Excess length of stay due to central line-associated bloodstream infection in intensive care units in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico

Objective.To estimate the excess length of stay in an intensive care unit (ICU) due to a central line–associated bloodstream infection (CLABSI), using a multistate model that accounts for the timing of infection. Design.A cohort of 3,560 patients followed up for 36,806 days in ICUs. Setting.Eleven ICUs in 3 Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. Patients.All patients admitted to the ICU during a defined time period with a central line in place for more than 24 hours. Results.The average excess length of stay due to a CLABSI increased in 10 of 11 ICUs and varied from −1.23 days to 4.69 days. A reduction in length of stay in Mexico was probably caused by an increased risk of death due to CLABSI, leading to shorter times to death. Adjusting for patient age and Average Severity of Illness Score tended to increase the estimated excess length of stays due to CLABSI. Conclusions.CLABSIs are associated with an excess length of ICU stay. The average excess length of stay varies between ICUs, most likely because of the case‐mix of admissions and differences in the ways that hospitals deal with infections

Impact of Switching from an Open to a Closed Infusion System on Rates of Central Line-Associated Bloodstream Infection: A Meta-analysis of Time-Sequence Cohort Studies in 4 Countries

BACKGROUND. We report a meta-analysis of 4 identical time-series cohort studies of the impact of switching from use of open infusion containers (glass bottle, burette, or semirigid plastic bottle) to closed infusion containers (fully collapsible plastic containers) on central line-associated bloodstream infection (CLABSI) rates and all-cause intensive care unit (ICU) mortality in 15 adult ICUs in Argentina, Brazil, Italy, and Mexico. METHODS. All ICUs used open infusion containers for 6-12 months, followed by switching to closed containers. Patient characteristics, adherence to infection control practices, CLABSI rates, and ICU mortality during the 2 periods were compared by chi(2) test for each country, and the results were combined using meta-analysis. RESULTS. Similar numbers of patients participated in 2 periods (2,237 and 2,136). Patients in each period had comparable Average Severity of Illness Scores, risk factors for CLABSI, hand hygiene adherence, central line care, and mean duration of central line placement. CLABSI incidence dropped markedly in all 4 countries after switching from an open to a closed infusion container (pooled results, from 10.1 to 3.3 CLABSIs per 1,000 central line-days; relative risk [RR], 0.33 [95% confidence interval {CI}, 0.24-0.46]; P < .001). All-cause ICU mortality also decreased significantly, from 22.0 to 16.9 deaths per 100 patients (RR, 0.77 [95% CI, 0.68-0.87]; P < .001). CONCLUSIONS. Switching from an open to a closed infusion container resulted in a striking reduction in the overall CLABSI incidence and all-cause ICU mortality. Data suggest that open infusion containers are associated with a greatly increased risk of infusion-related bloodstream infection and increased ICU mortality that have been unrecognized. Furthermore, data suggest CLABSIs are associated with significant attributable mortality

Attributable cost and length of stay for patients with central venous catheter-associated bloodstream infection in Mexico City intensive care units: A prospective, matched analysis

Background. No information is available about the financial impact of central venous catheter (CVC)–associated bloodstream infection (BSI) in Mexico. Objective. To calculate the costs associated with BSI in intensive care units (ICUs) in Mexico City. Design. An 18-month (June 2002 through November 2003), prospective, nested case-control study of patients with and patients without BSI. Setting. Adult ICUs in 3 hospitals in Mexico City. Patients and Methods. A total of 55 patients with BSI (case patients) and 55 patients without BSI (control patients) were compared with respect to hospital, type of ICU, year of hospital admission, length of ICU stay, sex, age, and mean severity of illness score. Information about the length of ICU stay was obtained prospectively during daily rounds. The daily cost of ICU stay was provided by the finance department of each hospital. The cost of antibiotics prescribed for BSI was provided by the hospitals' pharmacy departments. Results. For case patients, the mean extra length of stay was 6.1 days, the mean extra cost of antibiotics was $598, the mean extra hospital cost was$11,591, and the attributable extra mortality was 20%. Conclusions. In this study, the duration of ICU stay for patients with central venous catheter–associated BSI was significantly longer than that for control patients, resulting in increased healthcare costs and a higher attributable mortality. These conclusions support the need to implement preventive measures for hospitalized patients with central venous catheters in Mexico

Bioterrorismo: apuntes para una agenda de lo inesperado Preparedness against bioterrorist attacks in Mexico

La vulnerabilidad de las poblaciones humanas a terrorismo químico, biológico, radiológico y nuclear ha sido ampliamente discutida pero insuficientemente analizada. Las políticas de salud pública carecen de información sólida y relevante para diseñar programas costo-efectivos para prevenir o mitigar este tipo de incidentes en el futuro. Los gobiernos tienen insuficiencia presupuestal para hacer frente a este tipo de ataques. Por lo anterior, en países en desarrollo, como México, es conveniente reflexionar sobre las acciones preventivas particulares, los agentes potenciales y la prevención de la transmisión. Propuestas. La respuesta internacional ante un ataque biológico debe basarse en acuerdos internacionales que prohiben el uso de agentes biológicos con fines de guerra o defensa; así como intercambio académico y tecnológico para la prevención de ataques bioterroristas. Las recomendaciones, a escala nacional, ante un ataque biológico son: a) una estrategia legal de defensa contra bioterrorismo; b) educación, como clave para defensa contra bioterrorismo; c) creación de un programa nacional de coordinación interinstitucional antibioterrorista, que incluya asistencia de urgencias médicas y la obtención de evidencia médica forense; d) instalación de un sistema de vigilancia epidemiológica ante el uso de armas biológicas; e) instauración de un laboratorio de análisis de material biológico asociado con incidentes terroristas; f) preparación de campañas públicas de información; g) garantía de abasto de material diagnóstico, protección especial y tratamiento de urgencias ante ataques biológicos; h) descentralización de sistemas de alerta para detección oportuna de terrorismo biológico; i) respuesta a acciones bioterroristas dirigidas contra animales y plantas, y j) creación de Comités de Etica ante situaciones de urgencia por un ataque biológico. Conclusiones. El cambiante panorama epidemiológico requiere de una infraestructura suficiente para establecer diagnósticos de enfermedades emergentes o insólitas como sería el caso de una agresión bioterrorista. La tecnología permite ahora identificar, en pocas horas, a múltiples agentes infecciosos por análisis de ácidos nucleicos y debería ser accesible en laboratorios de referencia. Todas las acciones requieren de presupuestos suficientes para enfrentar esta posible eventualidad. La situación es potencialmente de extrema gravedad y así deberá considerarse al cuantificar la inversión. El texto completo en inglés de este artículo está disponible en: http://www.insp.mx/salud/index.html The vulnerability of human populations to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear terrorism has been widely discussed but insufficiently studied. Current public health policies are not guided by solid and relevant information to design cost-effective programs for preventing or controlling this kind of incidents in the future. Governmental budgets are insufficient to respond to bioterrorist attacks. To face these threats, developing countries like Mexico should frame strategies and devise specific preventive actions that consider the transmission dynamics of potential infectious agents likely to be used in a bioterrorist attack. Proposals. The international reaction to a biological attack must be supported by international agreements that ban the use of biological agents for warfare and/or defense purposes, as well as on academic and technological exchange for the prevention of bioterrorist attacks. At the national level, the recommendations in the event of a biological attack are: a) establishing a legal defense strategy against bioterrorism; b) implementing education programs as a key strategy for defense against bioterrorism; c) devising a national program of interinstitutional antibioterrorist coordination that includes medical emergency assistance and collection of medical forensic evidence; d) including a biological weapon registry in epidemiological surveillance systems; e) implementing a laboratory for biological material analysis related to terrorist incidents; f) devising public health information campaigns, g) assuring the supply of diagnostic testing, special protection, and emergency treatment materials; h) decentralizing alert systems for the timely detection of bioterrorist attacks; i) responding to bioterrorist actions addressed against animals and plants, and j) organizing Ethics Committees in case of urgent events derived from a biological attack. Conclusions. The proper response to sudden and unexpected events of emergent or unusual infectious diseases involved in a bioterrorist attack requires an adequate public health infrastructure. Modern technology allows the timely identification of multiple infectious agents by nucleic acid analyses and should be widely available in reference laboratories. All these measures require sufficient funding to respond to this potential threat. Resource allocation to respond to bioterrorist attacks must be consonant with their potential public health consequences. The English version of this paper is available at: http://www.insp.mx/salud/index.html</A

Time-dependent analysis of extra length of stay and mortality due to ventilator-associated pneumonia in intensive-care units of ten limited-resources countries: findings of the International Nosocomial Infection Control Consortium (INICC)

Ventilator-associated pneumonias (VAPs) are a worldwide problem that significantly increases patient morbidity, mortality, and length of stay (LoS), and their effects should be estimated to account for the timing of infection. The purpose of the study was to estimate extra LoS and mortality in an intensive-care unit (ICU) due to a VAP in a cohort of 69 248 admissions followed for 283 069 days in ICUs from 10 countries. Data were arranged according to the multi-state format. Extra LoS and increased risk of death were estimated independently in each country, and their results were combined using a random-effects meta-analysis. VAP prolonged LoS by an average of 2.03 days (95% CI 1.52-2.54 days), and increased the risk of death by 14% (95% CI 2-27). The increased risk of death due to VAP was explained by confounding with patient morbidity