The Focal Account: Indirect Lie Detection Need Not Access Unconscious, Implicit Knowledge

People are poor lie detectors, but accuracy can be improved by making the judgment indirectly. In a typical demonstration, participants are not told that the experiment is about deception at all. Instead, they judge whether the speaker appears, say, tense or not. Surprisingly, these indirect judgments better reflect the speaker’s veracity. A common explanation is that participants have an implicit awareness of deceptive behavior, even when they cannot explicitly identify it. We propose an alternative explanation. Attending to a range of behaviors, as explicit raters do, can lead to conflict: A speaker may be thinking hard (indicating deception) but not tense (indicating honesty). In 2 experiments, we show that the judgment (and in turn the correct classification rate) is the result of attending to a single behavior, as indirect raters are instructed to do. Indirect lie detection does not access implicit knowledge, but simply focuses the perceiver on more useful cues

Are you hiding something from me? Uncertainty and judgments about the intentions of others

We are skilled at reading other’s intentions – until they try to hide them. We are biased towards taking at face value what others say, but it is not clear why. One possibility is that we are uncertain, and make the decision by relying on heuristics. Half of our participants judged whether speakers were lying or telling the truth. The other half did not have to commit to a judgment: they were allowed to say they were unsure. We expected these participants would no longer need to rely on simplified heuristics and so show a reduced bias compared to the forced choice condition. Surprisingly, those who could say they were unsure were more biased towards believing people. We consider two possible accounts, both highlighting the importance of examining raters’ uncertainty, which have so far been undocumented. Allowing raters to abstain from judgment gives new insights into the judgment-forming process

Joint perception: gaze and beliefs about social context

The way that we look at images is influenced by social context. Previously we demonstrated this phenomenon of joint perception. If lone participants believed that an unseen other person was also looking at the images they saw, it shifted the balance of their gaze between negative and positive images. The direction of this shift depended upon whether participants thought that later they would be compared against the other person or would be collaborating with them. Here we examined whether the joint perception is caused by beliefs about shared experience (looking at the same images) or beliefs about joint action (being engaged in the same task with the images). We place our results in the context of the emerging field of joint action, and discuss their connection to notions of group emotion and situated cognition. Such findings reveal the persuasive and subtle effect of social context upon cognitive and perceptual processes

The Bodily Movements of Liars

We measured the continuous bodily motion of participants as they lied to experimenters. These lies were spontaneous rather than elicited, and occurred for different motivations. In one situation, participants were given the opportunity to lie about their performance on a maths test in order to win money. In another, they witnessed one experimenter accidentally break a laptop. When asked what had happened, participants were motivated to lie and deny any knowledge. Across these situations, participants lied 61% of the time, allowing us to contrast the body movements of liars with truth tellers as they answered neutral and critical questions. Those who lied had significantly reduced bodily motion. In one case this motion appeared before the experimenter had even asked the critical question. We conclude that a person’s bodily dynamics can be indicative of their cognitive and effective states, even when they would rather conceal them

Can the unconscious boost lie detection accuracy?

Recently, a variety of methods have been used to show that unconscious processes can boost lie detection accuracy. This article considers the latest developments in the context of research into unconscious cognition. Unconscious cognition has been under attack in recent years because the findings do not replicate, and when they do reliably improve performance they fail to exclude the possibility that conscious processing is at work. Here we show that work into unconscious lie detection suffers from the same weaknesses. Future research would benefit from taking a stronger theoretical stance and explicitly attempting to exclude conscious processing accounts

Exploring the movement dynamics of deception

Both the science and the everyday practice of detecting a lie rest on the same assumption: hidden cognitive states that the liar would like to remain hidden nevertheless influence observable behavior. This assumption has good evidence. The insights of professional interrogators, anecdotal evidence, and body language textbooks have all built up a sizeable catalog of non-verbal cues that have been claimed to distinguish deceptive and truthful behavior. Typically, these cues are discrete, individual behaviors—a hand touching a mouth, the rise of a brow—that distinguish lies from truths solely in terms of their frequency or duration. Research to date has failed to establish any of these non-verbal cues as a reliable marker of deception. Here we argue that perhaps this is because simple tallies of behavior can miss out on the rich but subtle organization of behavior as it unfolds over time. Research in cognitive science from a dynamical systems perspective has shown that behavior is structured across multiple timescales, with more or less regularity and structure. Using tools that are sensitive to these dynamics, we analyzed body motion data from an experiment that put participants in a realistic situation of choosing, or not, to lie to an experimenter. Our analyses indicate that when being deceptive, continuous fluctuations of movement in the upper face, and somewhat in the arms, are characterized by dynamical properties of less stability, but greater complexity. For the upper face, these distinctions are present despite no apparent differences in the overall amount of movement between deception and truth. We suggest that these unique dynamical signatures of motion are indicative of both the cognitive demands inherent to deception and the need to respond adaptively in a social context

Intrinsic hole mobility and trapping in a regio-regular poly(thiophene)

The transport properties of high-performance thin-film transistors (TFT) made with a regio-regular poly(thiophene) semiconductor (PQT-12) are reported. The room-temperature field-effect mobility of the devices varied between 0.004 cm2/V s and 0.1 cm2/V s and was controlled through thermal processing of the material, which modified the structural order. The transport properties of TFTs were studied as a function of temperature. The field-effect mobility is thermally activated in all films at T<200 K and the activation energy depends on the charge density in the channel. The experimental data is compared to theoretical models for transport, and we argue that a model based on the existence of a mobility edge and an exponential distribution of traps provides the best interpretation of the data. The differences in room-temperature mobility are attributed to different widths of the shallow localized state distribution at the edge of the valence band due to structural disorder in the film. The free carrier mobility of the mobile states in the ordered regions of the film is the same in all structural modifications and is estimated to be between 1 and 4 cm2/V s.Comment: 20 pages, 8 figure

Living conditions and respiratory health in Walmer Township and Wells Estate, Port Elizabeth, South Africa

Background. Many impoverished communities in South Africa (SA) simultaneously face multiple preventable socioenvironmental hazards associated with elevated burdens of ill health. One such hazard is failure to institute effective buffer zones between human settlements and point sources of pollution such as airports and industrial zones.Objectives. To gather information on living conditions, housing quality and health status in two poor communities in the SA coastal industrial city of Port Elizabeth.Methods. The study was undertaken in Walmer Township, situated in close proximity to Port Elizabeth International Airport, and Wells Estate, which borders two industrial sites. Approximately 120 households were randomly selected from each study site. Following written informed consent, information on the neighbourhood environment and housing conditions was collected through administration of a structured questionnaire.Results. The two study sites were similar in respect of household language, income, education, high levels of debt servicing and high reliance on social grants. Relative to Walmer Township, higher levels of indoor dust and bad odours in the neighbourhood were reported in Wells Estate, as were higher rates of selected respiratory ill-health symptoms. Upper respiratory tract symptoms were significantly associated with reports of high levels of indoor dust, while lower respiratory tract symptoms were significantly associated with low income, overcrowding, and having a young child in the household.Conclusions. The study highlights a scenario of a triple environmental hazard to health in the study communities: (i) poverty; (ii) poor-quality housing; and (iii) lack of an effective buffer zone between the study communities and local point sources of pollution. Respiratory ill-health conditions were significantly associated with poverty, household composition and living conditions

Spectrum of Sizes for Perfect Deletion-Correcting Codes

One peculiarity with deletion-correcting codes is that perfect $t$-deletion-correcting codes of the same length over the same alphabet can have different numbers of codewords, because the balls of radius $t$ with respect to the Levenshte\u{\i}n distance may be of different sizes. There is interest, therefore, in determining all possible sizes of a perfect $t$-deletion-correcting code, given the length $n$ and the alphabet size~$q$. In this paper, we determine completely the spectrum of possible sizes for perfect $q$-ary 1-deletion-correcting codes of length three for all $q$, and perfect $q$-ary 2-deletion-correcting codes of length four for almost all $q$, leaving only a small finite number of cases in doubt.Comment: 23 page

Epistemic Schmagency?

Constructivist approaches in epistemology and ethics offer a promising account of normativity. But constructivism faces a powerful Schmagency Objection, raised by David Enoch. While Enoch’s objection has been widely discussed in the context of practical norms, no one has yet explored how the Schmagency Objection might undermine epistemic constructivism. In this paper, I rectify that gap. First, I develop the objection against a prominent form of epistemic constructivism, Belief Constitutivism. Belief Constitutivism is susceptible to a Schmagency Objection, I argue, because it locates the source of normativity in the belief rather than the agent. In the final section, I propose a version of epistemic constructivism that locates epistemic normativity as constitutive of agency. I argue that this version has the resources to respond to the Schmagency Objection