Tied Wage-Hours Offers and the Endogeneity of Wages

In the standard model of labor supply, each worker is a price taker,where the relevant price is an hourly wage rate which is fixed in the short run, and which does not depend upon the number of hours supplied. With this basic assumption, the wage can be regarded as exogenous for the purpose of estimating a labor supply function. This paper proposes and implements a pair of tests for the exogeneity of wages in a longitudinal labor supply model, and for the particular failure of exogeneity associated with jobs that offer wage-hour packages.The first test is very simple -- it amounts to a test of whether hours Granger -- cause wages at the individual level. The second test involves a simultaneous estimation of labor supply and wage offer equations. Both tests indicate that the offered wage is related to hours worked, though the offer locus is, for this sample, very flat. The principal conclusion is that labor supply equations cannot properly be estimated in isolation from the process generating wages, even when long time series are available on a sample of individuals.

Saving for Retirement: Household Bargaining and Household Net Worth

Traditional economic models treat the household as a single individual, and do not allow for separate preferences of and possible conflicts of interest between husbands and wives. Since wives are typically younger than their husbands and life expectancy for women exceeds that for men, wives may prefer to save more for retirement than do their husbands. This suggests that households in which wives have greater relative bargaining power may accumulate greater net worth as they approach retirement. Most empirical models of net worth in the literature do not include characteristics of both spouses. We present a more complete unitary model of household net worth and find, among couples in the first wave of the Health and Retirement Survey, that the characteristics of both husband and wife are determinants of net worth. We explore the importance of bargaining in marriages of older couples by examining the empirical relationship between their net worth and factors such as relative control over current income sources, relative age, and relative education. We find some evidence that low relative education of wives is associated with low net worth.

Hours Restrictions and Labor Supply

This study presents a model of labor supply in which individuals may face constraints on their choice of work hours, and analyzes the sensitivity of parameter estimates and policy conclusions to the usual assumption of unrestricted choice. We set up the labor supply decision asa discrete choice problem, where each worker faces a finite number of employment opportunities, each offering fixed hours of work.The distribution from which these are drawn, as well as the number of draws, is estimated along with the behavioral parameters of individual labor supply.The standard model with unconstrained hours appears as a special case where the number of draws approaches infinity. We estimate the mean absolute difference between desired and actual work hours to be about ten hours perweek. The results strongly support the notion that hours choices are constrained, and suggest that models which ignore restrictions on hours worked may yield biased estimates of the wage elasticity of desired hours. Further, we suggest that analysis of policies such as income transfers and the flat rate tax which do not consider their effects on the distribution of hours offered may be very misleading.

Saving for Retirement: Household Bargaining and Household Net Worth

Traditional economic models of savings treat the household as a single individual, and do not allow for the separate preferences of and possible conflicts of interest between husbands and wives. Since wives are typically younger than their husbands and life expectancy for women exceeds that for men, wives may prefer to save more for retirement than do their husbands. This suggests that households in which wives have greater relative bargaining power may accumulate greater net worth as they approach retirement. We explore the importance of bargaining in marriages of older couples by examining the empirical relationship between the net worth of couples in the first wave of the Health and Retirement Survey and factors that may affect the relative bargaining power of husbands and wives, such as control over income sources, relative age, and relative education. We find that measures of long-term relative bargaining power of wives have a positive effect on the household's wealth, even when controlling for other factors. In general, the realized effects of reforms intended to increase private saving for retirement may depend on how these reforms affect household bargaining relationships, as well as how they affect individual incentives to save.

The Added-Worker Effect: A Reappraisal

In this paper, the added worker effect is interpreted as a response to uncertain returns to labour supply offers by members of a household. A model of household labour supply is developed In which each member's current labour force status affects the job search and participation decisions of the other and thus the probabilities of observed transitions between the states of employment, unemployment, and non-participation. The determinants of actual household transitions are then investigated using continuous employment histories for a sample of low-income families. Simulations using the estimated transition functions show that increased unemployment among married men has a sizeable short-run effect on both participation and employment of married women.

Women in economics: Stalled progress

Women are still a minority in the economics profession. By the mid-2000s, just under 35 percent of PhD students and 30 percent of assistant professors were female, and these numbers have remained roughly constant ever since. Over the past two decades, women's progress in academic economics has slowed, with virtually no improvement in the female share of junior faculty or graduate students in decades. Little consensus has emerged as to why, though there has been a renewal of widespread interest in the status and future of women in economics and of the barriers they face to professional success. In this paper, we first document trends in the gender composition of academic economists over the past 25 years, the extent to which these trends encompass the most elite departments, and how women's representation across fields of study within economics has changed. We then review the recent literature on other dimensions of women's relative position in the discipline, including research productivity and income, and assess evidence on the barriers that female economists face in publishing, promotion, and tenure. While differences in preferences and constraints may directly affect the relative productivity of men and women, productivity gaps do not fully explain the gender disparity in promotion rates in economics. Furthermore, the progress of women has stalled relative to that in other disciplines in the past two decades. We propose that differential assessment of men and women is one important factor in explaining this stalled progress, reflected in gendered institutional policies and apparent implicit bias in promotion and tenure processes.publishedVersio

Love and Taxes – And Matching Institutions

We study a setting with search frictions in the marriage market and with incomplete contracting inside the family. Everyone prefers a partner that has high income and is a perfect emotional match, but compromises must often be struck. A high income earner may abstain from marrying a low-income earner even though they would be a perfect match emotionally, because the highincome earner may dislike the implicit income redistribution implied by the marriage. Redistributive income taxation may ease this problem. Income matching institutions that secure that people largely from the same income groups meet each other can substitute for redistribution, so that optimal redistribution is reduced. We also introduce a divorce option. Redistributive taxation is shown both to further and stabilize marriage.Wenn Menschen mit unterschiedlichem Einkommen heiraten, führt dies zu einer Umverteilung innerhalb der Ehe von der wirtschaftlich stärkeren zur wirtschaftlich schwächeren Person. Zwei Personen, die zufällig aufeinander treffen und aufgrund ähnlicher Interessen und Neigungen gut zueinander passen, werden auch die finanziellen Folgen einer Heirat berücksichtigen. Falls die Person mit hohem Einkommen diese Umverteilung als zu stark empfindet, kommt die Ehe nicht zustande. Die Rente, die z.B. dadurch entsteht, dass das Paar ähnliche Interessen hat oder gemeinsamen Hobbys nachgehen kann, geht in diesem Fall verloren. Progressive Besteuerung führt zu einer Angleichung der Einkommensverteilung und verringert daher die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass Ehen aufgrund hoher Einkommensunterschiede nicht zustande kommen. Aus wohlfahrtstheoretischer Sicht ist dies ein positiver Aspekt umverteilender Besteuerung, der bisher in der Literatur nicht berücksichtigt wurde. Die optimale Höhe der Besteuerung hängt von den Matching-Institutionen ab, d.h. davon wer wen auf dem Heiratsmarkt trifft. Treffen vorwiegend Personen mit unterschiedlichem Einkommen und ähnlichen Interessen aufeinander, ist der positive Effekt der Besteuerung besonders wirksam. In diesem Fall ist der optimale Steuersatz umso höher, je ähnlicher die Interessen der potentiellen Partner ist. Umgekehrt kann progressive Besteuerung in einer Gesellschaft, in der vorwiegend Personen mit ohnehin ähnlichem Einkommen aufeinandertreffen, kaum etwas bewirken. Daher fällt in diesem Fall der optimale Steuersatz umso geringer aus, je ähnlicher die Einkommen der potentiellen Paare auf dem Heiratsmarkt sind

What Effects Do Macroeconomic Conditions Have on Families’ Time Together?

We examine family time together using data from the 2003-2010 American Time Use Survey combined with Bureau of Labor Statistics data on state-level unemployment rates. Couple time together is U-shaped; while fathers spend more time engaging in enriching childcare activities without a spouse present as the unemployment rate rises. Patterns are similar for dual-earner couples, but appear concentrated among demographic groups most affected by recessions. We also find that mothers are less likely to work standard hours and more likely to work on weekends as employment crises deepen, which is consistent with both sets of results for family time together

The Responsiveness of Married Women's Labor Force Participation to Income and Wages: Recent Changes and Possible Explanations

One contributor to the twentieth century rise in married women's labor force participation was declining responsiveness to husbands' wages and other family income. Now that the rapid rise in married women's participation has slowed and even begun to reverse, this paper asks whether married women's cross-wage elasticities have continued to fall. Using the outgoing rotation group of the monthly Current Population Survey (CPS) and estimating coefficients separately for each year from 1994 through 2006, we find that the decline in responsiveness to husbands' wages has come to an endat least for the time beingand even find evidence of rising responsiveness to husbands' wages. This increase in the cross-wage elasticity of participation occurs largely between 1997 and 2002 and is concentrated among younger women and women with children. We also explore a number of possible explanations for this development. We conclude that declining divorce rates, rising child care costs, and the increasing prevalence of high work hours for high payall of which were more pronounced at the high end of the income distributionalong with rising income inequality may have played a role. Also possible is that some of the decline is an artifact of changes in the tax system and the way income is measured. In addition, we observe some backsliding in attitudes supportive of gender equality in the market and at home, and perhaps a change in lifecycle timing among Generation X women