Optimal Taxation for Integrated Resorts-Japan, Macau and Las Vegas

After debating the costs and benefits of legalize gambling in the integrated resorts for several years, the Japanese House of Representatives passed the Integrated Resorts (IR) Implementation Bill on June 19, 2018 and the parliament finally passed the Bill in late July 2018. It is predicted that the first casino licenses to be issued in 2020 and actual operation of casino after five years. The objectives of this paper are to develop an optimal taxation model that can help the Japanese government, and other countries that are interested in offering integrated resorts to attract tourist, to set up a tax policy and other related regulations to maximize the benefit from IR. Unlike other previous studies that assume that the gaming industry and IR is competitive, we will use an oligopolistic setting to capture the “limited competition” implied by the speculations that the Japanese government will issue three licenses only to operators. In Macau, similar number of licenses were issued, but the three license holders later on were allowed to “split” their licenses into two and therefore currently there are six casino operators in Macau. In Singapore, only two licenses was granted. In Las Vegas, a more liberal approach similar to the competitive market philosophy was employed and therefore more than 10 licenses are provided. Our oligopoly model is consistent with the small number of casino firms and their impact on tax revenue will be examined. Implications Our model can be used to examine the impact of local and foreign tourist on optimal taxation. We will show that the strategy proposed by the IR executive may be sub-optimal and in conflict with the government objective if the local tourists are most day trippers according to the gaming literature. Attracting tourists from other countries, especially those near China, may be desirable in term of international trade, because tourism is in fact an exporting of service. Author: Prof. Jacky Yuk-chow So Dean and BNU Chair Professor in Finance Faculty of Business Administration | www.umac.mo/fba | Co-Director of Asia Pacific Academy of Economics and Management | www.umac.mo/apaem | Room 4047a University of Macau, E22 Avenida da Universidade, Taipa, Macau, SAR, China Tel.: 853 8822 4724 | Fax: 853 8822 2374 | Email: [email protected]

A stress-reduced passaging technique improves the viability of human pluripotent cells

Xeno-free culture systems have expanded the clinical and industrial application of human pluripotent stem cells (PSCs). However, reproducibility issues, often arising from variability during passaging steps, remain. Here, we describe an improved method for the subculture of human PSCs. The revised method significantly enhances the viability of human PSCs by lowering DNA damage and apoptosis, resulting in more efficient and reproducible downstream applications such as gene editing and directed differentiation. Furthermore, the method does not alter PSC characteristics after long-term culture and attenuates the growth advantage of abnormal subpopulations. This robust passaging method minimizes experimental error and reduces the rate of PSCs failing quality control of human PSC research and application

Evaluation of the modified Pittsburgh classification for predicting the disease-free survival outcome of squamous cell carcinoma of the external auditory canal

Background: Squamous cell carcinoma (SCC) of the external auditory canal (EAC) is a rare disease, which is commonly classified with the modified Pittsburgh classification. Our aim was to evaluate the predictive performance of this classification in relation to disease-free survival (DFS). Methods: We examined retrospective data from a nationwide Dutch cohort study including patients with primary EAC SCC. These data were combined with individual patient data from the literature. Using the combined data, the predictive performances were calculated using the c-index. Results: A total of 381 patients were included, 294 for clinical and 281 for the pathological classification analyses. The c-indices of the clinical and the pathological modified Pittsburgh classification predicting DFS were 0.725 (0.668-0.782) and 0.729 (0.672-0.786), respectively. Conclusion: The predictive performance of the modified Pittsburgh classification system as such appears to be acceptable to predict the DFS of EAC SCC. Other factors need to be added to a future model to improve the predicted performance

The ASTRO-H X-ray Observatory

The joint JAXA/NASA ASTRO-H mission is the sixth in a series of highly successful X-ray missions initiated by the Institute of Space and Astronautical Science (ISAS). ASTRO-H will investigate the physics of the high-energy universe via a suite of four instruments, covering a very wide energy range, from 0.3 keV to 600 keV. These instruments include a high-resolution, high-throughput spectrometer sensitive over 0.3-2 keV with high spectral resolution of Delta E < 7 eV, enabled by a micro-calorimeter array located in the focal plane of thin-foil X-ray optics; hard X-ray imaging spectrometers covering 5-80 keV, located in the focal plane of multilayer-coated, focusing hard X-ray mirrors; a wide-field imaging spectrometer sensitive over 0.4-12 keV, with an X-ray CCD camera in the focal plane of a soft X-ray telescope; and a non-focusing Compton-camera type soft gamma-ray detector, sensitive in the 40-600 keV band. The simultaneous broad bandpass, coupled with high spectral resolution, will enable the pursuit of a wide variety of important science themes.Comment: 22 pages, 17 figures, Proceedings of the SPIE Astronomical Instrumentation "Space Telescopes and Instrumentation 2012: Ultraviolet to Gamma Ray

Second nationwide surveillance of bacterial pathogens in patients with acute uncomplicated cystitis conducted by Japanese Surveillance Committee from 2015 to 2016: antimicrobial susceptibility of Escherichia coli, Klebsiella pneumoniae, and Staphylococcus saprophyticus

The Japanese Surveillance Committee conducted a second nationwide surveillance of antimicrobial susceptibility patterns of uropathogens responsible for acute uncomplicated cystitis (AUC) in premenopausal patients aged 16–40 years old at 31 hospitals throughout Japan from March 2015 to February 2016. In this study, the susceptibility of causative bacteria (Escherichia coli, Klebsiella pneumoniae, Staphylococcus saprophyticus) for various antimicrobial agents was investigated by isolation and culturing of organisms obtained from urine samples. In total, 324 strains were isolated from 361 patients, including E. coli (n = 220, 67.9%), S. saprophyticus (n = 36, 11.1%), and K. pneumoniae (n = 7, 2.2%). The minimum inhibitory concentrations (MICs) of 20 antibacterial agents for these strains were determined according to the Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute (CLSI) manual. At least 93% of the E. coli isolates showed susceptibility to fluoroquinolones and cephalosporins, whereas 100% of the S. saprophyticus isolates showed susceptibility to fluoroquinolones and aminoglycosides. The proportions of fluoroquinolone-resistant and extended-spectrum β-lactamase (ESBL)-producing E. coli strains were 6.4% (13/220) and 4.1% (9/220), respectively. The antimicrobial susceptibility of K. pneumoniae was retained during the surveillance period, while no multidrug-resistant strains were identified. In summary, antimicrobial susceptibility results of our second nationwide surveillance did not differ significantly from those of the first surveillance. Especially the numbers of fluoroquinolone-resistant and ESBL-producing E. coli strains were not increased in premenopausal patients with AUC in Japan

Essays on political economy in trade and environment

This thesis consists of three essays that contribute to international trade and environmental economics. The first essay addresses the question of why some countries fail to adopt environmental policies that are sufficiently strong, while others adopt policies that are too stringent. Constructing a political economy model in which voters face uncertainty due to types of politicians and the risk of environmental damage, it demonstrates that there is an equilibrium in which a politician uses a weaker environmental policy rather than efficient direct transfers for redistribution. It also shows that there is an equilibrium in which a stricter environmental policy can be implemented by a politician who has no incentive to make transfers. Then, the latter equilibrium in which a too stringent environmental policy emerges is shown to be more plausible unless the incumbent’s initial reputation is sufficiently strong. The second essay questions how one country’s decision to liberalize trade affects a political economic structure that determines environmental policy in other country. By constructing a political economy model with endogenous lobby formation, it shows that unilateral tariff reductions (UTRs) by a large country importing a dirty good will generate an industry lobby that demands a lax environmental regulation in a small country exporting that good. Then, it shows that for a pre-existing lobby, the UTRs cause the formation of a lobby group that opposes initially distorted environmental policy in the small country. Numerical simulations show that the UTRs first cause the formation of industry lobby groups and further reductions of trade barriers will generate an environmental lobby in the small country. The third essay examines what the successful scenarios for the environmental policy reforms should look like when they have an impact on the terms of trade. By setting up a general equilibrium model of international trade that is extended to include environmental externalities, it characterizes and compares the welfare-improving reforms of environmental taxes and standards in a large open economy. It also considers the case in which there are multiple rather than single pollutants in the economy to examine how a reform of one pollutant affects other remaining pollutants.Arts, Faculty ofVancouver School of EconomicsGraduat

排出量取引の政治経済

This paper examines how a politically-motivated government can behave in a domestic emissions trading scheme within a simple political economy framework. By constructing a model in which the amount of emissions cap and the distribution of emissions permits (grandfathering system or auction system) are endogenously determined, we show that a corruptible government issues inefficient amounts of emissions cap to benefit its preferable group. In particular, a pro-industry government issues too large amount of emissions cap to reduce its price, which benefits an industry group. A pro-environment government issues too small amount of emissions cap to reduce pollution emissions, which benefits an environmental group. Then, we examine how an incumbent government decides the distribution of initial permits if it will be replaced in the future by a government with a different objective. In particular, we show that a pro-welfare government which will be replaced by a corruptible government in the future chooses grandfathering system to make the amount of emissions cap chosen in the future more efficient

Electoral competition with environmental policy as a second best transfer

Abstract This paper explains why some governments fail to adopt policies that are sufficiently strong, while others adopt policies that are too stringent. Constructing a political economy model in which voters face uncertainty due to the types of politicians and the risk of environmental damage, we show that there is an equilibrium in which a politician uses a weaker environmental policy rather than efficient direct transfers for redistribution. We also show that there is an equilibrium in which a stricter environmental policy can be implemented by a politician who has no incentive to make transfers. Then, we discuss which equilibrium should be more plausible. We conclude that the latter equilibrium in which a too stringent environmental policy emerges can dominate the former unless the citizen's estimate of environmental risk is sufficiently low.Environmental policy Political competition Asymmetric information