Auer Deference: Doubling Down on Delegation\u27s Defects

Together with the better-known Chevron deference rule, the doctrine articulated in Auer v. Robbins two decades ago—which makes reasonable administrative constructions of ambiguous administrative rules binding on courts in most circumstances—has become a focal point for concerns about the expanding administrative state. Auer deference, even more than Chevron deference, enlarges administrative authority in ways that are at odds with basic constitutional structures and due process requirements. Objections to Auer have provided cogent reasons for why courts should not grant deference to administrative interpretations merely because an agency’s rule is unclear. The most commonly voiced objections, however, do not explain why Congress should be disabled in all instances from granting administrators discretionary authority over rule interpretation—even in settings that do not raise serious risks of partiality or unfair surprise in administrative construction. Examining the relationship between statutorily directed deference and constitutional-structural principles clarifies the essential underlying objection to Auer and the limits of that objection. When Congress by law confers discretionary authority that does not exceed its constitutional power to delegate functions to an administrator, courts should respect that assignment of authority, unless it violates other specific constitutional commands. Yet, when delegations are at most only arguably consistent with the Constitution, extending deference—especially expanding deference as Auer does in successive determinations—exacerbates delegations’ difficulties. A reinvigorated nondelegation doctrine would solve the major Auer problem directly, and elimination of Auer-like deference would clearly be preferable to retaining the doctrine in its current form. Short of that, demanding that the statutory basis for deference is clearly articulated would provide a modest first step in cabining problems associated with constitutionally questionable delegations of lawmaking authority. Those who embrace the rule of law, whether advocates or opponents of the modern administrative state, should support that step

Distribution of iron- and sulfate-reducing bacteria across a coastal acid sulfate soil (CASS) environment: implications for passive bioremediation by tidal inundation

Coastal acid sulfate soils (CASS) constitute a serious and global environmental problem. Oxidation of iron sulfide minerals exposed to air generates sulfuric acid with consequently negative impacts on coastal and estuarine ecosystems. Tidal inundation represents one current treatment strategy for CASS, with the aim of neutralizing acidity by triggering microbial iron- and sulfate-reduction and inducing the precipitation of iron-sulfides. Although well-known functional guilds of bacteria drive these processes, their distributions within CASS environments, as well as their relationships to tidal cycling and the availability of nutrients and electron acceptors, are poorly understood. These factors will determine the long-term efficacy of “passive” CASS remediation strategies. Here we studied microbial community structure and functional guild distribution in sediment cores obtained from 10 depths ranging from 0 to 20 cm in three sites located in the supra-, inter- and sub-tidal segments, respectively, of a CASS-affected salt marsh (East Trinity, Cairns, Australia). Whole community 16S rRNA gene diversity within each site was assessed by 454 pyrotag sequencing and bioinformatic analyses in the context of local hydrological, geochemical, and lithological factors. The results illustrate spatial overlap, or close association, of iron-, and sulfate-reducing bacteria (SRB) in an environment rich in organic matter and controlled by parameters such as acidity, redox potential, degree of water saturation, and mineralization. The observed spatial distribution implies the need for empirical understanding of the timing, relative to tidal cycling, of various terminal electron-accepting processes that control acid generation and biogeochemical iron and sulfur cycling

Sludge and Ordeals

Is there an argument for behaviorally informed deregulation? In 2015, the United States government imposed 9.78 billion hours of paperwork burdens on the American people. Many of these hours are best categorized as “sludge,” understood as friction, reducing access to important licenses, programs, and benefits. Because of the sheer costs of sludge, rational people are effectively denied life-changing goods and services. The problem is compounded by the existence of behavioral biases, including inertia, present bias, and unrealistic optimism. A serious deregulatory effort should be undertaken to reduce sludge through automatic enrollment, greatly simplified forms, and reminders. At the same time, sludge can promote legitimate goals. First, it can protect program integrity, which means that policymakers might have to make difficult tradeoffs between (1) granting benefits to people who are not entitled to them and (2) denying benefits to people who are entitled to them. Second, it can overcome impulsivity, recklessness, and self-control problems. Third, it can prevent intrusions on privacy. Fourth, it can serve as a rationing device, ensuring that benefits go to people who most need them. Fifth, it can help public officials to acquire valuable information, which they can use for important purposes. In most cases, however, these defenses of sludge turn out to be far more attractive in principle than in practice. For sludge, a form of cost-benefit analysis is essential, and it will often demonstrate the need for a neglected form of deregulation: sludge reduction. For both public and private institutions, “Sludge Audits” should become routine, and they should provide a foundation for behaviorally informed deregulation. Various suggestions are offered for new action by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, which oversees the Paperwork Reduction Act; for courts; and for Congress

Looking With One Eye Closed: The Twilight of Administrative Law

n an article published recently in this Journal, Judge Loren Smith calls for a change in the focus of thinking and writing about administrative law. Attractive though his general themes are, in developing them Judge Smith passes much too quickly over two important points: the difficulty of arriving at political consensus, and the importance to political consensus of exactly those processes to which Smith objects

Regleprudence – at OIRA and Beyond

There are significant domains of legality within the administrative state that are mostly immune from judicial review and have mostly escaped the attention of legal theorists. While administrative law generally focuses on the products of agency action as they are reviewed by the judiciary, there are important aspects of regulatory activity that are legal or law-like but rarely interrogated by systematic analysis with reference to accounts about the role and nature of law. In this Article, we introduce a category of analysis we call regleprudence, a sibling of jurisprudence and legisprudence. Once we explore some regleprudential norms, we delve into one case study – the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs and the legal work it undertakes through regulatory review – and gesture at how more general attention to regleprudence can improve our understanding of important corners of the Executive Branch

Race, Crime, and Institutional Design

Minorities are gravely overrepresented in every stage of the criminal process--from pedestrian and automobile stops, to searches and seizures, to arrests and convictions, to incarceration and capital punishment. While racial data can provide a snapshot of the current state of affairs, such information rarely satisfies questions of causation, and usually only sets the scene for normative theory

Regleprudence – at OIRA and Beyond

There are significant domains of legality within the administrative state that are mostly immune from judicial review and have mostly escaped the attention of legal theorists. While administrative law generally focuses on the products of agency action as they are reviewed by the judiciary, there are important aspects of regulatory activity that are legal or law-like but rarely interrogated by systematic analysis with reference to accounts about the role and nature of law. In this Article, we introduce a category of analysis we call regleprudence, a sibling of jurisprudence and legisprudence. Once we explore some regleprudential norms, we delve into one case study – the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs and the legal work it undertakes through regulatory review – and gesture at how more general attention to regleprudence can improve our understanding of important corners of the Executive Branch