Bulgaria: Political Developments and Data in 2021

Institutions, Decisions and Collective Behaviou

Bulgaria

The Institutions of Politics; Design, Workings, and implications ( do not use, ended 1-1-2020

Bulgaria

The Institutions of Politics; Design, Workings, and implications ( do not use, ended 1-1-2020

Risk factors for glucose intolerance in active acromegaly

In the present retrospective study we determined the frequency of glucose intolerance in active untreated acromegaly, and searched for risk factors possibly supporting the emergence of the diabetic condition. Among 43 patients, 8 (19%; 95% CI: 8-33%) had diabetes mellitus and 2 (5%; 1-16%) impaired glucose tolerance. No impaired fasting glycemia was demonstrable. The frequency of diabetes was on average 4.5 times higher than in the general Slovak population. Ten factors suspected to support progression to glucose intolerance were studied by comparing the frequency of glucose intolerance between patients with present and absent risk factors. A family history of diabetes and arterial hypertension proved to have a significant promoting effect (P<0.05, chi-square test). A significant association with female gender was demonstrated only after pooling our data with literature data. Concomitant prolactin hypersecretion had a nonsignificant promoting effect. In conclusion, the association of active untreated acromegaly with each of the three categories of glucose intolerance (including impaired fasting glycemia, not yet studied in this connection) was defined as a confidence interval, thus permitting a sound comparison with the findings of future studies. Besides a family history of diabetes, female gender and arterial hypertension were defined as additional, not yet described risk factors

(Extreme) political polarization and party patronage

Institutions, Decisions and Collective Behaviou

Party Patronage in the Netherlands: Sharing Appointments to Maintain Consensus

Contains fulltext : 111771.pdf (publisher's version ) (Closed access)This chapter shows that Dutch political parties are actively engaged in influencing appointments in the public and semi-public sector. This can be explained by the Dutch tradition of consensus and coalition governments. Political parties are used to sharing power, and sharing appointments is part of that system. There is an (informal) system of distribution of appointments between political parties. Political parties have geared their party organization to this end. In the Dutch tradition, this system of distribution is considered to neutralize political differences and competition rather than to increase political power or reward active party members, which probably explains why (party) patronage has so far been assumed to be absent in the Netherlands