53 research outputs found
The Quest to Solve Problems That Donβt Exist: Thought Artifacts in Contemporary Ontology
Questions about the nature of reality and consciousness remain unresolved in philosophy today, but not for lack of hypotheses. Ontologies as varied as physicalism, microexperientialism and cosmopsychism enrich the philosophical menu. Each of these ontologies faces a seemingly fundamental problem: under physicalism, for instance, we have the βhard problem of consciousness,β whereas under microexperientialism we have the βsubject combination problem.β I argue that these problems are thought artifacts, having no grounding in empirical reality. In a manner akin to semantic paradoxes, they exist only in the internal logico-conceptual structure of their respective ontologies
An Ontological Solution to the Mind-Body Problem
I argue for an idealist ontology consistent with empirical observations, which seeks to explain the facts of nature more parsimoniously than physicalism and bottom-up panpsychism. This ontology also attempts to offer more explanatory power than both physicalism and bottom-up panpsychism, in that it does not fall prey to either the βhard problem of consciousnessβ or the βsubject combination problemβ, respectively. It can be summarized as follows: spatially unbound consciousness is posited to be natureβs sole ontological primitive. We, as well as all other living organisms, are dissociated alters of this unbound consciousness. The universe we see around us is the extrinsic appearance of phenomenality surroundingβbut dissociated fromβour alter. The living organisms we share the world with are the extrinsic appearances of other dissociated alters. As such, the challenge to artificially create individualized consciousness becomes synonymous with the challenge to artificially induce abiogenesis
Can A Quantum Field Theory Ontology Help Resolve the Problem of Consciousness?
The hard problem of consciousness arises in most incarnations of present day physicalism. Why should certain physical processes necessarily be accompanied by experience? One possible response is that physicalism itself should be modified in order to accommodate experience: But, modified how? In the present work, we investigate whether an ontology derived from quantum field theory can help resolve the hard problem. We begin with the assumption that experience cannot exist without being accompanied by a subject of experience (SoE). While people well versed in Indian philosophy will not find that statement problematic, it is still controversial in the analytic tradition. Luckily for us, Strawson has elaborately defended the notion of a thin subjectβan SoE which exhibits a phenomenal unity with different types of content (sensations, thoughts etc.) occurring during its temporal existence. Next, following Stoljar, we invoke our ignorance of the true physical as the reason for the explanatory gap between present day physical processes (events, properties) and experience. We are therefore permitted to conceive of thin subjects as related to the physical via a new, yet to be elaborated relation. While this is difficult to conceive under most varieties of classical physics, we argue that this may not be the case under certain quantum field theory ontologies. We suggest that the relation binding an SoE to the physical is akin to the relation between a particle and (quantum) field. In quantum field theory, a particle is conceived as a coherent excitation of a field. Under the right set of circumstances, a particle coalesces out of a field and dissipates. We suggest that an SoE can be conceived as akin to a particleβa SelfOnβwhich coalesces out of physical fields, persists for a brief period of time and then dissipates in a manner similar to the phenomenology of a thin subject. Experiences are physical properties of selfons with the constraint (specified by a similarity metric) that selfons belonging to the same natural kind will have similar experiences. While it is odd at first glance to conceive of subjects of experience as akin to particles, the spatial and temporal unity exhibited by particles as opposed to fields and the expectation that selfons are new kinds of particles, paves the way for cementing this notion. Next, we detail the various no-go theorems in most versions of quantum field theory and discuss their impact on the existence of selfons. Finally, we argue that the time is ripe for a rejuvenated Indian philosophy to begin tackling the three-way relationship between SoEs (which may become equivalent to jivas in certain Indian frameworks), phenomenal content and the physical world. With analytic philosophy still struggling to come to terms with the complex worlds of quantum field theory and with the relative inexperience of the western world in arguing the jiva-world relation, there is a clear and present opportunity for Indian philosophy to make a worldcentric contribution to the hard problem of experience
Π₯Π°ΡΠ΄Π²Π΅ΡΡΠΊΠΈ ΠΏΠΎΡΠΏΠΎΠΌΠΎΠ³Π½Π°ΡΠ° Π²ΠΈΡΡΡΠ΅Π»ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΡΠ° Π½Π° ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΡΡΡΠ΅ΡΡΠΊΠΈ ΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌΠΈ
ΠΠΈΡΡΡΠ΅Π»ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΡΠ° Π΅ ΡΠΎΡΡΠ²Π΅ΡΡΠΊΠ° ΡΠ΅Ρ
Π½ΠΈΠΊΠ° ΡΠΎ ΠΊΠΎΡΠ° ΡΠ΅ Π΅ΠΌΡΠ»ΠΈΡΠ° ΡΠ°Π±ΠΎΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅ΡΠΎ Π½Π° ΡΠ΅Π»ΠΈΠΎΡ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΡΡΡΠ΅Ρ. Π‘ΠΎ Π½Π΅Π° ΡΠ΅ ΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ·ΠΌΠΎΠΆΡΠ²Π° Π½Π° Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ ΡΠΈΠ·ΠΈΡΠΊΠΈ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΡΡΡΠ΅Ρ Π΄Π° Π±ΠΈΠ΄Π°Ρ ΠΈΠ½ΡΡΠ°Π»ΠΈΡΠ°Π½ΠΈ Π½Π΅ΠΊΠΎΠ»ΠΊΡ Π²ΠΈΡΡΡΠ΅Π»Π½ΠΈ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΡΡΡΠ΅ΡΠΈ ΡΠΎ ΠΈΠ½ΡΡΠ°Π»ΠΈΡΠ°Π½ΠΈ ΠΎΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠ²ΠΈ ΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌΠΈ ΠΈ ΡΠΎΠΎΠ΄Π²Π΅ΡΠ½ΠΈ Π°ΠΏΠ»ΠΈΠΊΠ°ΡΠΈΠΈ. ΠΡΠΈ ΡΠΎΠ°, ΠΈΠ½ΡΡΠ°Π»ΠΈΡΠ°Π½ΠΈΡΠ΅ Π²ΠΈΡΡΡΠ΅Π»Π½ΠΈ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΡΡΡΠ΅ΡΠΈ ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ°Ρ Π΄Π° Π½Π΅ ΡΠ΅ Π³Π»Π΅Π΄Π°Π°Ρ ΠΌΠ΅ΡΡ ΡΠ΅Π±Π΅, Π° ΠΎΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΠΈΠΎΡ ΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌ ΠΊΠΎΡ Π΅ ΠΈΠ½ΡΡΠ°Π»ΠΈΡΠ°Π½ ΠΈ ΡΠ΅ ΠΈΠ·Π²ΡΡΡΠ²Π° Π²ΠΎ ΠΎΠΊΠ²ΠΈΡ Π½Π° Π΅Π΄Π½ΠΈΠΎΡ Π²ΠΈΡΡΡΠ΅Π»Π΅Π½ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΡΡΡΠ΅Ρ Π΅ ΡΠ±Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ Π΄Π΅ΠΊΠ° ΡΠ°ΠΌΠΎ ΡΠΎΡ ΠΈΠΌΠ° ΡΠ΅Π²ΠΊΡΠΏΠ½Π° ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΡΠΎΠ»Π° Π½Π°Π΄ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΡΡΡΠ΅ΡΠΎΡ. ΠΠ½ΡΡΠ°Π»Π°ΡΠΈΠΈΡΠ΅ Π½Π° Π²ΠΈΡΡΡΠ΅Π»Π½ΠΈΡΠ΅ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΡΡΡΠ΅ΡΠΈ ΡΠ΅ ΠΈΠ·Π²Π΅Π΄ΡΠ²Π°Π°Ρ Π²ΠΎ Π΄Π°ΡΠΎΡΠ΅ΠΊΠΈ Π½Π° Π΄ΠΈΡΠΊΠΎΡ, ΠΏΠ° Π½Π΅ΠΌΠ° ΠΏΠΎΡΡΠ΅Π±Π° Π·Π° ΠΏΠΎΡΠ΅Π±Π½ΠΈ ΠΏΠ°ΡΡΠΈΡΠΈΠΈ.
ΠΠΎ Π·Π°Π²ΠΈΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡ ΠΎΠ΄ ΠΏΠΎΡΡΠ΅Π±ΠΈΡΠ΅ ΠΈ ΠΎΠ΄ ΠΌΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡΠ° Π½Π° ΡΠΈΠ·ΠΈΡΠΊΠΈΠΎΡ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΡΡΡΠ΅Ρ, ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ΅ΠΌΠ΅ Π΄Π° ΠΈΠΌΠ°ΠΌΠ΅ ΠΈΠ½ΡΡΠ°Π»ΠΈΡΠ°Π½ΠΎ Π½Π΅ΠΊΠΎΠ»ΠΊΡ Π²ΠΈΡΡΡΠ΅Π»Π½ΠΈ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΡΡΡΠ΅ΡΠΈ ΠΈΡΡΠΎΠ²ΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ΅Π½ΠΎ. Π‘Π΅ ΡΠ°Π·Π±ΠΈΡΠ° Π΄Π΅ΠΊΠ° ΡΠ΅ΡΡΡΡΠΈΡΠ΅ Π½Π° ΡΠΈΠ·ΠΈΡΠΊΠΈΠΎΡ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΡΡΡΠ΅Ρ ΡΠ΅ Π±ΠΈΠ΄Π°Ρ Π΄Π΅Π»Π΅Π½ΠΈ ΠΏΠΎΠΌΠ΅ΡΡ ΡΠΈΡΠ΅ Π²ΠΈΡΡΡΠ΅Π»Π½ΠΈ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΡΡΡΠ΅ΡΠΈ ΠΈ ΠΏΠΎΡΠ°Π΄ΠΈ ΡΠΎΠ° Π²ΠΈΡΡΡΠ΅Π»Π½ΠΈΡΠ΅ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΡΡΡΠ΅ΡΠΈ ΡΠ΅ Π±ΠΈΠ΄Π°Ρ Π·Π½Π°ΡΠΈΡΠ΅Π»Π½ΠΎ ΠΏΠΎΠ±Π°Π²Π½ΠΈ Π²ΠΎ ΡΠ²ΠΎΡΠ°ΡΠ° ΡΠ°Π±ΠΎΡΠ°.ΠΠΈΡΡΡΠ΅Π»Π½ΠΈΡΠ΅ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΡΡΡΠ΅ΡΠΈ ΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ·ΠΌΠΎΠΆΡΠ²Π°Π°Ρ Π΄Π° ΡΠ΅ ΠΈΠ½ΡΡΠ°Π»ΠΈΡΠ°Π°Ρ Π½Π°ΡΡΠ°Π·Π»ΠΈΡΠ½ΠΈ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ³ΡΠ°ΠΌΠΈ, Π±Π΅Π· Π³ΡΠΈΠΆΠ° Π΄Π΅ΠΊΠ° Π±ΠΈ ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ΅Π»ΠΎ Π½Π΅ΡΡΠΎ Π½Π΅ΡΠ°ΠΊΠ°Π½ΠΎ Π΄Π° ΡΠ΅ ΡΠ»ΡΡΠΈ ΡΠΎ ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π½ΠΈΠΎΡ ΠΎΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠ²Π΅Π½ ΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌ. Π’ΡΠΊΠ° Π΅ ΠΈ ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ½ΠΎΡΡΠ° Π·Π° ΠΊΡΠ΅ΠΈΡΠ°ΡΠ΅ Π½Π° Π²ΠΈΡΡΡΠ΅Π»Π½Π° ΠΌΡΠ΅ΠΆΠ° Π·Π° ΠΈΡΠΏΠΈΡΡΠ²Π°ΡΠ΅ Π½Π° ΠΌΡΠ΅ΠΆΠ½ΠΈΠΎΡ ΡΠΎΡΡΠ²Π΅Ρ ΠΊΠ°ΠΊΠΎ ΠΈ ΠΌΠ½ΠΎΠ³Ρ Π΄ΡΡΠ³ΠΈ ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ. ΠΡΠ²Π΅Π½ Π½Π° ΠΏΠ΅ΡΡΠΎΠ½Π°Π»Π½ΠΈΡΠ΅ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΡΡΡΠ΅ΡΠΈ, Π²ΠΈΡΡΡΠ΅Π»ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΡΠ°ΡΠ° ΡΠ΅ ΠΈΠ·Π²Π΅Π΄ΡΠ²Π° ΠΈ Π½Π° ΡΠ΅ΡΠ²Π΅ΡΠΈΡΠ΅, Π½ΠΎ Π½Π° ΠΌΠ°Π»ΠΊΡ ΠΏΠΎΠΈΠ½Π°ΠΊΠΎΠ² Π½Π°ΡΠΈΠ½. Π‘Π΅ΡΠ²Π΅ΡΡΠΊΠΈΠΎΡ Ρ
Π°ΡΠ΄Π²Π΅Ρ Π½Π°ΡΡΠ΅ΡΡΠΎ ΠΈΠΌΠ° Π²Π³ΡΠ°Π΄Π΅Π½Π° ΠΏΠΎΠ΄Π΄ΡΡΠΊΠ° Π·Π° Ρ
Π°ΡΠ΄Π²Π΅ΡΡΠΊΠ° Π²ΠΈΡΡΡΠ΅Π»ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΡΠ°, ΡΠΎ ΡΡΠΎ ΡΠ΅Π»Π°ΡΠ° Π²ΠΈΡΡΡΠ΅Π»ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΡΠ° ΡΠ΅ ΠΎΠ΄Π²ΠΈΠ²Π° ΠΌΠ½ΠΎΠ³Ρ ΠΏΠΎΠ±ΡΠ³Ρ ΠΎΡΠΊΠΎΠ»ΠΊΡ Π½Π° ΠΏΠ΅ΡΡΠΎΠ½Π°Π»Π½ΠΈΡΠ΅ ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΏΡΡΡΠ΅ΡΠΈ. Π₯Π°ΡΠ΄Π²Π΅ΡΡΠΊΠΈ ΠΏΠΎΡΠΏΠΎΠΌΠΎΠ³Π½Π°ΡΠ°ΡΠ° Π²ΠΈΡΡΡΠ΅Π»ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΡΠ° Π½Π΅ Π΅ Π½ΠΎΠ²Π° ΠΈΠ΄Π΅ΡΠ°, Π½ΠΎ ΡΠΎ Π½Π΅ΡΠ·ΠΈΠ½ΠΈΠΎΡ ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΎΡ, Π·Π°ΠΏΠΎΡΠ½ΡΠ²Π° ΡΠ΅Π»Π°ΡΠ° ΠΏΠΎΠΏΡΠ»Π°ΡΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΡΠ° Π½Π° Π²ΠΈΡΡΡΠ΅Π»ΠΈΠ·Π°ΡΠΈΡΠ°ΡΠ° ΠΊΠ°ΠΊΠΎ Π½Π°ΡΠΈΠ½ Π½Π° ΡΠ°Π±ΠΎΡΠ° Π½Π° ΡΠΊΠΎΡΠΎ ΡΠΈΡΠ΅ ΠΏΠΎΠ½ΠΎΠ²ΠΈ ΡΠ΅ΡΠ²Π΅ΡΠΈ
Π‘ΠΏΠΎΡΠ΅Π΄Π±Π° Π½Π° ΠΏΠ΅ΡΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°Π½ΡΠΈΡΠ΅ Π½Π° 802.11n ΡΡΠ°Π½Π΄Π°ΡΠ΄ΠΎΡ Π·Π° ΡΠ°Π·Π»ΠΈΡΠ½ΠΈ ΠΊΠ»Π°ΡΠΈ Π½Π° Π±Π΅Π·ΠΆΠΈΡΠ½ΠΈ ΠΌΡΠ΅ΠΆΠ½ΠΈ ΡΡΠ΅Π΄ΠΈ
ΠΠ²ΠΎΡ ΡΡΡΠ΄ Π΅ ΠΏΡΠΈΠΊΠ°Π· Π½Π° ΠΏΠΎΡΠ»Π΅Π΄Π½ΠΈΠΎΡ ΡΡΠ°Π½Π΄Π°ΡΠ΄ Π·Π° Π±Π΅Π·ΠΆΠΈΡΠ½ΠΈ Π»ΠΎΠΊΠ°Π»Π½ΠΈ ΠΌΡΠ΅ΠΆΠΈ ΠΏΠΎΠ΄ ΠΈΠΌΠ΅ΡΠΎ 802.11n. ΠΠΏΠΈΡΠ°Π½ Π΅ ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΎΡΠΎΡ Π½Π° Π²Π΅ΡΠ·ΠΈΠΈΡΠ΅, ΠΊΠ°ΠΊΠΎ ΠΈ ΠΏΠ°ΡΠΎΡ ΠΊΠΎΡ ΡΡΠ΅Π±Π°ΡΠ΅ Π΄Π° ΡΠ΅ ΠΏΠΎΠΌΠΈΠ½Π΅ Π·Π° Π΄Π° Π²Π΅ΡΠ·ΠΈΡΠ°ΡΠ° 11.0 ΠΏΡΠ΅ΡΠ°ΡΠ½Π΅ Π²ΠΎ ΠΏΠΎΠ»Π½ΠΎΠΏΡΠ°Π²Π΅Π½ ΡΡΠ°Π½Π΄Π°ΡΠ΄, ΠΏΠΎ ΡΠΊΠΎΡΠΎ ΡΠ΅ΡΡ Π³ΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΠ½ΠΈ ΠΎΠ΄ ΠΈΠ·Π³Π»Π°ΡΡΠ²Π°ΡΠ΅ΡΠΎ Π½Π° ΠΏΡΠ²Π°ΡΠ° Π²Π΅ΡΠ·ΠΈΡΠ°. ΠΠ±ΡΠ°ΡΠ½Π΅ΡΠΈ ΡΠ΅ Π½ΠΎΠ²ΠΈΡΠ΅ ΡΠ΅Ρ
Π½ΠΎΠ»ΠΎΠ³ΠΈΠΈ ΡΠΎ ΡΠΈΡΠ° ΠΏΠΎΠΌΠΎΡ ΠΌΡΠ΅ΠΆΠ½ΠΈΡΠ΅ ΡΡΠ΅Π΄ΠΈ ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ°Ρ Π΄Π°
ΠΏΠΎΡΡΠΈΠ³Π½Π°Ρ ΠΌΠ½ΠΎΠ³Ρ ΠΏΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ»Π΅ΠΌΠ° Π±ΡΠ·ΠΈΠ½Π° Π½Π° ΠΏΡΠ΅Π½ΠΎΡ Π²ΠΎ ΠΎΠ΄Π½ΠΎΡ Π½Π° ΡΠ²ΠΎΠΈΡΠ΅ ΠΏΡΠ΅ΡΡ
ΠΎΠ΄Π½ΠΈΡΠΈ. ΠΡΡΠΎ ΡΠ°ΠΊΠ°, ΡΠΏΠ΅ΡΠΈΡΠΈΠΊΠ°ΡΠΈΠΈΡΠ΅ Π½Π° ΠΎΠ²ΠΎΡ ΡΡΠ°Π½Π΄Π°ΡΠ΄ Π½Π°Π»Π°Π³Π°Π°Ρ ΠΌΡΠ΅ΠΆΠ½ΠΈΡΠ΅ ΡΡΠ΅Π΄ΠΈ Π΄Π° ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ°Ρ Π΄Π° ΠΊΠΎΠΌΡΠ½ΠΈΡΠΈΡΠ°Π°Ρ ΡΠΎ Π΄ΡΡΠ³ΠΈΡΠ΅ ΠΌΡΠ΅ΠΆΠ½ΠΈ ΡΡΠ΅Π΄ΠΈ ΠΊΠΎΠΈ ΡΠ΅ ΠΏΡΠΎΠΈΠ·Π²Π΅Π΄Π΅Π½ΠΈ ΡΠΏΠΎΡΠ΅Π΄ Π±ΠΈΠ»ΠΎ ΠΊΠΎΡ ΠΏΡΠ΅ΡΡ
ΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π½ 802.11 ΡΡΠ°Π½Π΄Π°ΡΠ΄. ΠΠΎΡΠΎΠ° Π΅ Π΄Π°Π΄Π΅Π½ ΠΎΠΏΠΈΡ Π½Π° ΡΠ΅ΡΡΠΈΡΠ°ΡΠ΅ Π½Π° ΠΏΡΠΎΠΏΡΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡΠ° Π½Π° ΡΡΠΈ ΠΌΡΠ΅ΠΆΠ½ΠΈ ΡΡΠ΅Π΄ΠΈ, ΠΊΠ°ΠΊΠΎ ΠΈ ΡΠΎΠΎΠ΄Π²Π΅ΡΠ½ΠΈΡΠ΅ ΡΠ΅Π·ΡΠ»ΡΠ°ΡΠΈ ΠΊΠΎΠΈ ΡΠ΅ Π΄ΠΎΠ±ΠΈΠ΅Π½ΠΈ ΠΏΡΠΈ ΠΎΠ²Π° ΡΠ΅ΡΡΠΈΡΠ°ΡΠ΅. ΠΠ° ΠΊΡΠ°Ρ ΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΈ Π·Π°ΠΊΠ»ΡΡΠΎΠΊΠΎΡ ΠΎΠ΄ ΡΠ΅Π»ΠΎΡΠΎ ΡΠ΅ΡΡΠΈΡΠ°ΡΠ΅, ΠΊΠ°ΠΊΠΎ ΠΈ ΠΏΡΠ΅ΠΏΠΎΡΠ°ΠΊΠΈ Π·Π° ΠΈΠ΄Π½ΠΈΡΠ΅ ΡΠΎΠΏΡΡΠ²Π΅Π½ΠΈΡΠΈ Π½Π° ΠΎΠ²ΠΈΠ΅ ΡΡΠ΅Π΄ΠΈ
Panpsychism in the West /
Includes bibliographical references (p. 291-306) and index
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