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Economic Rationality, Risk Presentation, and Retirement Portfolio Choice*

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Abstract

This research studies the propensity of individuals to violate implications of expected utility maximization in allocating retirement savings within a compulsory defined contribution retirement plan. The paper develops the implications and describes the construction and administration of a discrete choice experiment to almost 1200 members of Australia's mandatory retirement savings scheme. The experiment finds overall rates of violation of roughly 25%, and substantial variation in rates, depending on the presentation of investment risk and the characteristics of the participants. Presentations based on frequency of returns below or above a threshold generate more violations than do presentations based on the probability of returns below or above thresholds. Individuals with low numeracy skills, assessed as part of the experiment, are several times more likely to violate implications of the conventional expected utility model than those with high numeracy skills. Older individuals are substantially less likely to violate these restrictions, when risk is presented in terms of event frequency, than are younger individuals. The results pose significant questions for public policy, in particular compulsory defined contribution retirement schemes, where the future welfare of participants in these schemes depends on quantitative decision-making skills that a significant number of them do not possess.

1 Introduction

Defined contribution schemes are now the dominant model for retirement income provision in many countries. As a result, investment decisions that were once the province of wealthy households and their advisers are now the norm for most adults in these countries. One of the most difficult of these decisions, particularly for unsophisticated investors, is choosing a portfolio for retirement savings, where an appreciation of investment risk is crucial. This brings to the fore interesting positive questions: for example, how is investment risk assessed by individuals in allocating retirement wealth, and by retirees in consuming out of this wealth? The fact that public policy increasingly compels these private decisions leads to attendant normative questions: what kinds of information and guidance effectively inform retirement portfolio allocation decisions, and how should options for these allocations be structured?

This study elicits decisions about the allocation of retirement wealth from a panel of 1199 participants in the compulsory retirement savings scheme in Australia (Superannuation Guarantee). We examine these decisions in the context of the core expected utility model of portfolio allocation, and find significant violations of this model. The propensity for these violations to occur varies systematically with the way in which risk is presented, as well as with the age and quantitative skills of workers. Our findings are relevant for the presentation of risk to participants in defined contribution retirement plans, for education in support of more informed decision-making by these participants, and for public policy decisions involving compulsory retirement schemes.

Allocation of retirement wealth is the most significant and sophisticated financial decision that many individuals ever make. In economics, the core model for this decision begins with a regular (i.e., monotone increasing and concave) utility function

for consumption and stipulates that portfolio allocations are made so as to maximize expected utility. Section 2 explains how we used this model in designing the discrete choice experiment that elicited the retirement savings allocation decisions from our panel. It develops two restrictions on the decisions panel respondents made. The strong restriction (Proposition 1) is solely a consequence of the expected utility model, and implies that certain allocation decisions should never be observed. The weak restriction (Proposition 2) follows under the further condition that from the information about risk presented, respondents infer an ordering with respect to second order stochastic dominance, and implies that certain pairs of allocation decisions should never be observed.

Our approach builds on previous studies that have employed an array of methods to elicit risk preferences. These studies vary widely with respect to the magnitude of risk under consideration and the method of elicitation. Academic experimental studies have asked lottery questions (e.g., Holt and Laury 2002; Kimball et al. 2008). Empirical investigations have inferred risk parameters from observed portfolio allocations or insurance choices (e.g., Friend and Blume 1975, Barseghyan et al. 2009). More recent methods include interactive interfaces such as distribution builders (Goldstein et al. 2008) or experience sampling, which gives feedback about risky choices through web-based platforms (Haisley et al. 2010).

The discrete choice experiment that is detailed in Section 3 recognizes that retirement portfolio decisions involve a substantial fraction of lifetime wealth, where risk aversion should be significant, as opposed to decisions about lotteries where the proportion of wealth involved is often small, and the impact of risk aversion is therefore negligible. The form of our survey resembles instruments used in the financial services sector to obtain relevant information about clients, and is similar to recent academic studies (e.g. Gerardi et al. 2010) that have measured quantitative aptitude. The

form of the discrete choice experiment contained in our survey instrument is similar to choices that confront workers deciding on retirement savings portfolios.

The experiment varies both the level and presentation of risk. There are four levels of risk, common to all respondents and presentations, driven by an underlying lognormal distribution of risky asset returns. There are nine risk presentations, each respondent being exposed to three. Each respondent makes retirement portfolio allocations in twelve environments, the Cartesian product of the four risk levels and three risk presentations. In each of these allocations the respondent selects the best and the worst from a portfolio consisting entirely of risky growth assets, a portfolio consisting entirely of an inflation-protected guaranteed bank deposit, and a portfolio in which contributions are divided equally between purchases of the growth asset and the bank deposit. Thus each respondent reveals a preference ordering over the three alternatives in a dozen different settings.

Section 4 studies the rates of violation of the strong and weak restrictions in the context of three statistical models. The rate at which respondents violate the strong restriction at some risk level varies by the presentation of risk, the lowest rate being 14% and the highest rate being 31%. For the weak restriction the rates of violation are between 25% and 37%. Presentations of risk stating the frequency with which returns will exceed or fail a benchmark have higher rates of violation than do presentations stating the probability of returns above or below a specified level. In all risk presentations the propensity to violate either restriction is substantially lower for respondents with high numeracy scores than it is for those with low numeracy scores, and it is substantially lower for older than for younger respondents. For older respondents with high numeracy scores the probability of violating the restrictions is about 5%; for younger respondents with low numeracy scores it is over 60%.

The final section reviews these and other findings. It outlines tentative conclusions

about the presentation of risk in retirement portfolio decisions, the implications for public policy of requiring these decisions of most adults, and productive directions for future research.

2 Analytical framework

The discrete choice experiment described in the next section asks respondents to rank three alternative portfolios of retirement wealth. In the first portfolio S (“safe”) all retirement contributions purchase a guaranteed bank deposit that provides an annual real return of 2%. In the second portfolio R (“risky,” consisting of growth assets like equities and property) these contributions purchase shares in a growth fund that yields an uncertain return. In the third portfolio M (“mixed”) half of each period’s contributions purchase the bank deposit and half purchase shares in the growth fund. The outcome of each experiment for each respondent can be written as an ordered triple: for example, MRS indicates an outcome in which M was ranked first and S was ranked last.

For each respondent the experiment varies the information provided about the uncertain return of R . The information varies in two dimensions. The first dimension is the presentation of risk to the respondent. For example, respondents were presented with the frequency of negative annual returns, the fifth and ninety-fifth percentiles of returns, or one of several alternatives detailed in the next section. In the discrete choice experiment each set of information presented corresponds to one of four different log-normal distributions of the gross real return y_i to R , indexed by $i = 1, 2, 3, 4$. At risk level i , $\log(y_i) \stackrel{iid}{\sim} N(\mu_i, \sigma_i^2)$ and the corresponding net return is $y_i - 1$. The gross return on S is $x = 1.02$ and the gross return on M is $z_i = (x + y_i)/2$. The experiment is designed so that each respondent is exposed to three different risk pre-

sentations, with each presentation repeated four times, calibrated to the four returns indexed by $i = 1, 2, 3, 4$. Table 1 shows the parameters of each of the four log-normal distributions of gross return and the corresponding mean and standard deviation of the annual rates of net returns of the portfolios R , M , and S .

Table 1: Alternative risk levels

Risk level i	Log-normal parameters		Portfolio R		Portfolio M		Portfolio S	
	μ_i	σ_i	Mean	s.d.	Mean	s.d.	Mean	s.d.
1	0.03747	0.11446	0.045	0.12	0.0325	0.06	0.02	0
2	0.03243	0.15222	0.045	0.16	0.0325	0.08	0.02	0
3	0.02603	0.18967	0.045	0.20	0.0325	0.10	0.02	0
4	0.00935	0.26331	0.045	0.28	0.0325	0.14	0.02	0

The four levels of risk were chosen so that the rankings of R , M , and S would vary across the risk levels in a simple model of retirement savings portfolio allocation. In each period before retirement, each worker has an exogenous stream of earnings, divided (exogenously) between current consumption, taxes, and contributions to retirement savings. At the end of the period the worker allocates all her accumulated retirement savings to R , M or S for the next period. The date of retirement is exogenous, and on this date retirement savings are converted to an annuity that provides an unchanging level of consumption each period until the worker dies. The date of death is random but independent of portfolio returns.

In this stylized model, a worker's post-retirement consumption is a function of wealth at the date of retirement. Before retirement, each worker's future consumption is therefore random and affected by her decisions about the allocation of accumulated retirement savings. Suppose, further, that the worker allocates her retirement savings portfolio so as to maximize the expectation of a time-separable utility function, the instantaneous utility of each period's consumption c_t being of standard constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) form $U(c_t) = (c_t^{1-\alpha} - 1) / (1 - \alpha)$. The CRRA pa-

parameter α is worker-specific, with $\alpha \in [0, \infty)$ and $U(c_t) = \log(c_t)$ when $\alpha = 1$. Since returns to the retirement savings portfolio are independent and identically distributed each period, it follows (Ingersoll, 1997 Chapter 11) that workers maintain the same allocation of their portfolio to S , M or R each period, even though they are free to re-allocate. Thus, in this model, retirement portfolio allocations do not depend on time to retirement or on the level of accumulated wealth. Workers with low values of α allocate to R , workers with high values of α to S , and workers with intermediate values of α to M . Table 2 indicates the rankings of R , M and S corresponding each of the risk levels in Table 1 and all possible values of α .

Table 2: CRRA parameter ranges supporting orderings for each risk level

Ordering	Risk level			
	1	2	3	4
<i>RMS</i>	(0.00, 2.46)	(0.00, 1.39)	(0.00, 0.90)	(0.00, 0.46)
<i>MRS</i>	(2.46, 3.69)	(1.39, 2.09)	(0.90, 1.34)	(0.46, 0.69)
<i>MSR</i>	(3.69, 7.42)	(2.09, 4.19)	(1.34, 2.69)	(0.69, 1.39)
<i>SMR</i>	(7.42, ∞)	(4.19, ∞)	(2.69, ∞)	(1.39, ∞)

The only function of this simple model was to guide us in selecting numerical values in risk presentations. None of the model's specific assumptions are made in any of the following analysis. Likewise, the only role of a log-normal distribution for gross returns to the risky asset R was to calibrate quantities across alternative presentations of risk. There was no attempt to convey to respondents the idea that these returns are log-normally distributed, nor is the assumption of log normality made in any of the analysis that follows.

The analysis in Section 4 tests two potential restrictions on the rankings of R , M and S . Both assume risk aversion and expected utility maximization. The strong restriction assumes nothing further. The weak restriction assumes, in addition, that from the information provided in the experiment respondents infer mean-preserving

spread relationships among the gross returns to R at different risk levels.

Proposition 1 (*Strong restriction on retirement portfolio choice*) *The orderings SRM and RSM are inconsistent with expected utility maximization and risk aversion.*

Proof. Recall that the gross returns to R , S and M are y_i , x , and $z_i = (x + y_i) / 2$ respectively. Risk aversion is equivalent to concavity of utility so that

$$U(z_i) = U\left(\frac{x + y_i}{2}\right) > \frac{U(x) + U(y_i)}{2}$$

and hence

$$E[U(z_i)] > \frac{U(x) + E[U(y_i)]}{2}.$$

Therefore $E[U(z_i)] > \min\{U(x), E[U(y_i)]\}$ and so M cannot be the least preferred allocation of retirement wealth. ■

For the log-normal distributions indicated in the second and third columns of Table 1, $\sigma_i/\mu_i < \sigma_j/\mu_j$ for all pairs (i, j) with $i < j$. It follows (Levy 1991) that (a) the distribution of gross returns y_i to R at risk level i second-order stochastically dominates that of gross returns y_j at risk level j , (b) the distribution of y_j is a mean-preserving spread of the distribution of y_i , and (c) $E[U(y_i)] > E[U(y_j)]$ for any U that is monotone increasing and concave. Directly from the definition of second-order stochastic dominance, relationships (a), (b) and (c) are true of the gross returns z_i and z_j to M as well.

Respondents are always told the means of net returns, and each time they are asked to provide an ordering among R , M and S they are reminded of these means. As detailed in the next section, each respondent is exposed to three different presentations of risk associated with R and M , and there is always a natural ordering within each of the presentations: for example, if a respondent is told that negative

returns occur on average a years out of every 20, it is natural to associate larger a with greater risk. It is therefore reasonable to entertain the prospect that from the information provided respondents infer changes in spread with a common mean.

Proposition 2 (*Weak restriction on retirement portfolio choice*) *Suppose*

(1) *Orderings are consistent with expected utility maximization and risk aversion;*

(2) *The distribution of R at risk level j is a mean-preserving spread of the distribution of R at risk level i for all pairs (i, j) with $i < j$.*

Then the pairs of orderings with an entry A , B_i or C in Table 3 are all possible, whereas those with entries D or E are all impossible.

Table 3: Pairs of orderings for lower (i) and higher (j) risk levels

Ordering at risk level i	Ordering at risk level j			
	SMR	MSR	MRS	RMS
SMR	A	E	D, E	D, E
MSR	B_1	A	D	D
MRS	B_2	B_4	A	C
RMS	B_3	B_5	B_6	A

Proof. Pairs of orderings for cells with entry A can all be generated by sufficiently small differences in mean-preserving spread between risk levels i and j .

Pairs of orderings for cells marked B_i can be found in Table 3: $\alpha = 4, i = 1, j = 3$ for B_1 , $\alpha = 3, i = 1, j = 3$ for B_2 , $\alpha = 2, i = 1, j = 4$ for B_3 , $\alpha = 3, i = 1, j = 2$ for B_4 , $\alpha = 2, i = 1, j = 3$ for B_5 and $\alpha = 1, i = 1, j = 3$ for B_6 .

Appendix A provides an example that satisfies conditions (1) and (2) and generates the pair of orderings for the cell marked C .

Conditions 1 and 2 imply $E[U(y_i)] > E[U(y_j)]$ (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1970) and therefore $E[U(x)] - E[U(y_j)] > E[U(x)] - E[U(y_i)]$. This eliminates pairs of

orderings in which S is preferred to R at the lower risk level i but R is preferred to S at the higher risk level j , the cells of Table 3 with an entry D .

Condition 2 is equivalent to the existence of a random variable ε with $E(\varepsilon | y_i) = 0$ for all y_i such that $y_j = y_i + \varepsilon$ (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1970). Therefore $z_j = (x + y_j) / 2 = (x + y_i + \varepsilon) / 2 = z_i + (\varepsilon / 2)$, which is equivalent to the distribution of M at risk level j being a mean-preserving spread of the distribution of M at risk level i . It follows that $E[U(z_i)] > E[U(z_j)]$ and $E[U(x)] - E[U(z_j)] > E[U(x)] - E[U(z_i)]$, thus eliminating pairs of orderings in which S is preferred to M at the lower risk level i but M is preferred to S at the higher risk level j , the cells of Table 3 with entry E .

■

3 The discrete choice experiment

The experiment is the third part of an on-line, four-part survey instrument that collects substantial information about the characteristics of each respondent. The instructions for the experiment, reproduced in Appendix B, present a simplified retirement savings (superannuation) program in which the only options for the savings portfolio are S , M and R . The instructions indicate that the respondent will be asked to indicate which option he or she would be most likely to choose, and which option he or she would be least likely to choose, in a series of settings in which average returns remain the same but levels of risk vary. There are 36 settings in total, of which each respondent sees 12. Each setting presents the annual returns net of inflation (2% for S , 3.25% for M , and 4.5% for R) together with a presentation of risk for M and R . The 12 settings are the Cartesian product of the four risk levels indicated in Table 1 (common to all respondents) and three of the nine risk presentations.

Many presentations of risk to retirement savers are possible. We utilize nine

Table 4: Alternative risk presentations in the discrete choice experiment

Presentation	Statement in the presentation of risk
1	There is a 9 in 10 chance of a return between $x\%$ and $y\%$.
2	There is a 1 in 10 chance of a return outside $x\%$ and $y\%$.
3	There is a 1 in 20 chance of a return above $y\%$.
4	There is a 1 in 20 chance of a return below $x\%$.
5	On average, positive returns occur $20 - x$ years in every 20.
6	On average, negative returns occur x years in every 20.
7	On average, returns above the bank account occur $20 - x$ years in every 20.
8	On average, returns below the bank account occur x years in every 20.
9	See Figure 1

alternatives, drawn from standard prospectuses of the financial services industries in Australia, Europe and the United States, as well as from related studies (Vlaev et al. 2009). Table 4 indicates the first eight presentations, and Table 5 shows the corresponding numerical values for the portfolios M and R at the four risk levels. Presentation 9 gives the same information as presentations 1 through 4 in graphical form, together with the sure return on S . Figure 1 illustrates presentation 9 using the highest risk level. Presentations 1 through 4 and presentation 9 convey risk through the cumulative distribution function of returns each year. Presentations 5 through 8 convey risk through the frequency of returns above or below simple reference points.

Table 5: Aspects of risk at different levels

Presentations	1-4: (x, y)		5-6: x		7-8: x	
	M	R	M	R	M	R
Risk level 1	$(-6, 14)$	$(-14, 25.5)$	6	7	9	9
Risk level 2	$(-9, 17.5)$	$(-19.5, 32.5)$	7	8	9.5	9.5
Risk level 3	$(-11.5, 21)$	$(-25, 40)$	8	9	10	10
Risk level 4	$(-16.5, 29)$	$(-34.5, 55.5)$	9	10	11.5	11.5

Each respondent is exposed to three of the risk presentations. For one group of respondents, A , the presentations are 1, 2 and 9; for group B , 3, 4 and 9; C , 5, 6




Figure 1: Presentation of risk in frame 9 (Example for risk level 4)

and 9; and for group *D*, 7, 8 and 9. Figure 2 provides a representative choice task, corresponding to risk level 1 and presentation 3. This task was completed by the members of group *B*.

We recruited a random sample of 1220 respondents from the PureProfile online panel of over 600,000 Australians, specifying that they hold at least one current superannuation account. Under Australia's Superannuation Guarantee, all Australians who earned at least 8% of average earnings in a calendar year between the ages of 18 and 65 participate in the mandatory retirement savings system. Members allocate their retirement savings to one or more accounts, selected from a menu of funds, many privately managed and all subject to regulation. Most adults are members of defined contribution, privately managed funds. The recruited sample was divided evenly among groups *A*, *B*, *C* and *D*. Of the 1199 complete responses, 300 were in group *A*, 299 in *B*, 297 in *C* and 303 in *D*.

Features of Options	Option A	Option B	Option C
Option type	100% Bank account	50% Bank account & 50% Growth assets	100% Growth assets
Average annual rate of return (above inflation)	2%	3.25%	4.5%
Level of investment risk	No risk	There is a 9 in 10 chance of a rate of return <u>between</u> -16.5% to 29%	There is a 9 in 10 chance of a rate of return <u>between</u> -34.5% to 55.5%

If these superannuation options above were available for you to invest your money today

1. Which one of the three would you be **most likely** to choose?

- Option A
- Option B
- Option C

2. Which one of the three would you be **least likely** to choose?

- Option A
- Option B
- Option C

Figure 2: A representative choice task in the discrete choice experiment

The other parts of the survey instrument provide respondent characteristics, and our findings utilize some of that information. The first part consists of questions about subjects' retirement savings, including the aggregate amount in their superannuation accounts. From this amount we constructed a polychotomous covariate, "superannuation," coded as 1 for accounts of less than \$20,000, 2 for accounts in the range \$20,000 to \$80,000, 3 for accounts in the range \$80,000 to \$500,000, and 4 for accounts above \$500,000. (Individuals' average accumulation in Australia's superannuation program is about \$70,000.)

The second part of the survey consists of 21 questions measuring numeracy and financial literacy skills, as well as self-assessed knowledge of finance, access to financial education, use of financial advice and confidence in stock market recovery. The five numeracy questions are drawn from Gerardi et al. (2010) and are designed to test basic concepts such as fractions, percentages, division, multiplication and simple probability. They are provided here in Appendix C. We fitted a factor model to the

responses to these questions, and used the fitted factor loadings to create the covariate “numeracy,” a numeracy score for each respondent. This covariate has mean 0 and standard deviation 1.

The third part of the survey instrument is the experiment just described. The final part of the survey instrument consists of demographic questions relating to age, marital status, work status, occupation, industry/business, education, income, assets, household make-up and number in household. From the responses to these questions we created a polychotomous covariate, “age,” coded as -1 for 18-34 years, 0 for 35-54 years, and 1 for 55 years or older. Bateman et al. (2010) provides a more detailed presentation of the survey instrument, which may be found at <http://survey.confermit.com/wix/p1250911674.aspx>.

From this information we selected superannuation account balance, numeracy, and age as covariates for the propensity to violate Propositions 1 and 2. The selection was based on our prior belief that wealth, cognition and/or financial literacy, and time to retirement are likely drivers in choosing a retirement portfolio. (See, for example, on wealth, Mankiw and Zeldes 1991 and Carroll 2001; on cognition and literacy, Dohmen et al. 2010 and Lusardi et al. 2009; on age, Agnew, Balduzzi and Sunden 2003 and Ameriks and Zeldes 1997.) Preliminary work with logit models confirmed that these choices did not exclude other important covariates.

4 Findings

We investigate the propensity of respondents to violate Propositions 1 and 2, respectively, as a function of the three covariates just described. Since there were 1199 complete responses, each providing 12 orderings of S , M and R , there are 14,388 orderings all together. Table 6 indicates the frequency of each ordering in each of the

Table 6: Frequency of orderings in the discrete choice experiment

Ordering	Risk presentation									Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
<i>RMS</i>	246	232	334	149	379	342	301	272	1625	3880
<i>MRS</i>	265	237	341	190	235	251	297	269	1066	3151
<i>MSR</i>	344	339	303	233	173	274	332	229	1194	3421
<i>SMR</i>	274	300	128	537	169	164	160	283	566	2581
<i>RSM</i>	20	23	28	25	67	52	28	39	149	431
<i>SRM</i>	51	69	62	62	165	105	94	120	196	924
Total	1200	1200	1196	1196	1188	1188	1212	1212	4796	14388

nine presentations.

Independence across respondents is a plausible and conventional assumption, and we maintain this assumption throughout our formal interpretation of the outcome of the experiment. For each risk presentation f ($f = 1, \dots, 9$) let r index the respondents assigned to that presentation; r ranges from 1 to about 300 for $f = 1, \dots, 8$ and $r = 1199$ for $f = 9$. Each respondent r assigned to presentation f creates an ordering of S , M and R at each risk level i . Table 6 indicates substantial differences in response across risk presentations, and this is confirmed by formal tests.

4.1 The strong restriction

The 1355 orderings *RSM* and *SRM* (about 9% of the total) violate the strong restriction (Proposition 1). Proceeding to a more formal analysis, for each combination of r and i we observe 0, 1, 2, 3 or 4 violations of Proposition 1. Define the dichotomous variable $v_{fr}^{(j)}$, set to 1 if respondent r violates Proposition 1 (i.e., orders M last) j or more times in the four orderings in presentation f . From our assumption of independence across respondents, it follows that for each combination of f and j the variables $v_{fr}^{(j)}$ are also independent across the respondents r assigned to presentation f .

Table 7: Probabilities of at least one violation ($j=1$) and at least two violations ($j=2$) in the independent response model for violation of the strong restriction

Group:	<i>A</i>		<i>B</i>		<i>C</i>		<i>D</i>	
(f_1, f_2, f_3)	(1, 2, 9)		(3, 4, 9)		(5, 6, 9)		(7, 8, 9)	
$\geq j$ violations	$j = 1$	$j = 2$	$j = 1$	$j = 2$	$j = 1$	$j = 2$	$j = 1$	$j = 2$
$p_{f_1}^{(j)}$	0.153	0.063	0.134	0.090	0.253	0.141	0.198	0.116
$p_{f_2}^{(j)}$	0.183	0.077	0.147	0.074	0.313	0.219	0.244	0.149
$p_{f_3}^{(j)}$	0.140	0.063	0.127	0.060	0.145	0.108	0.178	0.102

Since the outcomes $v_{fr}^{(j)}$ are dichotomous, the simplest possible model casts them as Bernoulli random variables, $P(v_{fr}^{(j)} = 1) = p_f^{(j)}$, independent across f as well as r . We refer to this as the independent response (IR) model. Table 7 provides the parameter estimates for these models. For example, the fraction of respondents who violated the strong restriction at least once in presentation 1 is 0.153; at least twice, 0.063. For all of the entries the standard error of estimate is about 0.02, and so differences across presentations are almost all statistically significant. For $j = 1$, violation probabilities are higher in presentations 5 through 8 than in presentations 1 through 4, and the same is true for $j = 2$. The distinguishing feature of presentations 5 through 8 is that they all convey risk as the frequency of returns above or below a specified benchmark, whereas presentations 1 through 4 provide probability bounds on annual returns (see Table 4). Violation probabilities for presentation 9, which conveys these probability bounds in graphical terms, are more similar to those in presentations 1 through 4 than in presentations 5 through 8.

We also consider the binomial logit model $P(v_{fr}^{(j)} = 1 | \mathbf{x}_r) = f_L(\boldsymbol{\beta}_f^{(j)}, \mathbf{x}_r)$, where \mathbf{x}_r denotes the 3×1 vector of covariates of numeracy, age and superannuation described at the end of the previous section and $\boldsymbol{\beta}_f^{(j)}$ is the corresponding 4×1 vector of parameters. In this model responses are independent across presentations f as well as respondents r , conditional on the covariates. The independent response model is a

special case, in which the covariate coefficients are all zero. We refer to this binomial logit model as the conditionally independent response (CIR) model.

The entries in Table 8 provide the estimated odds ratios from this model, that is, the change in

$$P\left(v_{fr}^{(j)} = 1 \mid \mathbf{x}_r\right) / \left[1 - P\left(v_{fr}^{(j)} = 1 \mid \mathbf{x}_r\right)\right] \quad (1)$$

of a one-unit increase in the indicated covariate. For example, for risk presentation 4 (group *B*, presentation f_2) the odds ratio for numeracy is 0.535, which is significantly different from 1.0 at the 5% level. Except for presentation 5 (“On average, positive returns occur $20 - x$ years in every 20”) the effect of the numeracy score on the conditional probability of violating the strong restriction is substantively powerful and statistically significant. The strongest effect is in presentation 1 (“There is a 9 in 10 chance of a return between $x\%$ and $y\%$ ”) where an increase of two standard deviations in numeracy reduces the odds ratio (1) by a factor of $0.385^2 = 0.148$: if, at a numeracy score of 0, the other covariates indicate the probability of violating the strong restriction is 0.50, then the probability of violating the strong restriction is $0.385/(1 + 0.385) = 0.278$ when numeracy is 1 and 0.722 when numeracy is -1. For an odds ratio of 0.6, the same exercise implies probabilities of 0.375 and 0.625 of violating the strong restriction at numeracy scores of 1 and -1, respectively.

Age is also important in the conditional probability of violating the strong restriction, especially in presentations 5 through 8, which (unlike presentations 1 through 4) refer to time dimensions of risk. Age is then a more important conditioning covariate in presentation 9 (the graphical presentation of risk) for those respondents who were exposed to the presentations referring to time (Groups *C* and *D*) than for those respondents who were not. In a situation where the covariates numeracy and superannuation imply the probability of violating the strong restriction is 0.5 for a

Table 8: Odds ratios for binomial logit conditionally independent response model for the weak restriction

Group:	<i>A</i>		<i>B</i>		<i>C</i>		<i>D</i>	
(f_1, f_2, f_3)	(1, 2, 9)		(3, 4, 9)		(5, 6, 9)		(7, 8, 9)	
$\geq j$ violations	$j = 1$	$j = 2$	$j = 1$	$j = 2$	$j = 1$	$j = 2$	$j = 1$	$j = 2$
Risk presentation f_1								
Numeracy	0.385*	0.528*	0.472*	0.577*	0.875	0.851	0.486*	0.564*
Age	0.759	1.099	0.851	0.802	0.544*	0.546*	0.505*	0.349*
Superannuation	0.840	0.645	0.834	0.750	1.259	1.268	0.902	0.789
Risk presentation f_2								
Numeracy	0.508*	0.551*	0.535*	0.630*	0.660*	0.625*	0.624*	0.745*
Age	0.761	1.115	0.921	1.081	0.586*	0.557*	0.595*	0.579*
Superannuation	0.758	0.599	0.928	0.960	1.082	0.949	0.915	0.943
Risk presentation $f_3 = 9$								
Numeracy	0.418*	0.569*	0.614*	0.646*	0.577*	0.560*	0.549*	0.628*
Age	0.628*	0.877	0.740	0.784	0.507*	0.457*	0.402*	0.464*
Superannuation	0.636*	0.317*	1.005	0.967	1.273	1.232	0.913	0.650

*Significantly different from 1.000 at the 5% level

respondent in group *C* or *D* age 35 to 45, the probability of violation typically (odds ratio 0.5) would be 2/3 for a respondent in the younger group and 1/3 for a respondent in the older group. For respondents in groups *A* and *B* there is no statistically significant indication of such changes in probability and the point estimates imply violation probabilities of about 0.55 for the younger group and 0.45 for the older.

There is no evidence that the conditional probability of violating the strong restriction systematically increases or decreases with the size of the respondent's superannuation account. Point estimates of odds ratios exceed one for some presentations, are less than one for others, and are statistically significant at level 5% in 2 of the 24 cases.

Comparison of the maximized log likelihood values in the IR and CIR models provides another indication of the importance of the covariates. For each respondent group (*A*, *B*, *C*, *D*) and for the cases of at least one violation ($j = 1$) and at least

Table 9: Maximized log likelihoods and test statistics, three models for violations of the strong restriction

Group:	<i>A</i>		<i>B</i>		<i>C</i>		<i>D</i>	
(f_1, f_2, f_3)	$(1, 2, 9)$		$(3, 4, 9)$		$(5, 6, 9)$		$(7, 8, 9)$	
$\geq j$ violations	$j = 1$	$j = 2$	$j = 1$	$j = 2$	$j = 1$	$j = 2$	$j = 1$	$j = 2$
Log likelihoods								
IR model	-392.9	-222.8	-356.4	-237.3	-475.3	-378.6	-461.2	-335.8
CIR model	-347.1	-198.7	-314.5	-217.9	-456.4	-361.2	-406.1	-297.3
CDR model	-240.3	-153.4	-224.1	-189.6	-396.2	-313.3	-344.3	-231.5
Test statistics								
$H_0 : \text{IR} = \text{CIR}$	91.6	48.2	83.8	38.8	37.8	34.8	110.2	77.0
$H_0 : \text{CIR} = \text{CDR}$	213.6	90.6	180.8	56.6	120.4	95.8	123.6	131.6

two violations ($j = 2$), Table 9 provides the sums of the log likelihoods over all three presentations in the IR model and in the CIR model. Because the CIR model nests the IR model the maximized likelihood is necessarily greater in the former than in the latter. These increases range from 17.4 (group *C*, $j = 2$) to 55.1 (group *D*, $j = 1$). The null hypothesis of no effect of covariates in the CIR model implies that the asymptotic distribution of twice the increase is $\chi^2(9)$. Table 9 reports these test statistics in the next-to-last line, and all imply rejection at the 0.01% level.

Although the CIR model is more general than the IR model, it still imposes the assumption that beyond knowing a respondent's numeracy, age and superannuation, choices of investment option for the retirement portfolio are independent from one presentation to another. If this were true, elicitation of risk preferences, for instance, by financial advisors, would be simplified because collection of the information in the covariates (numeracy, age and superannuation) is more straightforward than eliciting individual attitudes toward risk. There is much to argue against this simplification, from the heterogeneity of preferences conventionally presumed in demand models to the resources devoted to individual risk elicitation in the financial services industry.

To measure the importance of idiosyncratic risk preferences and to provide a formal test of this apparently strong assumption, we generalize the CIR model. In this generalization, the conditionally dependent response (CDR) model is

$$P\left(v_{f_1r}^{(j)} = m_1, v_{f_2r}^{(j)} = m_2, v_{9r}^{(j)} = m_3\right) = m_L\left(\boldsymbol{\gamma}_{f_1, f_2}^{(j)}, \mathbf{x}_r\right),$$

where the expression on the right side denotes a multinomial logit model with parameter vector $\boldsymbol{\gamma}_{f_1, f_2}^{(j)}$ specific to the presentations f_1 , f_2 and $f_3 = 9$ to which respondent r is assigned. There are $2^3 = 8$ outcomes (m_1, m_2, m_3) , and consequently the multinomial logit model has $(8 - 1) \times 4 = 28$ coefficients. Estimates of these coefficients are unsurprising in the context of Table 8. Coefficients on numeracy and age are mostly negative and of the same magnitude; though because of the small number of observations for some combinations (m_1, m_2, m_3) fewer are statistically significant than was the case in the binomial logit CIR model.

Given any set of coefficient vectors $\boldsymbol{\beta}_f^{(j)}$ ($f = f_1, f_2, f_3$) from binomial logit CIR models, there is a coefficient vector $\boldsymbol{\gamma}_{f_1, f_2}^{(j)}$ in the multinomial logit CDR model such that

$$m_L\left(\boldsymbol{\gamma}_{f_1, f_2}^{(j)}, \mathbf{x}\right) = f_L\left(\boldsymbol{\beta}_{f_1}^{(j)}, \mathbf{x}\right) \cdot f_L\left(\boldsymbol{\beta}_{f_2}^{(j)}, \mathbf{x}\right) \cdot f_L\left(\boldsymbol{\beta}_9^{(j)}, \mathbf{x}\right)$$

for all possible \mathbf{x} . Thus the CDR model nests the CIR model, and consequently the maximum of the log likelihood function in each CDR model exceeds the sum of the maximums of the log likelihood functions in the three corresponding CIR models. This is evident in Table 9. The last line of this table provides formal tests of the hypotheses that the CDR model in each presentation collapses to the product of the CIR models. The conventional asymptotic distributions of these test statistics are chi-square with 16 degrees of freedom ($\boldsymbol{\gamma}_{f_1, f_2}^{(j)}$ is 28×1 , each $\boldsymbol{\beta}_{f_1}^{(j)}$ is 4×1) or fewer (because for certain presentations and certain of the eight possible outcomes

there are four or fewer observations in the CDR model). While the adequacy of the conventional asymptotic distribution theory is open to question in this setting there can be no real doubt that the CIR hypothesis should be rejected. The results in Table 9 indicate substantial dependence of respondent orderings across presentations. Some of this dependence is explained by the covariates numeracy, age and superannuation, but even more must be ascribed to idiosyncratic variation. The financial services industry has long devoted substantial resources to eliciting individual tastes for risk, consistent with these results. (See Yooks and Everett (2003) for discussion.)

4.2 The weak restriction

A respondent violates the weak restriction (Proposition 2) in a presentation f if either (1) the respondent violates Proposition 1 at one of the four risk levels or (2) the respondent has at least one pair of orderings among the four risk levels that violates Proposition 2. We study these outcomes by defining the random variable $v_{fr} = 1$ if respondent r violates Proposition 2 in presentation f and $v_{fr} = 0$ if not. The approach is similar to that taken for Proposition 1: we consider first independent response (IR), then conditionally independent response (CIR), and finally conditionally dependent response (CDR) models.

Table 10: Estimates of the probabilities of at least one violation ($j=1$) and at least two violations ($j=2$) in the independent response model for violations of the weak restriction

Group:	A	B	C	D
(f_1, f_2, f_3)	(1, 2, 9)	(3, 4, 9)	(5, 6, 9)	(7, 8, 9)
$p_{f_1}^{(j)}$	0.293	0.268	0.374	0.340
$p_{f_2}^{(j)}$	0.273	0.261	0.357	0.373
$p_{f_3}^{(j)}$	0.250	0.251	0.242	0.271

Table 10 provides the parameter estimates in the IR model, each parameter having a standard error of estimate of about 0.025. As was the case for the strong restriction, the probability of violations of the weak restriction is higher in presentations 5 through 8, which couch risk in terms of the frequency of returns above or below benchmark values, than it is in the other presentations, which express risk in terms of points on the cumulative distribution function for annual returns.

Table 11: Odds ratios for conditionally independent response binomial logit model for the weak restriction

(f_1, f_2, f_3)	(1, 2, 9)	(3, 4, 9)	(5, 6, 9)	(7, 8, 9)
Risk presentation f_1				
Numeracy	0.407*	0.642*	0.792	0.407*
Age	0.673*	0.810	0.719*	0.713*
Superannuation	0.980	0.762	1.101	0.763
Risk presentation f_2				
Numeracy	0.419*	0.519*	0.602*	0.606*
Age	0.744	0.887	0.696*	0.606*
Superannuation	0.781	0.824	1.067	0.999
Risk presentation $f_3 = 9$				
Numeracy	0.484*	0.761*	0.702*	0.546*
Age	0.541*	0.915	0.729	0.478*
Superannuation	0.788	0.969	0.913	0.977

The conditional probabilities of violation of the weak restriction in the CIR model are similar to those of violation of the strong restriction, as detailed in Table 11. These probabilities decline rapidly with increasing numeracy and age. The effect of numeracy on the conditional probability is about the same as for the strong restriction. The effect of age is somewhat reduced, and the greater importance of age in presentations 5 through 8 than in the other presentations is somewhat muted. Combined, the impacts of numeracy and age are substantial: if a respondent aged 35 to 54 with a numeracy score 0 (the average) violates the strong restriction with probability 0.5, then (assuming a numeracy odds ratio of 0.6 and an age odds ratio of 0.7) the prob-

Table 12: Maximized log likelihoods and test statistics, three models for violations of the weak restriction

Group:	<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>
(f_1, f_2, f_3)	(1, 2, 9)	(3, 4, 9)	(5, 6, 9)	(7, 8, 9)
Log-likelihoods				
IR model	-526.2	-513.7	-554.3	-571.3
CIR model	-477.8	-484.4	-541.3	-511.4
CDR model	-402.2	-442.9	-488.4	-455.3
Test statistics				
$H_0 : \text{IR} = \text{CIR}$	96.8	58.6	26.0	119.8
$H_0 : \text{CIR} = \text{CDR}$	151.2	83.0	105.8	112.2

ability of violation of the weak restriction is about 0.7 for a younger respondent with a numeracy score of -1 and 0.3 for an older respondent with a numeracy score of 1. As was the case with the strong restriction, there is no indication of a systematic impact of the size of the respondent's superannuation account on violation of the weak restriction.

Table 12 details the increase in maximized log likelihood moving from the IR to the CIR to the CDR model. The comparisons are similar to those for the strong restriction, and indicate formal rejection of smaller models in favor of larger ones. The three covariates again account for a substantial proportion of the dependence of respondent violations of the restriction, moving across presentations, but there is even more dependence that is not accounted for by the covariates. These results reinforce the conclusion that there is value in assessing individuals' attitudes toward risk in retirement planning.

5 Conclusion

Our analysis of the results of the discrete choice experiment can be summarized in five main points, as follows.

1. In a setting that is experimental but similar to that in which real decisions are made, respondents routinely violate the two implications of the expected utility theory of decision-making under risk, detailed in Section 2. These rates range from 14% to 37%.
2. When risk is presented with respect to frequency, for example “On average, negative returns occur 7 years in every 20,” the probability of violating the restrictions is greater: about 25% for the strong restriction and 35% for the weak restriction. When risk is presented with respect to the probability of high or low returns each year, for example “There is a 9 in 10 chance of a return between -6% and 14%,” the probability of violation is less: about 15% for the strong restriction and 25% for the weak restriction.
3. A respondent’s quantitative aptitude, as measured by a short conventional test of numeracy, substantially affects the probability that either restriction will be violated. For example, in the case of the strong restriction with risk presented as frequency, for an otherwise randomly selected respondent with numeracy in the top decile, the probability of violation is about 5%, whereas for one in the bottom decile, it is about 35%.
4. A respondent’s age substantially affects the probability that either restriction will be violated when the risk presentation invokes the frequency of events. For example, in the case of the strong restriction, for an otherwise randomly selected

respondent, the probability of violation is about 15% for a respondent age 55 or older, and about 38% for a respondent age 18 to 34 .

5. In the discrete choice experiment the alternative presentations of risk were all calibrated to the same log-normal distribution of returns at each level of risk. From the information provided respondents need not have inferred that the distributions of returns were the same across the alternative presentations. Nevertheless, there is strong dependence in the propensity to violate the strong and weak restriction across risk presentations: if a respondent violates a restriction in one presentation this increases the probability that the respondent will violate that restriction in another presentation. Much of this dependence across risk presentations can be attributed to a respondent's numeracy score and age, but it is also the case that much dependence remains after conditioning on these attributes.

From these results we venture several more tentative conclusions about the direction of future research and lessons for the public policy of compulsory defined contribution retirement schemes.

1. The strong association between poor numeracy skills and the propensity to violate the expected utility paradigm is strong and consistent with the few studies that have explored this issue (Peters and Levin, 2008; Gerardi et al., 2010). This relationship is fundamental to the evaluation of public policy that delegates sophisticated financial decisions to individuals who are compelled to contribute to defined contribution retirement plans. Further research should be undertaken to understand the relationship between quantitative aptitude and quantitative decision making, eventually addressing the question of whether

there are policy interventions that might increase quantitative decision-making skills.

2. In the interim, this work would support serious reservations about public policy linking the future welfare of current workers to quantitative decision-making skills that a significant number of them do not possess.
3. The presentation of risk is important in the elicitation of decisions for retirement planning, a conclusion that has emerged in related work. (See, among others, Saez 2009 on contributions, Benartzi and Thaler 1999, Rubaltelli et al. 2005, Anagol and Gamble 2008 on asset allocation decisions, and Agnew et al. 2008 and Brown et al. 2008 on annuitization decisions.) Our findings suggest, in particular, that consistency with the core economic model of expected utility is specific to the presentation of risk. Further research is warranted to understand those attributes of risk presentation that are most important in determining whether revealed preferences are consistent with the core model.

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Appendix A: Proposition 2, MRS/RMS ordering case

The following example shows that entry C in Table 3 is possible. The example was produced by an algorithm that randomly generates discrete random variables on $[0, 1]$ and weakly convex piecewise linear utility functions normalized with $u(0) = 0$, $u(1) = 1$. Through linear transformation all of these examples can be made to match the values $S = 1.02$ and $E(R) = 1.045$ of the experiments without changing the preference orderings for S , M and R .

The utility function in the example is

$$U(w) = s_1 \cdot I_{[0,b]}(w) \cdot w + [s_1 b + s_2 \cdot I_{[b,1]}(w) \cdot (w - b)]$$

with breakpoint $b = 0.2383$ and slopes $s_1 = 0.9067$ and $s_2 = 0.0580$. The upper panels of Figure 3 indicate $U(w)$.

The sure return to S is $x = 0.1653$. The distribution of y (the gross return to R) has the same 10 points of support in $[0, 1]$ at both risk levels i and j , with $E(y) = 0.4562$. Therefore the distribution of z (the gross return to M) also has common points of support at both risk levels i and j , with $E(z) = 0.3107$. The probability distributions are indicated in the upper panels of Figure 3. The lower left panel shows the cumulative distribution functions $F(y)$ for R at both risk levels, and the lower right panel shows the values of $G(y) := \int_0^y F(x) dx$ for both risk levels. Note that $G(y)$ for the higher risk level either exceeds or is coincident with $G(y)$ for the lower risk level, and therefore y at the higher risk level is a mean preserving spread of y at the lower risk level.

Tables 13 and 14 provide complete details for the example. Comparing the two tables note in particular that at the lower risk level i , $E[U(y)] = 0.6926 < 0.7030 =$




Figure 3: Aspects of the example showing entry C is feasible in Table 3.

$E[U(z)]$; whereas at the higher risk level j , $E[U(y)] = 0.6877 > 0.6801 = E[U(z)]$. For the safe asset with certain return $x = 0.1653$, $U(x) = 0.5759$. Thus the ordering is *MRS* at the lower risk level i and *RMS* at the higher risk level j , establishing the possibility of entry *C* in Table 3.

Table 13: Distribution and utility for gross returns y on the risky asset R

Lower risk level i			Higher risk level j				
w	u	p	$p \cdot w$	$p \cdot u$	p	$p \cdot w$	$p \cdot u$
0.0414	0.1443	0.1519	0.0063	0.0219	0.1519	0.0063	0.0219
0.0554	0.1930	0.1477	0.0082	0.0285	0.1477	0.0082	0.0285
0.2325	0.8103	0.0295	0.0068	0.0239	0.0295	0.0068	0.0239
0.2708	0.8375	0.1332	0.0361	0.1116	0	0	0
0.2940	0.8426	0.0823	0.0242	0.0694	0	0	0
0.5010	0.8888	0.0223	0.0112	0.0198	0	0	0
0.5097	0.8907	0.0581	0.0296	0.0517	0	0	0
0.6864	0.9301	0.0453	0.0311	0.0421	0	0	0
0.9172	0.9815	0.1773	0.1626	0.1740	0	0	0
0.9193	0.9820	0.1524	0.1401	0.1496	0.4060	0.3733	0.3987
Sums		1.0000	0.4562	0.6926	1.0000	0.4562	0.6877

Table 14: Distribution and utility for gross returns z on the mixed asset M

Lower risk level i			Higher risk level j				
w	u	p	$p \cdot w$	$p \cdot u$	p	$p \cdot w$	$p \cdot u$
0.1033	0.3601	0.1519	0.0157	0.0547	0.1519	0.0157	0.0547
0.1103	0.3844	0.1477	0.0163	0.0568	0.1477	0.0163	0.0568
0.1989	0.6931	0.0295	0.0059	0.0204	0.0295	0.0586	0.2040
0.2180	0.7598	0.1332	0.0291	0.1012	0	0	0
0.2297	0.8002	0.0823	0.0189	0.0659	0	0	0
0.3331	0.8513	0.0223	0.0074	0.0190	0	0	0
0.3375	0.8523	0.0581	0.0196	0.0495	0	0	0
0.4258	0.8720	0.0453	0.0193	0.0395	0	0	0
0.5412	0.8977	0.1773	0.0960	0.1592	0	0	0
0.5423	0.8980	0.1524	0.0826	0.1368	0.4060	0.2202	0.3646
Sums		1.0000	0.3107	0.7030	1.0000	0.3107	0.6801

Appendix B: Instructions to survey subjects.

The Australian Government is concerned about the complexity of superannuation arrangements and is looking for ways of simplifying superannuation investment choices. One possibility is to offer only three investment options for all superannuation accounts. Each investment option has a different expected rate of return (the average rate at which your investment will grow each year), and a different amount of investment risk (year to year UPSIDE and DOWNSIDE variation in the return to your investment).

The options are

Option A: All (100%) of your superannuation account is invested in a guaranteed bank deposit with a fixed rate of interest paid each year.

Option B: Your superannuation account will be divided half and half (50%/50%) between the bank account and growth assets. You can anticipate that savings in this option will grow faster than the bank deposit (Option A), but will grow more slowly and be less risky than only choosing growth assets (Option C).

Option C: All (100%) of your superannuation account is invested in assets like shares and property. On average, you can anticipate that savings in this option will grow at a faster rate than in the bank deposit (Option A) but without a guarantee. There is some risk that your account will grow faster or slower than average if you choose this option.

We are going to show you 12 sets of these options for investing your superannuation. Each set includes 3 investment options like the ones described above. Each investment option has a average rate of return and investment risk. The average rates of return stay the same in each of the twelve sets; only the risk will change. Remember that more risk of high returns also means more risk of low returns.

What we want you to do is simple. There are two questions to ask about each set of options::

1. If these superannuation options were available for you to invest your money today, which one of the three would you be most likely to choose?

2. If these superannuation options were available for you to invest your money today, which of the three would you be least likely to choose?

Your choices will inform government and industry about better ways to simplify superannuation arrangements.

Appendix C: Numeracy instrument

The instrument was administered as part of the online survey. There was no limit on response time.

Q1: In a sale, a shop is selling all items at half price. Before the sale, a sofa costs \$300. How much will it cost in the sale? (Answers: \$150; \$300; \$600; Do not know; Refuse to answer.)

Q2: If the chance of getting a disease is 10 per cent, how many people out of 1,000 would be expected to get the disease? (Answers: 10; 100; 1000; Do not know; Refuse to answer.)

Q3: A second hand car dealer is selling a car for \$6,000. This is two-thirds of what it cost new. How much did the car cost new? (Answers: \$4,000; \$6,600; \$9,000; Do not know; Refuse to answer.)

Q4: If 5 independent, unrelated people all have the winning numbers in the lottery and the prize is \$2 million, how much will each of them get? (Answers: \$40,000; \$400,000; \$500,000; Do not know; Refuse to answer.)

Q5: If there is a 1 in 10 chance of getting a disease, how many people out of 1,000 would be expected to get the disease? (Answers: 10; 100; 1000; Do not know; Refuse to answer.)