Automation: Decision Aid or Decision Maker?

This study clarified that automation bias is something unique to automated decision making contexts, and is not the result of a general tendency toward complacency. By comparing performance on exactly the same events on the same tasks with and without an automated decision aid, we were able to determine that at least the omission error part of automation bias is due to the unique context created by having an automated decision aid, and is not a phenomena that would occur even if people were not in an automated context. However, this study also revealed that having an automated decision aid did lead to modestly improved performance across all non-error events. Participants in the non- automated condition responded with 83.68% accuracy, whereas participants in the automated condition responded with 88.67% accuracy, across all events. Automated decision aids clearly led to better overall performance when they were accurate. People performed almost exactly at the level of reliability as the automation (which across events was 88% reliable). However, also clear, is that the presence of less than 100% accurate automated decision aids creates a context in which new kinds of errors in decision making can occur. Participants in the non-automated condition responded with 97% accuracy on the six "error" events, whereas participants in the automated condition had only a 65% accuracy rate when confronted with those same six events. In short, the presence of an AMA can lead to vigilance decrements that can lead to errors in decision making

Vicarious Retribution in U.S. Public Support for War against Iraq

U.S. public anger and desires to avenge the 11 September 2001 terror attacks were redirected toward Iraq partly because of its identity as an Arab and Muslim state. Online panel survey data reveal that citizens who were relatively angry about the terror attacks were more belligerent toward Iraq, and that this effect was strongest among those who perceived Arabs and Muslims in monolithic terms. Angry desires to avenge 9/11 were more persistent for those who saw Arabs and Muslims in that light, and their effects on war support were partially mediated by worsened feelings about Arabs and Muslims in general. These findings help explain why public belligerence toward Iraq shot up right after 9/11, before President George W. Bush began alleging that Iraq was pursuing weapons of mass destruction and had ties to al Qaeda

A Case for Humans-in-the-Loop: Decisions in the Presence of Erroneous Algorithmic Scores

The increased use of algorithmic predictions in sensitive domains has been accompanied by both enthusiasm and concern. To understand the opportunities and risks of these technologies, it is key to study how experts alter their decisions when using such tools. In this paper, we study the adoption of an algorithmic tool used to assist child maltreatment hotline screening decisions. We focus on the question: Are humans capable of identifying cases in which the machine is wrong, and of overriding those recommendations? We first show that humans do alter their behavior when the tool is deployed. Then, we show that humans are less likely to adhere to the machine's recommendation when the score displayed is an incorrect estimate of risk, even when overriding the recommendation requires supervisory approval. These results highlight the risks of full automation and the importance of designing decision pipelines that provide humans with autonomy.Comment: Accepted at ACM Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (ACM CHI), 202

A synthesis of evidence for policy from behavioural science during COVID-19

Scientific evidence regularly guides policy decisions1, with behavioural science increasingly part of this process2. In April 2020, an influential paper3 proposed 19 policy recommendations (‘claims’) detailing how evidence from behavioural science could contribute to efforts to reduce impacts and end the COVID-19 pandemic. Here we assess 747 pandemic-related research articles that empirically investigated those claims. We report the scale of evidence and whether evidence supports them to indicate applicability for policymaking. Two independent teams, involving 72 reviewers, found evidence for 18 of 19 claims, with both teams finding evidence supporting 16 (89%) of those 18 claims. The strongest evidence supported claims that anticipated culture, polarization and misinformation would be associated with policy effectiveness. Claims suggesting trusted leaders and positive social norms increased adherence to behavioural interventions also had strong empirical support, as did appealing to social consensus or bipartisan agreement. Targeted language in messaging yielded mixed effects and there were no effects for highlighting individual benefits or protecting others. No available evidence existed to assess any distinct differences in effects between using the terms ‘physical distancing’ and ‘social distancing’. Analysis of 463 papers containing data showed generally large samples; 418 involved human participants with a mean of 16,848 (median of 1,699). That statistical power underscored improved suitability of behavioural science research for informing policy decisions. Furthermore, by implementing a standardized approach to evidence selection and synthesis, we amplify broader implications for advancing scientific evidence in policy formulation and prioritization

A synthesis of evidence for policy from behavioural science during COVID-19

Scientific evidence regularly guides policy decisions 1, with behavioural science increasingly part of this process 2. In April 2020, an influential paper 3 proposed 19 policy recommendations (‘claims’) detailing how evidence from behavioural science could contribute to efforts to reduce impacts and end the COVID-19 pandemic. Here we assess 747 pandemic-related research articles that empirically investigated those claims. We report the scale of evidence and whether evidence supports them to indicate applicability for policymaking. Two independent teams, involving 72 reviewers, found evidence for 18 of 19 claims, with both teams finding evidence supporting 16 (89%) of those 18 claims. The strongest evidence supported claims that anticipated culture, polarization and misinformation would be associated with policy effectiveness. Claims suggesting trusted leaders and positive social norms increased adherence to behavioural interventions also had strong empirical support, as did appealing to social consensus or bipartisan agreement. Targeted language in messaging yielded mixed effects and there were no effects for highlighting individual benefits or protecting others. No available evidence existed to assess any distinct differences in effects between using the terms ‘physical distancing’ and ‘social distancing’. Analysis of 463 papers containing data showed generally large samples; 418 involved human participants with a mean of 16,848 (median of 1,699). That statistical power underscored improved suitability of behavioural science research for informing policy decisions. Furthermore, by implementing a standardized approach to evidence selection and synthesis, we amplify broader implications for advancing scientific evidence in policy formulation and prioritization

A synthesis of evidence for policy from behavioural science during COVID-19

Scientific evidence regularly guides policy decisions1, with behavioural science increasingly part of this process2. In April 2020, an influential paper3 proposed 19 policy recommendations (‘claims’) detailing how evidence from behavioural science could contribute to efforts to reduce impacts and end the COVID-19 pandemic. Here we assess 747 pandemic-related research articles that empirically investigated those claims. We report the scale of evidence and whether evidence supports them to indicate applicability for policymaking. Two independent teams, involving 72 reviewers, found evidence for 18 of 19 claims, with both teams finding evidence supporting 16 (89%) of those 18 claims. The strongest evidence supported claims that anticipated culture, polarization and misinformation would be associated with policy effectiveness. Claims suggesting trusted leaders and positive social norms increased adherence to behavioural interventions also had strong empirical support, as did appealing to social consensus or bipartisan agreement. Targeted language in messaging yielded mixed effects and there were no effects for highlighting individual benefits or protecting others. No available evidence existed to assess any distinct differences in effects between using the terms ‘physical distancing’ and ‘social distancing’. Analysis of 463 papers containing data showed generally large samples; 418 involved human participants with a mean of 16,848 (median of 1,699). That statistical power underscored improved suitability of behavioural science research for informing policy decisions. Furthermore, by implementing a standardized approach to evidence selection and synthesis, we amplify broader implications for advancing scientific evidence in policy formulation and prioritization

A synthesis of evidence for policy from behavioural science during COVID-19

DATA AVAILABILITY : All data and study material are provided either in the Supplementary information or through the two online repositories (OSF and Tableau Public, both accessible via https://psyarxiv.com/58udn). No code was used for analyses in this work.Scientific evidence regularly guides policy decisions, with behavioural science increasingly part of this process. In April 2020, an influential paper proposed 19 policy recommendations (‘claims’) detailing how evidence from behavioural science could contribute to efforts to reduce impacts and end the COVID-19 pandemic. Here we assess 747 pandemic-related research articles that empirically investigated those claims. We report the scale of evidence and whether evidence supports them to indicate applicability for policymaking. Two independent teams, involving 72 reviewers, found evidence for 18 of 19 claims, with both teams finding evidence supporting 16 (89%) of those 18 claims. The strongest evidence supported claims that anticipated culture, polarization and misinformation would be associated with policy effectiveness. Claims suggesting trusted leaders and positive social norms increased adherence to behavioural interventions also had strong empirical support, as did appealing to social consensus or bipartisan agreement. Targeted language in messaging yielded mixed effects and there were no effects for highlighting individual benefits or protecting others. No available evidence existed to assess any distinct differences in effects between using the terms ‘physical distancing’ and ‘social distancing’. Analysis of 463 papers containing data showed generally large samples; 418 involved human participants with a mean of 16,848 (median of 1,699). That statistical power underscored improved suitability of behavioural science research for informing policy decisions. Furthermore, by implementing a standardized approach to evidence selection and synthesis, we amplify broader implications for advancing scientific evidence in policy formulation and prioritization.The National Science Foundation; Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (Brazilian Federal Agency for the Support and Evaluation of Graduate Education); Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (Brazilian Federal Agency for the Support and Evaluation of Graduate Education); the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation | Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (National Council for Scientific and Technological Development); National Science Foundation grants; the European Research Council; the Canadian Institutes of Health Research.http://www.nature.com/naturehj2024Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS)Non