Commercial applications of company law in Malaysia, 3rd. ed.

Commercial Applications of Company Law in Malaysia (Professional) is a comprehensive company law reference guide which takes into consideration the unique requirements of students, lecturers and professionals in area of law. This practical reference focuses on ordinary events and issues faced by companies, and explain and applies the law in a concise and accessible manner. This book also introduces a unique teaching method which has been well received in Australia and is reflecting the latest companies (Amendment) Act 2007

Governance Structures of Initial Public Offerings in Australia

We study the relationship between venture capital financing, CEO ownership, compensation structure, and board structures for a group of Australian IPO firms. Results suggest that board structures are influenced by the industry the firm is in, and presence of venture capitalists results in a larger board with a higher number of outside directors. CEOs in non VC-backed firms own a significantly higher fraction of firm shares, and CEO ownership is negatively related to both board size and outside blockholders. VC-backed firms are significantly more likely to disclose information about CEO compensation packages, but the relationship between actual board size and structure and disclosure is insignificant. Finally, we also find that venture capital backing significantly decreases the time to change-in-status for firms, whereby firms cease to exist as independent entities. Copyright (c) 2007 The Authors; Journal compilation (c) 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

The determinants of CEO compensation: rent extraction or labour demand?

CEO compensation is topical and controversial and accordingly receiving considerable attention by various stakeholders. We investigate whether rent extraction or labour demand explains CEO compensation level in Australia. We do so by examining the determinants (economic, governance and ownership) of CEO compensation level and explore the relationship between predicted excess compensation and subsequent firm performance. Our results suggest that governance and ownership attributes, in addition to economic attributes, are significant determinants of CEO compensation. However, these attributes differentially determine the various components of CEO compensation. Our evidence is consistent with: (1) the determination of fixed salary and share-based compensation reflecting a firm's demand for a high-quality CEO; and (2) the CEO's ability to extract rent through bonus and options compensation, particularly for smaller firms or firms with above average performance. However, the rent extraction is not economically significant and does not persist beyond one year. This is in sharp contrast to the US evidence where rent extraction through CEO compensation is pervasive, economically significant and persistent [Core, J., Holthausen, R., Larcker, D., 1999. Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics 51, 371-406]