Educating for Intellectual Virtue: a critique from action guidance

Virtue epistemology is among the dominant influences in mainstream epistemology today. An important commitment of one strand of virtue epistemology – responsibilist virtue epistemology (e.g., Montmarquet 1993; Zagzebski 1996; Battaly 2006; Baehr 2011) – is that it must provide regulative normative guidance for good thinking. Recently, a number of virtue epistemologists (most notably Baehr, 2013) have held that virtue epistemology not only can provide regulative normative guidance, but moreover that we should reconceive the primary epistemic aim of all education as the inculcation of the intellectual virtues. Baehr’s picture contrasts with another well-known position – that the primary aim of education is the promotion of critical thinking (Scheffler 1989; Siegel 1988; 1997; 2017). In this paper – that we hold makes a contribution to both philosophy of education and epistemology and, a fortiori, epistemology of education – we challenge this picture. We outline three criteria that any putative aim of education must meet and hold that it is the aim of critical thinking, rather than the aim of instilling intellectual virtue, that best meets these criteria. On this basis, we propose a new challenge for intellectual virtue epistemology, next to the well-known empirically-driven ‘situationist challenge’. What we call the ‘pedagogical challenge’ maintains that the intellectual virtues approach does not have available a suitably effective pedagogy to qualify the acquisition of intellectual virtue as the primary aim of education. This is because the pedagogic model of the intellectual virtues approach (borrowed largely from exemplarist thinking) is not properly action-guiding. Instead, we hold that, without much further development in virtue-based theory, logic and critical thinking must still play the primary role in the epistemology of education

Argument Quality and Cultural Difference

Argumentation theorists typically conceive argument goodness in terms of an argument\u27s provision of reasons for its conclusion which are such that fair-minded appraisal suggests that it ought to be accepted by all who so appraise it. This conception o f argument quality makes no reference to either the persons appraising the argument, or the context of the appraisal. Much recent work rejects such an abstract, impersonal notion of argument goodness, with some theorists emphasizing the importance of cul tural difference in argument appraisal. While there is much merit in this perspective, the multiculturalist argument against impersonal, acontextualist conceptions of argument quality fails

Presumptions in argument: Epistemic versus social approaches

This paper responds to Kauffeld’s 2009 OSSA paper, considering the adequacy of his “commitment-based” approach to “ordinary presumptive practices” (which explains the communicative force of presumptions socially, through the moral motivation agents have to meet their obligations) to sup-ply an account of presumption fit for general application in normative theories of argument. The central issue here is whether socially-grounded presumptions are defeasible in the right sorts of ways so as to pro-duce “truth-tropic” presumptive inferences

Argumentation, Arguing, and Arguments: Comments on Giving Reasons

Aunque aprobamos varios aspectos de la nueva teoría de la argumentación propuesta por Lilian Bermejo Luque y, en particular, su dimensión epistemológica, en este debate planteamos algunas dudas sobre su concepción de la argumentación, su análisis de la bondad argumentativa y su tratamiento de la noción de dar razones y de justificación

Global Growth Opportunities and Market Integration

We measure a country's growth opportunities by investigating how its industry mix is priced in global capital markets, using price earnings ratios of global industry portfolios. We derive three sets of empirical results. First, these exogenous growth opportunities strongly predict future changes in real GDP and investment in a large panel of countries. This relation is strongest in countries that have liberalized their capital accounts, equity markets, and banking systems. Second, we re-examine the link between financial development, investor protection, capital allocation, and growth. We find that financial development and investor protection measures are much less important in aligning growth opportunities with growth than is capital market openness. Third, we formulate new tests of market integration and segmentation. Under integration, the difference between a country's local PE ratio and its global counterpart should not predict relative growth, but the difference between its "exogenous" global PE ratio and the world market PE ratio should predict relative growth.

New Work on Critical Thinking: Comments on Frímannsson, Holma and Ritola

New Work on Critical Thinking: Comments on Frímannsson, Holma and Ritol