrounds with no personal history of thyroid cancer. Results Participants had low pre-existing general awareness of concepts of overdiagnosis and overtreatment and expressed concern regarding this new information in relation to thyroid cancer. Overall, participants understood why the strategy to change the terminology was being proposed and could see potential benefits including reducing the negative psychological impact and stigma associated with the term 'cancer'; however, many still had reservations about the strategy. The majority of the concerns were around their worry about the risk of further disease progression and that changing the terminology may create confusion and cause patients not to take the diagnosis and its associated managements seriously. Despite varied views towards the proposed strategy, there was a strong overarching desire for greater patient and public education around overdiagnosis and overtreatment in both thyroid cancer and cancer generally in order to complement any revised terminology and/or other mitigation strategies. Conclusions We found a strong and apparently widely held desire for more information surrounding the topic of overdiagnosis and overtreatment. Careful consideration of how to inform both the public and current patients about the implications of a change in terminology, including changes to patients' follow-up or treatments, would be needed if such a change were to go ahead