The Best of Times, the Worst of Times: Understanding Pro-cyclical Mortality

A growing literature documents cyclical movements in mortality and health. We examine this pattern more closely and attempt to identify the mechanisms behind it. Specifically, we distinguish between mechanisms that rely on fluctuations in own employment or time use and those involving factors that are external to the individual. Our investigation suggests that changes in individuals’ own behavior contribute very little to pro-cyclical mortality. Looking across broad age and gender groups, we find that own-group employment rates are not systematically related to own-group mortality. In addition, we find that most of the additional deaths that occur during times of economic growth are among the elderly, particularly elderly women, who have limited labor force attachment. Focusing on mortality among the elderly, we show that cyclicality is especially strong for deaths occurring in nursing homes, and is stronger in states where a higher fraction of the elderly reside in nursing homes. We also demonstrate that staffing in skilled nursing facilities moves counter-cyclically. Taken together, these findings suggest that cyclical fluctuations in the mortality rate may be largely driven by fluctuations in the quality of health care.

The Visceral \u3cem\u3eRetia Mirabilia\u3c/em\u3e of Tuna and Sharks: An Annotated Translation and Discussion of the Eschricht and Müller 1835 Paper and Related Papers

The focus of this volume is an annotated translation of the classic work by J. Müller and D.F. Eschricht on the visceral anatomy of the bluefin tuna, Thunnus thynnus, published in 1835. This text, with its outstanding figures, is to this day the definitive work on the anatomy of the bluefin viscera and especially on the circulation to and from the viscera. In addition, the text is historically important in that it represents the first comprehensive description of visceral relia mirabilia in a fish. In this work, Eschricht & Müller meticulously elucidate the pattern of blood flow to, within, and from the viscera. In addition they describe and speculate about the function of such peculiar anatomical structures such as: the visceral relia mirabilia, the radiating liver vessels and the unusually large visceral nerves seen in this species. We have annotated the translation in order to connect the findings of Eschricht & Müller with our current understanding of warm fishes. Eschricht & Müller published a supplement to the tuna article in which they describe the visceral anatomy of the common thresher shark, Alopias vulpinus. We provide an annotated translation of this text as well. The main point of the supplement is that the vascular arrangement of the thresher viscera is completely analogous to that in T. thynnus, and distinct from that found in the other warm sharks, such as Lamna nasus, implying that endothermy has evolved independently at least twice within elasmobranchs. Finally, to round out the historical aspect of this volume, we include two papers and their abstracts by John Davy, who is credited with the first body temperature measurements of warm fishes. Eschricht & Müller were aware of Davy\u27s measurements and discuss them briefly in their paper on tuna visceral anatomy. We also include plates from the 1923 paper by Kishinouye and sorne color photographs of the visceral relia from our dissections. The last two sections of this volume are facsimiles of the two texts by Eschricht & Müller as they appeared in their original form

Public and Private Forms of Opportunism within the Organization: A Joint Examination of Budget and Effort Behavior

We assert that some forms of opportunistic behavior within the organization are relatively transparent and, therefore, public in nature. Further , while organizations can tightly control such public opportunism, it may not be optimal for them to do so in the presence of private opportunism. To study how public and private forms of opportunism differ and interact, we jointly examine budget and effort behavior in a participative budgeting experiment. We group participants into producer /manager pairs and set the parameters such that the producer extracts the largest share of surplus from the manager by publicly setting the budget at zero and privately providing low effort. When the producer unilaterally sets the budget, the public opportunism of budgetary slack is higher and more affected by learning than the private opportunism of low effort. Giving the manager the power to reject the budget not only reduces budgetary slack by about 50 percent, but also generates reciprocity expectations and behavior. In particular, managers who allow more budgetary slack expect and receive higher effort from their producers on average. This reciprocity increases organizational performance by increasing the expected pay of the manager without decreasing the expected pay of the producer

A Test of Biochemical Symmorphosis in a Heterothermic Tissue: Bluefin Tuna White Muscle

To test predictions of biochemical symmorphosis, we measured the activity of seven consecutive glycolytic enzymes at three positions along the heterothermic white muscle of the bluefin tuna. Biochemical symmorphosis predicts that adjustments in sequential enzyme concentrations along a thermal gradient should occur as a function of the thermal sensitivity of the enzymes to ensure that no one enzyme in the pathway is in excess at any point along the gradient. We found no evidence for adjustments in enzyme quantity or quality along the thermal gradient, as well as no evidence for the prediction that the more temperature-sensitive enzymes would exhibit more dramatic compensation. Conservation of glycolytic flux in the cold exterior and warm interior muscle may be achieved by the near insensitivity of glyceraldehyde- 3-phosphate dehydrogenase to temperature in this tissue. This may have the added benefit of moderating flux during seasonal or transient changes in the thermal gradient. According to the strictest application of biochemical symmorphosis, such a mechanism represents adequate, yet suboptimal desig

Using Analysts’ Forecasts to Measure Properties of Analysts’ Information Environment

This paper presents a model that relates properties of the analysts\u27 information environment to the properties of their forecasts. First, we express forecast dispersion and error in the mean forecast in terms of analyst uncertainty and consensus (that is, the degree to which analysts share a common belief). Second, we reverse the relations to show how uncertainty and consensus can be measured by combining forecast dispersion, error in the mean forecast, and the number of forecasts. Third, we show that the quality of common and private information available to analysts can be measured using these same observable variables. The relations we present are intuitive and easily applied in empirical studies

Determinants of Moral Judgments Regarding Budgetary Slack:An Experimental Examination of Pay Scheme and Personal Values

We study moral judgments regarding budgetary slack made by participants at the end of a participative budgeting experiment in which an expectation for a truthful budget was present. We find that participants who set budgets under a slackinducing pay scheme, and therefore built relatively high levels of budgetary slack, judged significant budgetary slack to be unethical on average, whereas participants who set budgets under a truth-inducing pay scheme did not. This suggests that the slack-inducing pay scheme generated a moral frame by setting economic self-interest against common social norms such as honesty or responsibility. We also find that participants who scored high in traditional values and empathy on a pre-experiment personality questionnaire (JPI-R) were more likely to judge significant budgetary slack to be unethical. These results suggest that financial incentives play a role in determining the moral frame of the budgeting setting and that personal values play a role in determining how individuals respond to that moral frame

Can a Code of Ethics Improve Manager Behavior and Investor Confidence? An Experimental Study

Policy makers and corporations have recently emphasized a code of ethics as an effective aspect of corporate governance. The corporate governance literature in accounting, however, provides little empirical or theoretical support for this emphasis. We address this gap between public policy and the literature by studying the effectiveness of a code of ethics in an experimental setting. Using Bicchieri\u27s (2006) model of social norm activation, we predict that a code of ethics will improve manager return behavior and investor confidence to the extent that it activates social norms that control opportunistic behavior. Further, we predict that adding a certification choice whereby the manager can publicly certify that he will adhere to the code will enhance the potential for the code of ethics to activate such norms. We find that a code of ethics only improves manager return behavior and investor confidence when the code incorporates a public certification choice by the manager. When the code is present but there is no certification choice, manager return behavior does not improve and investor confidence erodes over time because of increased expectations that are not met by managers. An analysis of individual return decisions and exit questionnaire responses supports the activation of social norms as the underlying mechanism behind our results

Can Agent Cheap Talk Mitigate Agency Problems in the Presence of a Noisy Performance Measure? An Experimental Test in a Single- and Multi-Period Setting

Given traditional agency theory assumptions and unobservable effort in a single-period setting, a moral hazard arises in which the agent is expected to shirk and provide the minimal possible effort after contracting with the principal. Traditional solutions to this agency problem include paying the agent a financial incentive tied to some noisy measure of performance or allowing the agent to develop a reputation over multiple periods. As the noisiness of the performance-measure increases, however, these traditional solutions become increasingly costly and ineffective. In many single- and multi-period agency settings in the firm, however, the agent can communicate a promised level of effort to the principal prior to contracting. We document that this pre-contract communication, which is non-enforceable and therefore considered cheap talk by traditional economic theory, can be highly effective in mitigating the moral hazard problem in agency theory. In a repeating single-period experimental setting where production is observable but is a very noisy indicator of effort, communication of a promised level of effort results in higher pay for the agent, higher effort, and higher expected profit for the principal than the control group. When the principal and agent interact over multiple periods, reputation building is ineffective, but cheap talk continues to yield superior outcomes. These results are consistent with recent economic theory incorporating social norms such as the norm of promise-keeping