Impression management and retrospective sense-making in corporate annual reports: banks' graphical reporting during the global financial crisis

This study investigates two potentially complementary reporting scenarios in annual reports: reactive impression management and retrospective sense-making. It examines stock market performance graphs in European listed banks? annual reports before and during the global financial crisis. Our results indicate that banks reacted to the global financial crisis by omitting stock market performance graphs from the annual report and from its most prominent sections. On the other hand, banks reduced favorable distortions and favorable performance comparisons. No significant evidence of retrospective sense-making is found. Overall, the findings are consistent with impression management incorporating human cognitive biases, with companies preferring misrepresentation by omission over misrepresentation by commission. Under high public scrutiny, banks appear to seek to provide a more favorable view by concealing negative information rather than by favorable distortions or comparisons. The study contributes to the development of impression management theories. It uses a psychological interpretation that incorporates human cognitive biases, rather than adopting a purely economically based perspective

Auditors’ Quantitative Materiality Judgments: Properties and Implications for Financial Reporting Reliability

We analyze data made available through the PCAOB (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board) to provide descriptive evidence on the properties of auditors' actual quantitative materiality judgments and the implications of those judgments for financial reporting. Auditors' quantitative materiality judgments do not appear to result simply from applying conventional rules of thumb (e.g., 5% of pretax income), but instead are associated with size-related financial statement outcomes (income, revenues, and assets), where the relative importance of the size-related outcomes varies with client characteristics such as financial performance. Using the distribution of actual materiality amounts reported by auditors to the PCAOB as part of the audit-inspection process, we construct a materiality-judgment measure that locates a specific materiality amount within a normal range that is both comparable across varying client characteristics and supported by guidance in audit firm internal policy manuals. We find that looser materiality (an amount closer to the high end of a normal materiality range) is associated with fewer audit hours and lower audit fees, supporting the construct validity of this measure. We also find that looser materiality is associated with lower amounts of proposed audit adjustments and, in extreme cases, with a greater incidence of restatements, highlighting the importance of auditor materiality assessments for financial reporting reliability.12 month embargo; published online: 3 July 2019This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at [email protected]

The use and abuse of graphs in annual reports: a theoretical framework and empirical study

This study investigates the use and abuse of graphs in external financial reporting. From an analysis of the annual reports of 240 large UK companies for the year ended 1989 we document the nature and extent of graph usage. The average number of graphs per annual report is 5.9. with 65% of companies graphing at least one key financial variable. Drawing on modern theories of graphical perception we identify selectivity in the use of graphs, and non-compliance with the principles of graph construction, as potential distortions in the communication process. We find that companies with 'good' performance are significantly more likely to use financial graphs. Material measurement distortions occur in 30% of these graphs, with the underlying numerical data being exaggerated by an average of 10.7%. We conclude that auditors' and directors' responsibilities in this area should be made more explicit