Licence to lie and the social (In)appropriateness of lying

Environments that encourage dishonest behaviour can compromise intrinsic honesty by altering beliefs about what is considered socially appropriate behaviour. I extend the incentivised Krupka and Weber (2013) elicitation method to the domain of lying and present two complementary studies that show how different social environments not only instigate different levels of dishonest behaviour but also change what a representative sample of Norwegian citizens perceives as socially appropriate when it comes to lying.publishedVersio

It Pays to be Nice: The Benefits of Cooperating in Markets

We contribute to the experimental literature by examining the causal effect of partner choice opportunities on the earnings of different cooperative types. We first elicit cooperative types and then randomly assign subjects to a repeated prisoner's dilemma game, with either mutual partner choice or random matching. In each period, the individual who fails to attain a partner is excluded from the group. The results from three experiments show that mutual partner choice enables cooperators to outperform free riders; cooperators tend to earn more than free riders and are less frequently excluded. Our findings are robust with respect to varying group size and whether subjects are reminded about their entire partner and earnings history or only their recent history.publishedVersio

It pays to be nice: Partner choice as an informal punishment mechanism

Two mechanisms that have been shown to facilitate cooperation are partner choice and punishment, but can partner choice be employed as an informal punishment mechanism? To examine this question I conduct two experiments. The first experiment studies a two-person repeated Prisoner`s Dilemma game. Each individual is allowed to choose one person from a fixed group of five subjects they wish to be paired with. The individual who fails to find a partner is excluded from the group. Moreover, and most importantly, I elicit individual cooperative dispositions prior to the two-person repeated Prisoner`s Dilemma game and examine how different types of individuals perform when allowed to choose a partner. Results show that partner choice does not increase the overall efficiency. However, there appear to be interesting differences in the performance of individuals who exhibit heterogeneous cooperative dispositions. Cooperative individuals outperform non-cooperators when allowed to choose a partner. The second experiment is conducted in the Norwegian Citizen panel and attempts to distinguish between the social and the monetary cost associated with exclusion. I study a one-shot continuous Prisoner`s Dilemma game where exclusion is the consequence of being the lowest contributor in a group of three individuals. The monetary outside option is varied to examine which cost of exclusion individuals value the most. The results of the survey experiment show that the social cost of exclusion increases cooperation significantly, regardless of the size of the monetary cost linked to exclusion. The lab experiment is computerized with the experimental program z-Tree 3.3.8 (Fischbacher, 2007). Results of both experiments are analysed with the statistical software STATA/IC 14.1 and Microsoft Excel 2016

Licence to lie and the social (In)appropriateness of lying

Environments that encourage dishonest behaviour can compromise intrinsic honesty by altering beliefs about what is considered socially appropriate behaviour. I extend the incentivised Krupka and Weber (2013) elicitation method to the domain of lying and present two complementary studies that show how different social environments not only instigate different levels of dishonest behaviour but also change what a representative sample of Norwegian citizens perceives as socially appropriate when it comes to lying

It Pays to be Nice: The Benefits of Cooperating in Markets

We contribute to the experimental literature by examining the causal effect of partner choice opportunities on the earnings of different cooperative types. We first elicit cooperative types and then randomly assign subjects to a repeated prisoner's dilemma game, with either mutual partner choice or random matching. In each period, the individual who fails to attain a partner is excluded from the group. The results from three experiments show that mutual partner choice enables cooperators to outperform free riders; cooperators tend to earn more than free riders and are less frequently excluded. Our findings are robust with respect to varying group size and whether subjects are reminded about their entire partner and earnings history or only their recent history

Norwegian Citizen Panel Wave 1-7 Combined, 2013-2016

The Norwegian Citizen Panel is a platform for internet surveys of public opinion in important areas of society and politics in Norway. Participants are randomly recruited from the Norwegian population register, and they are encouraged to participate over time. The panel was fielded for the first time the fall of 2013 and as of 2017 the survey is carried out three times a year. The University of Bergen owns and is responsible for the Citizen panel. The company Ideas2Evidence recruits respondents, produces the survey, and provides documentation of the data. Data is stored and shared by the Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NSD). For access to time series data, or text data, please contact DIGSSCORE. The Norwegian Citizen Panel welcomes research proposals for survey content. More information about calls and other updates is available at <http://www.medborger.uib.no