403 research outputs found

    On distinct distances in homogeneous sets in the Euclidean space

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    A homogeneous set of nn points in the dd-dimensional Euclidean space determines at least Ω(n2d/(d2+1)/log⁥c(d)n)\Omega(n^{2d/(d^2+1)} / \log^{c(d)} n) distinct distances for a constant c(d)>0c(d)>0. In three-space, we slightly improve our general bound and show that a homogeneous set of nn points determines at least Ω(n.6091)\Omega(n^{.6091}) distinct distances

    Matching structure and bargaining outcomes in buyer–seller networks

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    We examine the relationship between the matching structure of a bipartite (buyer-seller) network and the (expected) shares of the unit surplus that each connected pair in this network can create. We show that in different bargaining environments, these shares are closely related to the Gallai-Edmonds Structure Theorem. This theorem characterizes the structure of maximum matchings in an undirected graph. We show that the relationship between the (expected) shares and the tructure Theorem is not an artefact of a particular bargaining mechanism or trade centralization. However, this relationship does not necessarily generalize to non-bipartite networks or to networks with heterogeneous link values

    Neighbour Games and the Leximax Solution

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    The Least-core and Nucleolus of Path Cooperative Games

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    Cooperative games provide an appropriate framework for fair and stable profit distribution in multiagent systems. In this paper, we study the algorithmic issues on path cooperative games that arise from the situations where some commodity flows through a network. In these games, a coalition of edges or vertices is successful if it enables a path from the source to the sink in the network, and lose otherwise. Based on dual theory of linear programming and the relationship with flow games, we provide the characterizations on the CS-core, least-core and nucleolus of path cooperative games. Furthermore, we show that the least-core and nucleolus are polynomially solvable for path cooperative games defined on both directed and undirected network

    The Szemeredi-Trotter Theorem in the Complex Plane

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    It is shown that nn points and ee lines in the complex Euclidean plane C2{\mathbb C}^2 determine O(n2/3e2/3+n+e)O(n^{2/3}e^{2/3}+n+e) point-line incidences. This bound is the best possible, and it generalizes the celebrated theorem by Szemer\'edi and Trotter about point-line incidences in the real Euclidean plane R2{\mathbb R}^2.Comment: 24 pages, 5 figures, to appear in Combinatoric
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