Dissipative stability theory for linear repetitive processes with application in iterative learning control

This paper develops a new set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the stability of linear repetitive processes, based on a dissipative setting for analysis. These conditions reduce the problem of determining whether a linear repetitive process is stable or not to that of checking for the existence of a solution to a set of linear matrix inequalities (LMIs). Testing the resulting conditions only requires compu- tations with matrices whose entries are constant in comparison to alternatives where frequency response computations are required

A Critique of the Second Circuit\u27s Analysis of New York and New Jersey Joint Venture Law in Arditi v. Dubitzky and Sagamore Corp. v. Diamond West Energy Corp.

When one party is encumbered with a liability, it will often look for another party to assume some of the costs. One method of forcing costs to be shared by another is to have a joint venturer contribute. Not surprisingly, when a liability arises, the liable party will be liberal in its interpretation of who among its relationships is a joint venturer, while a potential contributor will be conservative in its interpretation. Thus, it is important to identify analytical tools to determine if a joint venture exists. The first section of this article discusses the core legal elements of a joint venture and presents basic techniques for determining its existence. The second section discusses the majority view regarding the relationship between joint ventures and the corporations created to effect their purposes; the New York and New Jersey exception (the Exception ) to that view; and the Second Circuit\u27s interpretation of the Exception. Under the Exception, which can potentially determine cost allocation, a valid joint venture and attendant liabilities cease to exist once the joint venture incorporates. The Second Circuit\u27s interpretation has essentially permitted the rule to consume the Exception

Four Easy Pieces to Balance Privacy and Accountability in Public Higher Education: A Response to Wrongdoing Ranging from Petty Corruption to the Sandusky and Penn State Tragedy

This Article offers four legislative solutions—four easy pieces—to properly balance confidentiality and accountability in publicly financed higher education. It presents (1) a fix to the Federal Student Privacy Act that will prevent it from being misapplied as a defense to proper freedom of information act requests, (2) a bill to require the affirmative disclosure of admission practices at public schools receiving federal funding, (3) a bill that imposes direct costs, through the bankruptcy code, on schools that misrepresent their data regarding graduation and post-graduation opportunities, and (4) a revision of the federal freedom of information act to have it apply to those public schools that receive federal funding

The Unfairness Proof: Exposing the Fatal Flaw Hidden in the Rule Governing the Use of Criminal Convictions To Impeach Character for Truthfulness

Federal Rule of Evidence 609 (adopted by various states as well) allows for the introduction of certain convictions at trial to impeach the credibility— i.e., character for truthfulness—of any witness. The rule bifurcates its requirements between those that apply to criminal defendants—who, in theory, are afforded greater protection throughout the law than are all other participants in trials—and all remaining witnesses. The most important distinction between the standards that apply to these two classes of witnesses is that for prior crimes of criminal defendants to be introduced to impeach their credibility, those wrongdoings must survive a special balancing test spelled out within Rule 609. In contrast, evidence of prior crimes used to assess the character for truthfulness of non-criminal-defendant witnesses is subject to the well-known balancing test found in Rule 403. Critically, commentators, scholars, and courts alike (with one notable judicial distinction) have paid virtually no attention to the actual language of Rule 609’s key operating provision applicable to criminal defendants. As written, the rule is not merely more favorable to criminal defendants, as many have easily concluded; it is manifestly inoperable. This crucial flaw in the rule has largely been overlooked. After detailing the historical and legislative development of Rule 609, this Article, for the first time: (1) shows that courts have been routinely applying a similitude of Rule 609 that contravenes the express language enacted by Congress, (2) demonstrates, through a Euclidean mathematical proof, that Rule 609, as written, is inoperable against criminal defendants, and (3) evaluates several methods to address this longstanding, overlooked problem with the rule

A Critique of the Second Circuit\u27s Analysis of New York and New Jersey Joint Venture Law in Arditi v. Dubitzky and Sagamore Corp. v. Diamond West Energy Corp.

When one party is encumbered with a liability, it will often look for another party to assume some of the costs. One method of forcing costs to be shared by another is to have a joint venturer contribute. Not surprisingly, when a liability arises, the liable party will be liberal in its interpretation of who among its relationships is a joint venturer, while a potential contributor will be conservative in its interpretation. Thus, it is important to identify analytical tools to determine if a joint venture exists. The first section of this article discusses the core legal elements of a joint venture and presents basic techniques for determining its existence. The second section discusses the majority view regarding the relationship between joint ventures and the corporations created to effect their purposes; the New York and New Jersey exception (the Exception ) to that view; and the Second Circuit\u27s interpretation of the Exception. Under the Exception, which can potentially determine cost allocation, a valid joint venture and attendant liabilities cease to exist once the joint venture incorporates. The Second Circuit\u27s interpretation has essentially permitted the rule to consume the Exception