Economists Examine File-Sharing and Music Sales

The decline in sales of music CDs and the recording industry’s attempts to reverse the decline have been much in the news over the last few years. Since this decline began at the same time that file-sharing became popular, and since file-sharing would be expected to lead to a decline in sales, file-sharing is the leading candidate among possible causes of this decline. At the center of the file-sharing debate is the empirical issue of whether or not file-sharing decreases sales. In this paper I examine the different empirical methodologies that have been chosen by economists studying this issue. The studies use different methodologies but nevertheless find, almost unanimously, that file- sharing has led to a serious decline in record sales, except for one highly publicized study that reaches very different, and in my opinion, highly implausible conclusions.mp3, filesharing, music, downloading, napster

SEVENTEEN FAMOUS ECONOMISTS WEIGH IN ON COPYRIGHT: THE ROLE OF THEORY, EMPIRICS, AND NETWORK EFFECTS

In 2002, seventeen economists including five Nobel Laureates presented an amicus curiae brief discussing the economics of copyright extension in support of the petitioners in Eldred v. Ashcroft. The economists’ amicus brief was unusual in several respects, not least in that it brought together a group of economists almost as notable for its diversity of opinion (spanning the ideological spectrum from Kenneth Arrow to Milton Friedman) as for its academic distinction. When such a distinguished and broad panel of economists readers would have every reason to believe that the arguments set forth in this document are sound down to the smallest details. Yet this is not the case. Scholars in the fields of law and economics will continue to address the economics of copyright duration in the foreseeable future, so it is important that they understand the imperfections in the economists’ brief. This Article provides a counterweight to the amicus brief, identifying some points the economists ignored, clarifying some discussions they did not quite get right, and providing data that runs counter to some assumptions they made.Eldred, coypright, sonny bono, lessig

Seventeen Famous Economists Weigh in on Copyright: The Role of Theory, Empirics, and Network Effects

The case of Eldred v. Ashcroft, which sought to have the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA, aka Sonny Bono Copyright Act) declared unconstitutional, was recently decided by the Supreme Court. A remarkable group of seventeen economists including five Noble laureates, representing a wide spectrum of opinion in economics, submitted an amicus curie brief in support of Eldred. The economists condemned CTEA on the grounds that the revenues earned during the extension are so heavily discounted that they have almost no value, while the extended protection of aged works creates immediate monopoly deadweight losses and increases the costs of creating new derivative works. More important, we believe, than the particulars of this case, is the articulation of the economic issues involved in copyright extension. These issues are not fully developed in the brief, nor is the case as one sided as the Eldred economists claimed. First, private ownership of creative works may internalize potentially important externalities with respect to the use of existing works and the creation of derivative works. Second, the Eldred economists neglect the elasticity of the supply of creative works in their analysis, focusing instead solely on the benefits received by authors. Consequently, they may underestimate the potential for additional creativity, which confers benefits immediately. Third, the Eldred economists neglect certain features of copyright law, such as fair use, the distinction between idea and expression, and the parody exemption, which mitigate the costs of copyright. Finally, we present data that counters a common claim that copyright extension so far out in the future can have little effect on creativity. The small fraction of books that have the majority of commercial value when they are new appear to remain valuable for periods of time that are consistent with the expanded term of copyright under CTEA.Technology and Industry

Economics of Qwerty and Fgğıod

After summarizing the path dependency concept which began with the article named as “Clio and the Economics of Qwerty” written by Paul David in 1985, I will associate the path dependency with the reasons of why is F keyboard not used widely instead of Q keyboards, even though F keyboards were tried to be mandatory by the state in our country

Intellectual Property Infringements & 3D Printing: Decentralized Piracy

By drastically reducing the role of intermediaries in manufacturing, 3D printing is likely to set about the next wave of decentralized, non-commercial infringements of intellectual property rights. Drawing upon the lessons from the entertainment industry’s litigation campaign against illegal file sharing, this paper describes some of the common characteristics of decentralized piracy. I show that, like copyright enforcement on file-sharing networks, intellectual property enforcement of 3D printing faces economic and social norm complications that make traditional, litigation based enforcement ineffective and possibly counterproductive

Copyright Complements and Piracy-Induced Deadweight Loss

Conventional wisdom suggests that copyright piracy may in effect reduce the deadweight loss resulting from copyright protection because it allows the public unlimited access to information goods at a price closer to marginal cost. It has been further contended that lower copyright protection would benefit society as a whole, as long as authors continue to receive sufficient incentives from alternative revenue streams in ancillary markets, for example, touring, advertising, and merchandizing. By evaluating the empirical evidence from the music, performance, and video game markets, this Article highlights a counterintuitive yet important point: copyright piracy, while decreasing the deadweight loss in the music market, could simultaneously increase the deadweight loss in ancillary markets via the interaction between complementary goods. The deadweight loss in ancillary markets tends to become dominant if a substantial portion of relevant consumers have high valuation but low frequency in music consumption, are risk averse toward up-front payment with uncertain demand, or discount future value at a high rate. Additionally, this Article’s findings shed new light on the current debates over several competing propositions to reform indirect copyright liabilities in the digital age

Television: Peer-To-Peer’s Next Challenger

The entertainment industry has obsessed over the threat of peer-to-peer file sharing since the introduction of Napster in 1999. The sharing of television content may present a compelling case for fair use under the long-standing Betamax decision. Some argue that television sharing is fundamentally different than the distribution of music or movies since television is often distributed for free over public airwaves. However, a determination of fair use is unlikely because of the fundamental differences between recording a program and downloading it, recent regulation to suppress unauthorized content distribution and shifts in the television market brought on by new technology

Copyright Complements and Piracy-Induced Deadweight Loss

Conventional wisdom suggests that copyright piracy may in effect reduce the deadweight loss resulting from copyright protection because it allows the public unlimited access to information goods at a price closer to marginal cost. It has been further contended that lower copyright protection would benefit society as a whole, as long as authors continue to receive sufficient incentives from alternative revenue streams in ancillary markets, for example, touring, advertising, and merchandizing. By evaluating the empirical evidence from the music, performance, and video game markets, this Article highlights a counterintuitive yet important point: copyright piracy, while decreasing the deadweight loss in the music market, could simultaneously increase the deadweight loss in ancillary markets via the interaction between complementary goods. The deadweight loss in ancillary markets tends to become dominant if a substantial portion of relevant consumers have high valuation but low frequency in music consumption, are risk averse toward up-front payment with uncertain demand, or discount future value at a high rate. Additionally, this Article’s findings shed new light on the current debates over several competing propositions to reform indirect copyright liabilities in the digital age