We-thinking and 'double-crossing': frames, reasoning and equilibria

The idea of we-thinking, or we-reasoning, is increasingly drawing the attention of more and more economists. The two main contributors are Bacharach and Sugden, and they approach the topic in two different ways. Sugden's aim is to show that we-reasoning is a consistent and logical way of thinking, but he does not face the problem of how we-reasoning can arise. Bacharach's theory is based on frames and his never reached aim (because of his death) was to explain we-thinking in terms of Variable Frame Theory. But some of his intuitions conflict with the logical analysis he proposes. In the present paper, I take a different approach to the way in which we-thinking works. Based on a not fully developed intuition of Bacharach's, i.e. the `double-crossing' problem in Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) game, I propose a framework in which a person is allowed to have both I-thoughts, when she is we-reasoning, and we-concepts, when she is I-reasoning, and develop my analysis in terms of equilibrium concepts.we-thinking, frames, we-equilibria

We-thinking and 'double-crossing': frames, reasoning and equilibria

The idea of we-thinking, or we-reasoning, is increasingly drawing the attention of more and more economists. The two main contributors are Bacharach and Sugden, and they approach the topic in two different ways. Sugden's aim is to show that we-reasoning is a consistent and logical way of thinking, but he does not face the problem of how we-reasoning can arise. Bacharach's theory is based on frames and his never reached aim (because of his death) was to explain we-thinking in terms of Variable Frame Theory. But some of his intuitions conflict with the logical analysis he proposes. In the present paper, I take a different approach to the way in which we-thinking works. Based on a not fully developed intuition of Bacharach's, i.e. the `double-crossing' problem in Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) game, I propose a framework in which a person is allowed to have both I-thoughts, when she is we-reasoning, and we-concepts, when she is I-reasoning, and develop my analysis in terms of equilibrium concepts

Il Prezzo di Socrate: la selezione del personale nelle Organizzazioni a Movente Ideale

La selezione del personale e' un processo molto delicato in ogni organizzazione. Nelle Organizzazioni a Movente Ideale (OMI), che sono realta' nate attorno ad una ben chiara mission o "vocazione", saper attrarre le persone giuste e' decisivo per la crescita nel tempo. Il presente scritto va letto in continuita' con un precedente articolo (Bruni e Smerilli 2006), nel quale abbiamo esaminato le possibili trappole che possono risultare da un cambiamento generazionale non riuscito. Il cambio generazionale e' infatti un tipico momento critico per le OMI, proprio a causa della necessita' di sostituire alcuni membri chiave dell'organizzazione stessa. Resta comunque il fatto vuoi per la "pensione" dei fondatori, vuoi per la perdita di alcuni soggetti-chiave dell'organizzazione (che magari cambiano lavoro), vuoi infine per il bisogno di assumere nuove persone per la crescita dell'organizzazione, il momento della selezione di nuovi membri e' una dimensione fisiologica di ogni organizzazione che abbia un ciclo di vita piu' lungo di quello dei suoi fondatori.Organizzazioni a Movente Ideale (OMI); mission; cambio generazionale; fringe benefit

Logiche dell'azione collettiva: un'analisi evolutiva

L'azione collettiva e' essenzialmente una faccenda di cooperazione. La teoria economica propone una teoria della cooperazione molto parsimoniosa: oltre alla cooperazione che emerge sulla base del calcolo dell'interesse individuale non riesce ad arrivare. Per l'economia neoclassica standard, ad esempio, un soggetto non dovrebbe mai cooperare in un Dilemma del Prigioniero non ripetuto. Se in laboratorio poi si osserva che anche nel gioco one-shot alcuni giocatori cooperano, l'interpretazione e' semplice: hanno giocato male, o non sono stati razionali. La cooperazione ha invece una sua logica, sempre per l'economia standard, quando il gioco si ripete: allora, come dice il folk theorem, possiamo cooperare sulla semplice base del calcolo razionale: non occorre ipotizzare nessuna forma di "preferenze sociali" (come fa invece la scuola di Zurigo di Fehr e il suo gruppo), basta l'interesse personale. In questo studio noi proponiamo una teoria della cooperazione meno parsimoniosa, che cerca di dar conto di logiche di cooperazione diverse da quella standard in economia. Al tempo stesso, la nostra proposta non sposa neanche la versione delle "preferenze sociali". Cerca invece di prender sul serio entrambe queste visioni dell'azione collettiva, ma di guardare oltre, e in luoghi non ancora sufficientemente esplorati dalla teoria economica e sociale.azione collettiva; cooperazione; calcolo razionale; interesse personale; analisi dinamica; gioco one-shot

We-thinking and vacillation between frames: filling a gap in Bacharach's theory

The idea of team-thinking or we-thinking is increasingly drawing the attention of economists. The main claim of scholars who analyze we-thinking is that it is a coherent mode of reasoning people may use when they face a decision problem. But, if there is a general agreement on the existence of the we-mode of reasoning and on the fact people endorse it, scholars have different opinions about the way in which we-thinking arises and how it brings people to behave in a particular way. Then different authors have proposed different analyses of the issue. In this paper I address the issue by proposing a simple model of vacillation between the I and we-modes of reasoning, as a way in which we-thinking can arise in the face of a decision problem. The model is based on a not fully developed intuition - the double-crossing problem in the PD game - of Bacharach, whose theory is the most developed from an analytical point of view

We-thinking and 'double-crossing': frames, reasoning and equilibria

The idea of we-thinking, or we-reasoning, is increasingly drawing the attention of more and more economists. The two main contributors are Bacharach and Sugden, and they approach the topic in two different ways. Sugden's aim is to show that we-reasoning is a consistent and logical way of thinking, but he does not face the problem of how we-reasoning can arise. Bacharach's theory is based on frames and his never reached aim (because of his death) was to explain we-thinking in terms of Variable Frame Theory. But some of his intuitions conflict with the logical analysis he proposes. In the present paper, I take a different approach to the way in which we-thinking works. Based on a not fully developed intuition of Bacharach's, i.e. the `double-crossing' problem in Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) game, I propose a framework in which a person is allowed to have both I-thoughts, when she is we-reasoning, and we-concepts, when she is I-reasoning, and develop my analysis in terms of equilibrium concepts

We-thinking and vacillation between frames: filling a gap in Bacharach's theory

The idea of team-thinking or we-thinking is increasingly drawing the attention of economists. The main claim of scholars who analyze we-thinking is that it is a coherent mode of reasoning people may use when they face a decision problem. But, if there is a general agreement on the existence of the we-mode of reasoning and on the fact people endorse it, scholars have different opinions about the way in which we-thinking arises and how it brings people to behave in a particular way. Then different authors have proposed different analyses of the issue. In this paper I address the issue by proposing a simple model of vacillation between the I and we-modes of reasoning, as a way in which we-thinking can arise in the face of a decision problem. The model is based on a not fully developed intuition - the double-crossing problem in the PD game - of Bacharach, whose theory is the most developed from an analytical point of view

Bounded best-response and collective-optimality reasoning in coordination games

We investigate experimentally the conditions under which bounded best-response and collective-optimality reasoning are used in coordination games. Using level-k and team reasoning theories as exemplars, we study games with three pure-strategy equilibria, two of which are mutually isomorphic. The third is always team-optimal, but whether it is predicted by level-k theory differs across games. We find that collective-optimality reasoning is facilitated if the collectively optimal equilibrium gives more equal payoffs than the others, and is inhibited if that equilibrium is Pareto-dominated by the others, considered separately. We suggest that coordination cannot be explained by a single theory

Cooperation and diversity. An evolutionary approach

n this paper we propose a pluralistic and multi-dimensional ap- proach to cooperation. Specifically, we seek to show that, in certain settings, less unconditional forms of cooperation may be combined with more gratuitous ones. Starting with the prisoner’s dilemma game, the evolution of cooperation is analyzed in the presence of different strate- gies, which represent the heterogeneity of the forms of cooperation in civil life. There are many behaviour patterns, though not all of them are based on self-interest and conditionality. The dynamics of coop- eration are studied through the use of evolutionary games applied in contexts that are either one-shot or repetitive. One of the most impor- tant results of the paper is the conclusion that cooperation is favoured by heterogeneity