1,527 research outputs found

    Emotions and actions associated with altruistic helping and punishment

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    Evolutionary altruism (defined in terms of fitness effects) exists in the context of punishment in addition to helping. We examine the proximate psychological mechanisms that motivate altruistic helping and punishment, including the effects of genetic relatedness, potential for future interactions, and individual differences in propensity to help and punish. A cheater who is a genetic relative provokes a stronger emotional reaction than a cheater who is a stranger, but the behavioral response is modulated to avoid making the transgression public in the case of cheating relatives. Numerous behavioral differences are not accompanied by emotional differences, suggesting that other psychological mechanisms dictate the specific response to emotion-provoking events. Paradoxically, there is a positive correlation between temptation to cheat and propensity to punish others for cheating, leading to a concept of ?selfish punishment? that has been substantiated by a computer simulation model. This study demonstrates that fictional scenarios can provide an important methodological tool for studying the psychological basis of helping and punishment

    The prisoners dilemma on a stochastic non-growth network evolution model

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    We investigate the evolution of cooperation on a non - growth network model with death/birth dynamics. Nodes reproduce under selection for higher payoffs in a prisoners dilemma game played between network neighbours. The mean field characteristics of the model are explored and an attempt is made to understand the size dependent behaviour of the model in terms of fluctuations in the strategy densities. We also briefly comment on the role of strategy mutation in regulating the strategy densties.Comment: 8 pages, 8 figure

    Untangling the Conceptual Isssues Raised in Reydon and Scholz’s Critique of Organizational Ecology and Darwinian Populations

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    Reydon and Scholz raise doubts about the Darwinian status of organizational ecology by arguing that Darwinian principles are not applicable to organizational populations. Although their critique of organizational ecology’s typological essentialism is correct, they go on to reject the Darwinian status of organizational populations. This paper claims that the distinction between replicators and interactors, raised in modern philosophy of biology but not discussed by Reydon and Scholz, points the way forward for organizational ecologists. It is possible to conceptualise evolving Darwinian populations providing the inheritance mechanism is appropriately specified. By this approach, adaptation and selection are no longer dichotomised, and the evolutionary significance of knowledge transmission is highlightedPeer reviewe

    Individual freedom versus collective responsibility: an ethicist's perspective

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    Philosophical theories of collective action have produced a number of alternative accounts of the rationality and morality of self-interest and altruism. These have obvious applications to communicable disease control, the avoidance of antibiotic resistance, the responsibility of healthcare professionals to patients with serious communicable diseases, and the sharing of personal data in epidemiological research

    Learning From Early Attempts to Generalize Darwinian Principles to Social Evolution

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    Copyright University of Hertfordshire & author.Evolutionary psychology places the human psyche in the context of evolution, and addresses the Darwinian processes involved, particularly at the level of genetic evolution. A logically separate and potentially complementary argument is to consider the application of Darwinian principles not only to genes but also to social entities and processes. This idea of extending Darwinian principles was suggested by Darwin himself. Attempts to do this appeared as early as the 1870s and proliferated until the early twentieth century. But such ideas remained dormant in the social sciences from the 1920s until after the Second World War. Some lessons can be learned from this earlier period, particularly concerning the problem of specifying the social units of selection or replication

    Pre- and post-selected ensembles and time-symmetry in quantum mechanics

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    An expression is proposed for the quantum mechanical state of a pre- and post-selected ensemble, which is an ensemble determined by the final as well as the initial state of the quantum systems involved. It is shown that the probabilities calculated from the proposed state agree with previous expressions, for cases where they both apply. The same probabilities are found when they are calculated in the forward- or reverse-time directions. This work was prompted by several problems raised by Shimony recently in relation to the state, and time symmetry, of pre- and post-selected ensembles.Comment: RevTex4, 17 pages, no fig

    Multi-level selection and the issue of environmental homogeneity

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    In this paper, I identify two general positions with respect to the relationship between environment and natural selection. These positions consist in claiming that selective claims need and, respectively, need not be relativized to homogenous environments. I then show that adopting one or the other position makes a difference with respect to the way in which the effects of selection are to be measured in certain cases in which the focal population is distributed over heterogeneous environments. Moreover, I show that these two positions lead to two different interpretations – the Pricean and contextualist ones – of a type of selection scenarios in which multiple groups varying in properties affect the change in the metapopulation mean of individual-level traits. Showing that these two interpretations stem from different attitudes towards environmental homogeneity allows me to argue: a) that, unlike the Pricean interpretation, the contextualist interpretation can only claim that drift or selection is responsible for the change in frequency of the focal trait in a given metapopulation if details about whether or not group formation is random are specified; b) that the traditional main objection against the Pricean interpretation – consisting in arguing that the latter takes certain side-effects of individual selection to be effects of group selection – is unconvincing. This leads me to suggest that the ongoing debate about which of the two interpretations is preferable should concentrate on different issues than previously thought

    Degree of explanation

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    Partial explanations are everywhere. That is, explanations citing causes that explain some but not all of an effect are ubiquitous across science, and these in turn rely on the notion of degree of explanation. I argue that current accounts are seriously deficient. In particular, they do not incorporate adequately the way in which a cause’s explanatory importance varies with choice of explanandum. Using influential recent contrastive theories, I develop quantitative definitions that remedy this lacuna, and relate it to existing measures of degree of causation. Among other things, this reveals the precise role here of chance, as well as bearing on the relation between causal explanation and causation itself

    Fichte and Hegel on Recognition

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    In this paper I provide an interpretation of Hegel’s account of ‘recognition’ (Anerkennung) in the 1802-3 System of Ethical Life as a critique of Fichte’s account of recognition in the 1796-7 Foundations of Natural Right. In the first three sections of the paper I argue that Fichte’s account of recognition in the domain of right is not concerned with recognition as a moral attitude. I then turn, in section four, to a discussion of Hegel’s critique and transformation of Fichte’s conception of recognition. Hegel’s transformation consists, I argue, in the claim that a comprehensive account of recognition in the domain of right must be concerned with recognition as a moral attitude

    Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle in Algebraic Quantum Field Theory with Locally Finite Degrees of Freedom

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    In the paper it will be shown that Reichenbach's Weak Common Cause Principle is not valid in algebraic quantum field theory with locally finite degrees of freedom in general. Namely, for any pair of projections A and B supported in spacelike separated double cones O(a) and O(b), respectively, a correlating state can be given for which there is no nontrivial common cause (system) located in the union of the backward light cones of O(a) and O(b) and commuting with the both A and B. Since noncommuting common cause solutions are presented in these states the abandonment of commutativity can modulate this result: noncommutative Common Cause Principles might survive in these models
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