Estimating the employer size-wage premium in a panel data model with comparative advantage and non-random selection

This paper considers the estimation of the employer-size wage e?ect using a panel of employer-employee matched data. We test for the possibility of different returns to observable human capital variables as well as examine the role played by unmeasured skills in driving the allocation of workers across firms of di?erent sizes. Our results show that some of the observed skills; namely, education, age, and tenure have high returns in large firms, while the opposite is true for high skilled occupations and for the gender gap. On the other hand, the price of non-observed skills is reduced as firm size increases. This finding is consistent with explanations based on the premise that large employers have more difficulty monitoring workers, which therefore leads them to monitor less closely.firm size, wages, non-random selection.

Private Information: Similarity as Compatibility

We investigate the continuity of equilibrium in differential information economies with a finite number of agents. In this setting, agents can make contingent contracts based on events that are commonly observed. With private information modelled as finite partitions of a compact and metrizable space of states of nature, we introduce a topology on information that takes into account the compatibility of information fields in assessing similarity between private information fields. This topology allows us to establish upper semicontinuity of the private core correspondence.Differential Information Economy, Asymmetric Information, Radner Equilibrium, Private Core, Topologies on Information.

Existence and generic efficiency of equilibrium in two-period economies with private state-verification

Private state-verification is introduced in a two-period economy with spot markets in both periods and complete futures markets for contingent delivery in the second period. Existence of equilibrium is established, under standard assumptions. The equilibrium allocation is shown to be generically efficient if the number of states is not greater than the number of goods.General equilibrium, Differential information, Private state-verification, Two-period economies, Existence of equilibrium, Generic efficiency

General equilibrium with private state verification

We study general equilibrium with private and incomplete state verification. Trade is agreed ex ante, that is, before private information is received. It is useful to define a list of bundles as a derivative good that gives an agent the right to receive one of the bundles in the list. Enforceable trade agreements can be described by Pi-measurable plans of lists of bundles, instead of Pi-measurable plans of bundles as in Radner (1968). In equilibrium, the price of a list coincides with the price of the cheapest bundle in the list, and it is always the cheapest bundle of the list that is delivered. This property leads to a system of linear inequalities which are deliverability constraints on the choice set. We investigate existence of equilibrium in the case in which preferences are Pi-measurable. If there is a perfectly informed trader in the economy, existence of equilibrium is guaranteed.General equilibrium, Differential information, Verifiability, Uncertain delivery, Lists of bundles, Rational expectations

Contracts for uncertain delivery

We propose the notion of objects of choice as uncertain consumption bundles, extending the formulation of Arrow (1953). Agents sign “contracts for uncertain delivery”, which specify a list of alternative bundles, instead of a single one. This allows us to incorporate uncertainty and asymmetric information in the model of Arrow-Debreu. Relatively to the model of Radner (1968), efficiency of trade is increased and some “no trade” situations are avoided, while the classical results still hold: existence of core and competitive equilibrium, core convergence, welfare theorems, etc.Uncertainty, Asymmetric information, Private information, Contingent delivery, Radner equilibrium.

GUIsurfer : a reverse engineering framework for user interface software

GUIsurfer: A Reverse Engineering Framework for User Interface Softwar

The GUISurfer tool: towards a language independent approach to reverse engineering GUI code

Graphical user interfaces (GUIs) are critical components of today's software. Developers are dedicating a larger portion of code to implementing them. Given their increased importance, correctness of GUIs code is becoming essential. This paper describes the latest results in the development of GUISurfer, a tool to reverse engineer the GUI layer of interactive computing systems. The ultimate goal of the tool is to enable analysis of interactive system from source code