Sorting by Foot: Consumable Travel-for Local Public Good and Equilibrium Stratification

This paper reexamine Tiebout’s hypothesis of endogenous sorting in a competitive spatial equilibrium setup with both income and preference heterogeneity. Agents decide endogenously the number of trips to consume a travel-for congestable local public good. We show that the equilibrium configuration may be completely segregated, incompletely segregated or completely integrated, depending crucially on the scale of local public good services, relative market rents and the underlying income/preference/local tax parameters. Segregated equilibrium may feature endogenous sorting purely by income or by both income and preferences. Multiple equilibria may arise when the equilibrium configuration is incompletely segregated.Endogenous Sorting, Integrated/Segregated Equilibrium, Income/Preference Heterogeneity

Welfare Analysis of the Number and Locations of Local Public Facilities

We develop a discrete or finite household model with congestable local public goods where the level of provision, the number of facilities and their locations are all endogenously determined in a purely normative context. We prove the existence of an equal-treatment identical-provision second best optimum, where all households are required to reach the same utility level, the provision of local public good is required to be the same at all facilities, and all facilities must serve the same number of consumers. Such an optimal public facility configuration may or may not be geographically centralized if there is only a single public facility site. Moreover, the optimal public facility configuration could be either concentrated (single site) or dispersed (multiple sites), depending crucially on the degree of congestability and the household valuation of the local public good as well as the commuting cost.Congestable Local Public Goods, Optimal Public Facility Configurations

Welfare Analysis of the Number and Locations of Local Public Facilities

We develop a model with a finite number of households and congestable local public goods where the level of provision, the number of facilities and their locations are all endogenously determined. We prove that an equal-treatment identical-provision second-best optimum exists, where all households are required to reach the same utility level, the provision of local public good is required to be the same at all facilities, and all facilities must serve the same number of consumers. Such an optimal public facility configuration may be concentrated (single site) or dispersed (multiple sites), depending on congestability, commuting cost and the household preference parameters.Congestable Local Public Goods, Optimal Public Facility Configurations

"Multiproduct Duopoly with Vertical Differentiation"

The paper investigates a two-stage competition in a vertical differentiated industry, where each firm produces an arbitrary number of similar qualities and sells them to heterogeneous consumers. We show that, when unit costs of quality are increasing and quadratic, each firm has an incentive to provide an interval of qualities. The finding is in sharp contrast to the single-quality outcome when the market coverage is exogenously determined. We also show that allowing for an interval of qualities intensifies competition, lowers the profits of each firm and raises the consumer surplus and the social welfare in comparison to the single-quality duopoly.

"Economic Geography with Tariff Competition"

A simple two-country model of economic geography is constructed in order to examine the effect of tariff competition on the spatial distribution of manufacturing activities as well as on welfare. We show that when the transport cost is sufficiently small, tariff competition with firm migration leads to a core-periphery economy, where one of the two countries imposes no tariff in Nash equilibrium. We also show that when the transport cost is sufficiently large, tariff competition harms the welfare of the two countries, implying that each country is better off by mutually binding agreement of free trade.

Relationship-Specific Investments and Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement with Heterogeneous Suppliers

This paper examines the impact of intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement on multinationals' choice of input suppliers and industry profits in a host economy. The framework consists of suppliers with heterogeneous capabilities who must engage in a relation-specific investment to customize intermediate inputs upon a transfer payment by final producers. An outsourcing contract with better technologically-endowed suppliers requires a lower transfer and generates a higher surplus. Stronger IPR enforcement leads firms to self-select into better quality suppliers on average by reducing their outside option. Weak legal institutions instead make it possible for a larger range of suppliers, including the less capable ones, to form partnerships by granting them a larger outside option. A better IPR environment is more likely to harm lagging countries where the technology distribution is characterized by less capable suppliers

Effects of TRIPS on Growth, Welfare and Income Inequality in an R&D-Growth Model

What are the effects of the WTO’s TRIPS Agreement on growth, welfare and income inequality? To analyze this question, we develop an open-economy R&D-growth model with wealth heterogeneity. Under TRIPS, the North experiences higher growth and welfare at the expense of higher income inequality. As for the South, it experiences higher growth at the expense of lower welfare and higher income inequality. There exists a critical degree for the domestic importance of foreign goods below (above) which global welfare decreases (increases) under TRIPS. In light of our findings, we discuss policy implications on China’s accession to the WTO in 2001

International Intellectual Property Rights: Effects on Growth, Welfare and Income Inequality

What are the effects of strengthening developing countries' protection for intellectual property rights on economic growth, social welfare and income inequality in the global economy? To analyze this question, we develop a two-country R&D-based growth model with wealth heterogeneity. We find that the North experiences higher growth and welfare at the expense of higher income inequality while the South experiences higher growth at the expense of lower welfare and higher income inequality. As for global welfare, there exists a critical degree of cross-country spillovers below (above) which global welfare decreases (increases). In light of these findings, we discuss policy implications on China's accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001