A Neural Framework for Organization and Flexible Utilization of Episodic Memory in Cumulatively Learning Baby Humanoids

Cumulatively developing robots offer a unique opportunity to reenact the constant interplay between neural mechanisms related to learning, memory, prospection, and abstraction from the perspective of an integrated system that acts, learns, remembers, reasons, and makes mistakes. Situated within such interplay lie some of the computationally elusive and fundamental aspects of cognitive behavior: the ability to recall and flexibly exploit diverse experiences of one’s past in the context of the present to realize goals, simulate the future, and keep learning further. This article is an adventurous exploration in this direction using a simple engaging scenario of how the humanoid iCub learns to construct the tallest possible stack given an arbitrary set of objects to play with. The learning takes place cumulatively, with the robot interacting with different objects (some previously experienced, some novel) in an open-ended fashion. Since the solution itself depends on what objects are available in the “now,” multiple episodes of past experiences have to be remembered and creatively integrated in the context of the present to be successful. Starting from zero, where the robot knows nothing, we explore the computational basis of organization episodic memory in a cumulatively learning humanoid and address (1) how relevant past experiences can be reconstructed based on the present context, (2) how multiple stored episodic memories compete to survive in the neural space and not be forgotten, (3) how remembered past experiences can be combined with explorative actions to learn something new, and (4) how multiple remembered experiences can be recombined to generate novel behaviors (without exploration). Through the resulting behaviors of the robot as it builds, breaks, learns, and remembers, we emphasize that mechanisms of episodic memory are fundamental design features necessary to enable the survival of autonomous robots in a real world where neither everything can be known nor can everything be experienced

Children's Divergent Thinking Improves When They Understand False Beliefs

This research utilized longitudinal and cross sectional methods to investigate the relation between the development of a representational theory of mind and children's growing ability to search their own minds for appropriate problem solutions. In the first experiment 59 pre-school children were given three false-belief tasks and a divergent thinking task. Those children who passed false-belief tasks produced significantly more items, as well as more original items, in response to divergent thinking questions than those children who failed. This significant association persisted even when chronological age, verbal and nonverbal general ability were partialed out. In a second study 20 children who failed the false-belief tasks in the first experiment were re-tested three months later. Again, those who now passed the false-belief tasks were significantly better at the divergent thinking task than those who continued to fail. The associations between measures of divergent thinking and understanding false-beliefs remained significant when controlling for the covariates. Earlier divergent thinking scores did not predict false-belief understanding three months later. Instead, children who passed false-belief tasks on the second measure improved significantly in relation to their own earlier performance and improved significantly more than children who continued to fail. False-belief task performance was significantly correlated to the amount of intra-individual improvement in divergent thinking even when age, verbal and nonverbal skills were partialed out. These findings suggest that developments in common underlying skills are responsible for the improvement in understanding other minds and searching one's own. Changes in representational and executive skills are discussed as potential causes for the improvement

Your space or mine? : Mapping self in time

Peer reviewedPublisher PD

Why are we not flooded by involuntary thoughts about the past and future? Testing the cognitive inhibition dependency hypothesis

© The Author(s) 2018In everyday life, involuntary thoughts about future plans and events occur as often as involuntary thoughts about the past. However, compared to involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs), such episodic involuntary future thoughts (IFTs) have become a focus of study only recently. The aim of the present investigation was to examine why we are not constantly flooded by IFTs and IAMs given that they are often triggered by incidental cues while performing undemanding activities. One possibility is that activated thoughts are suppressed by the inhibitory control mechanism, and therefore depleting inhibitory control should enhance the frequency of both IFTs and IAMs. We report an experiment with a between-subjects design, in which participants in the depleted inhibition condition performed a 60-min high-conflict Stroop task before completing a laboratory vigilance task measuring the frequency of IFTs and IAMs. Participants in the intact inhibition condition performed a version of the Stroop task that did not deplete inhibitory control. To control for physical and mental fatigue resulting from performing the 60-min Stroop tasks in experimental conditions, participants in the control condition completed only the vigilance task. Contrary to predictions, the number of IFTs and IAMs reported during the vigilance task, using the probe-caught method, did not differ across conditions. However, manipulation checks showed that participants’ inhibitory resources were reduced in the depleted inhibition condition, and participants were more tired in the experimental than in the control conditions. These initial findings suggest that neither inhibitory control nor physical and mental fatigue affect the frequency of IFTs and IAMs.Peer reviewedFinal Published versio

The mirror neuron system as revealed through neonatal imitation: presence from birth, predictive power, and evidence of plasticity

There is strong evidence that neonates imitate previously unseen behaviors. These behaviors are predominantly used in social interactions, demonstrating neonates’ ability and motivation to engage with others. Research on neonatal imitation can provide a wealth of information about the early mirror neuron system (MNS): namely, its functional characteristics, its plasticity from birth, and its relation to skills later in development. Though numerous studies document the existence of neonatal imitation in the laboratory, little is known about its natural occurrence during parent-infant interactions and its plasticity as a consequence of experience. We review these critical aspects of imitation, which we argue are necessary for understanding the early action-perception system. We address common criticisms and misunderstandings about neonatal imitation and discuss methodological differences among studies. Recent work reveals that individual differences in neonatal imitation positively correlate with later social, cognitive, and motor development. We propose that such variation in neonatal imitation could reflect important individual differences of the MNS. Although postnatal experience is not necessary for imitation, we present evidence that neonatal imitation is influenced by experience in the first week of life

Anxiety: here and beyond

The future harbours the potential for myriad threats to the fitness of organisms, and many species prepare accordingly based on indicators of hazards. Here, we distinguish between defensive responses on the basis of sensed cues and those based on autocues generated by mental simulations of the future in humans. Whereas sensed threat cues usually induce specific responses with reference to particular features of the environment or generalized responses to protect against diffuse threats, autocues generated by mental simulations of the future enable strategic preparation for hazards that may not require an immediate response. The overlap of these mechanisms makes defence effective and versatile, yet can manifest as contemporary anxiety disorders in humans