Cost Allocation in Water Resources -- Three Gaming Experiments with Young Scientists at IIASA

This paper reviews three gaming experiments with a game on cost allocation in water resources, carried out with young scientists from eight countries at IIASA. The game is aimed at testing some different methods of cost allocation. In earlier experiments the game had mainly been used to test the predictive ability of these methods. In the three experiments reported on here the emphasis was on testing the normative relevance of these methods. All the players were initially given an overview of the methods. Furthermore, in two of the games each of the players obtained a "consultants report" on a method for which he should argue. The results did not appear to be affected by the introduction of this normative influence, except in one respect: while in the earlier games the solution had not been in the core, a core solution was now obtained in all three games

A Gaming Experiment on Cost Allocation in Water Resources Development

The paper describes a gaming experiment concerning the allocation of costs in water planning. Six Swedish water planners participated. The aim of the experiment was to be a first test of some models of cost allocation, mainly of a game theoretic nature, presented in another IIASA working paper. The behavior of the players, partly at odds with the normative implications of some game theoretic concepts, gave ideas for future research

The Application of Game Theory and Gaming to Conflict Resolution in Regional Planning

Firstly, the concepts of game situations, game, game theory, theory of game playing and gaming are introduced. Game theory and gaming are presented as system analysis tools, complementing each other, for the analysis of decisions in game situations. Next, the great amount of game situations existing in regional planning are discussed. An attempt at a taxonomy is given, to indicate what kind of models can be brought in from other areas. Some examples of different situations are given. Finally, the application of game theory and gaming to a specific problem, namely cost allocation in regional water resources management, is discussed and a small game is presented. The playing of this game in Italy by Tuscan regional planners is presented, and the outcome of this gaming experiment is compared with the solutions suggested by some game theoretical methods

Cost Allocation in Water Resources - Two Gaming Experiments with Doctoral Students

This paper reviews two gaming experiments with a game on cost allocation in water resources, carried out with doctoral students. The game is aimed at testing some different methods of cost allocation. Although many repeated game runs are necessary for conclusions, the main results of these two experiments, together with two earlier experiments on the same game but with real decision makers, are as follows: (1) The method of allocating costs in proportion to demand was far worse as a predictor of outcome than any of the other methods discussed here. (2) Of the four game theoretic methods, the method preferred from a normative point of view fared worst in all four games. (3) In none of the four games the solution was in the core. (4) In every game the coalition formation process started with some smaller coalitions being formed, then going on towards larger coalitions. (5) There were fairly great differences between the decision makers and the students both with regard to outcomes and the negotiation process

A Proposal for IIASA Research on Gaming 1980/81

A workshop on the use of operational gaming as an aid to policy development and decision making was held at IIASA in August 1978 (Collaborative Paper forthcoming) which recommended that there should be a continuing program of work on this topic at IIASA. This report translates those general recommendations into specific proposals. It is hoped to start work on these lines in 1980

An Interactive Model for Determining Coal Costs for a CO2-Game

A question of great interest in assessing future energy options is whether the burning of carbon, in the future mainly coal, will continue increasing so that the level of CO2 in the atmosphere rises significantly, perhaps doubling by the middle of the next century. It is widely believed that such an increase in atmospheric CO2 would lead to an unprecedented warning of the earth's climate and possibly severe consequences for the economy and environment. A project, called Carbon and Climate Gaming, has recently been started at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis to examine this issue. An important pat of the project deals with the construction of a computer-based game focused on the extraction, trade, and burning of coal during the next half century. The game aims at investigating whether different nations will pursue independent myopic energy policies, leading to a potential "tragedy of the commons," or whether there will be some sort of international cooperation to avoid drastic climatic changes. For the game it is important to have forecasts of how the costs of extracting coal will develop in various countries over time, dependent on both the actual and the cumulative production quantities. Since these cost functions should appear reasonable to the players of the game it is desirable that the players themselves can, in a short time, construct or revise these functions. This can be done by the computer dialogue system presented here. By answering approximately thirty questions a player determines the parameters of the cost model. Since the player continuously obtains feedback about the implications of his answers and then can revise them, the dialogue can continue until the player obtains a total cost function that appears reasonable

Estimating the Future Input of Fossil Fuel CO2 into the Atmosphere by Simulation Gaming

Previous estimates of input of fossil fuel CO2 into the atmosphere are reviewed, including those of NAS, IIASA, IEA, and Marchetti. Methods employed largely disregard that if CO2-induced changes are indeed harmful then there may be efforts to prevent emissions. There is a need to include explicitly societal response to increasing CO2 emissions in estimating future input as well as the strategic interaction among national energy policies. Economic theory of the general equilibrium type, game theory, and computer simulation (without humans) have disadvantages in this regard. Gaming, involving humans playing the roles of various nations, may be an illuminating approach to the problem. A simple game, focusing on coal, trade, and many nations is proposed as an initial effort

Cost Allocation in Water Resources - Six Gaming Experiments in Poland and Bulgaria

This paper reviews six gaming experiments with a game on cost allocation in water resources, carried out with water planners, scientists and advanced students in Poland and Bulgaria. The results are similar to those obtained from the games played in Sweden and Italy. The similarity is particularly noticeable when the comparison is limited to games involving planners

Effective Governance of Global Financial Markets:An Evolutionary Plan for Reform

Runaway electrons, which are generated in a plasma where the induced electric field exceeds a certain critical value, can reach very high energies in the MeV range. For such energetic electrons, radiative losses will contribute significantly to the momentum space dynamics. Under certain conditions, due to radiative momentum losses, a non-monotonic feature - a ‘bump' - can form in the runaway electron tail, creating a potential for bump-on-tail-type instabilities to arise. Here, we study the conditions for the existence of the bump. We derive an analytical threshold condition for bump appearance and give an approximate expression for the minimum energy at which the bump can appear. Numerical calculations are performed to support the analytical derivation

Towards transnational CSR. Corporate social responsibility approaches and governance solutions for multinational corporations

The global environment in which multinational corporations (MNCs) operate dramatically increases the complexity of the governance challenges and ethical dilemmas confronting MNCs and their leaders, as well as the diversity of stakeholders whose interests must be considered. In this context, MNCs face a perennial dilemma: how to balance the need for global consistency in CSR approaches and ethical standards across the organization with the need to be sensitive to the demands and expectations of a diverse set of stakeholders spread across the globe? Building on the framework of “transnational CSR”, we provide a systematic mapping of CSR approaches in MNCs, high¬light the tensions and possible trade-offs between globally integrated and locally adapted CSR strategies, and discuss the constraints that they impose on MNC activities at both headquarters and subsidiary levels. We also highlight the impli¬cations for corporate governance, stakeholder management and corporate social performance. Based on in-depth case studies of 18 MNCs, we conclude that a transnational CSR approach that attempts to strike an appropriate balance between global consistency and local adaptation seems best able to guide managerial decision making and help executives address the CSR challenges in the global arena