285 research outputs found
-stratifolds
Generalizing the ideas of -manifolds from Sullivan and the
theory of stratifolds from Kreck, we define -stratifolds. We
introduce the bordism theory of -stratifolds in order to
represent every homology class with -coefficients. We present a
geometric interpretation of the Bockstein long exact sequence and the
Atiyah-Hirzebruch spectral sequence for -bordism ( odd)
Examen del estado regulatorio y de negocios de la televisión pública valenciana: retos próximos
Con ocasión del primer aniversario tras 'el cierre de la Televisión Pública Valenciana' (29-11-2013), que venía emitiendo sus contenidos desde el 9 octubre 1989, tal vez sea un buen momento para realizar un sucinto examen sobre la situación en la que se encuentra la televisión pública en la Comunitat Valenciana. Un análisis que aborde las nuevas propuestas de televisión pública de lo que sin duda constituye no sólo un servicio público, sino más bien puede suponer un serio negocio; la situación actual del sector desde un punto de vista regulatorio y los elementos más destacados del horizonte inmediato por el que se dirige este medio de comunicación.On the occasion of the first anniversary following "the closure of the Valencian Public Broadcaster" (29-11-2013), which had been operating since the 9th October, 1989, it may be a good time to make a brief review of the current state of the public television in the Valencian Community. The aim is to analyse the proposed new public television system, which far from being simply a public service could also be thought to constitute serious business; and examine the current situation of the industry from a regulatory point of view as well as the most remarkable aspects of the new path which is followin
La divergente regulación del contenido publicitario por razón de género según el soporte
El escenario comunicativo que rodea a la sociedad actual se constituye como un arma
poderosa en la transmisión del mensaje. En este espacio, siguen suscitándose formatos publicitarios cuyo
contenido devienen discriminatorios por cuanto muestran la imagen de la mujer a modo de cosificación o
dan a conocer posibles diferencias existentes entre el sexo masculino y femenino, suponiendo un menoscabo
del principio a la igualdad constitucional (art. 14 CE). Ante tal realidad, el legislador ha adoptado
medidas de índole jurídico a fin de poner freno a su permanencia, que resultarán más restrictivas
dependiendo del soporte que porte la información. Por ello, el presente artículo pretende el análisis de las
divergencias reguladoras existentes cuando nos enfrentamos ante la emisión de una publicidad o
informativo susceptible de ser constitutivo de discriminación, así como, dar cuenta de las deficiencias
sancionadoras existentesThe communicative scenario that surrounds the present society constitutes as a powerful
weapon in the transmission of the message. In this space, there continue to be advertising formats whose
contents are discriminatory in that they show the image of women as a means of reification or reveal
possible differences between the male and female sex, assuming an impairment of the principle to
constitutional equality (art. 14 CE). Faced with this reality, the legislator has adopted legal measures in
order to curb their permanence, which will be more restrictive depending on the support provided by the
information. Therefore, this article aims at analyzing the existing regulatory divergences when we face the
issue of an advertisement or information that may constitute discrimination, as well as, account for the
existing sanctioning deficiencie
La financiación del servicio público de televisión a través de la publicidad: la falta de previsión estatal frente a la autonómica
En el presente trabajo analizaremos como desde la Unión
Europea se prevé un sistema para la financiación de las televisiones públicas
que deberán seguir los Estados miembros y como de forma paulatina han ido
aplicando estas políticas, con especial referencia al caso español. En este
sentido, destacaremos la figura de la publicidad, como una vía de financiación
de la televisión pública autonómica, y que pese a su tradición jurídica, la
televisión pública estatal ha desistido de la misma. Así pues, nos ocuparemos
de las consecuencias jurídicas que esta decisión ha supuesto y si la misma se
adecúa a la regulación europea.The aim of this paper will look at as a system of financing of
public television channels in Member States is expected from the European
Union and how gradually have been applying these policies, with particular
reference to the spanish case. In this sense, we will highlight the figure of
advertising, as a way of funding of the regional public television, and that
despite their legal tradition, the State public television has withdrawn it. So,
we will deal with the legal consequences that this decision has meant and if it
fits the European regulation
El derecho a la igualdad de acceso en el ejercicio de oposición por maternidad: comentario a la STS de 14 de marzo de 2014 (JUR 2014, 97110)
La Sentencia que será analizada en las siguientes páginas resuelve, de forma pionera,
el caso de una mujer embarazada que expresa su deseo de realizar las pruebas correspondientes
a una oposición para el acceso a la función pública. El Tribunal Supremo declara que el parto
se considera una causa suficiente, para no participar en el examen en el día y hora reflejado
en las bases. Se debate si se cumple el principio fundamental de igualdad garantizado
constitucionalmente y si la respuesta de la Administración en este contexto es eficaz.The Sentence, that will be analysed in the following pages, determines, in a pioneer
way, the case of the pregnant woman who expressed the desire to access to the corresponding
tests for a public examination. The Supreme Court of Justice declares that the labour is
considered an enough cause, to not carry out the tests at the established time and place. It is
discussed whether the compliance with the fundamental equality principle, that is guaranteed by
the constitution and if the answer of the administration, in that context, is effective
Revisiting the Social Origins of Human Morality: A Constructivist Perspective on the Nature of Moral Sense-Making
Human nature and the feasibility of inclusivist moral progress
The study of social, ethical, and political issues from a naturalistic perspective has been pervasive in social sciences and the humanities in the last decades. This articulation of empirical research with philosophical and normative reflection is increasingly getting attention in academic circles and the public spheres, given the prevalence of urgent needs and challenges that society is facing on a global scale.
The contemporary world is full of challenges or what some philosophers have called ‘existential risks’ to humanity. Nuclear wars, natural and/or engineered pandemics, climate change, global totalitarianism, and emergent technologies, are some of the challenges mentioned by many authors devoted to the study of long-term potential risks for the survival of the human species.
However, while there are many reasons to be a pessimist about the future of humanity, there is also a lot of ink wasted in showing that the world today is far better than we had in the past and also that there have been many instances of social and moral progress in the last centuries. Some authors have even claimed that “we have made more progress over the last 100 years than in the first 100,000” .
According to ‘our world in data’, some of the most relevant advances of humanity in the last centuries have to do with the reduction of poverty and/or inequality, better health and security, the decline of violence and war, and the development of democracy and institutional mechanisms to guarantee individual freedom and rights . Yet, there is a more concrete concern that our world faces nowadays, and requires a particularly detailed analysis.
In a few words, the advance in information and communication technologies, the huge volume of people migration because of prevalent instances of global inequality, and the reality of an interconnected world that just mirrors an extensive history of massive human intergroup relations open the question about the feasibility of social and moral progress in the contexts of diverse, multicultural, and unequal societies.
This makes it crucial to reflect not only on whether human societies may keep advancing on a path of social progress, but how this can be achieved by addressing the challenges of inequality and potential intergroup conflict. This concern closely relates to the further consolidation of democratic values and the achievement of a more generalized consideration of the equal moral value of human individuals far from group, ethnic, or collective distinctions. This vision of progress follows the moral convictions that have been considered right and worthy to be pursued by most ethical theories explored by philosophers and social scientists so far.
This work aims to contribute to the study of the mechanisms and feasibility of social and moral progress grounded on the precept of human equality and is guided by the idea that social and moral progress in a plural world requires the accomplishment of a more democratic and tolerant society. These forms of progress have already been defined by philosophers Allen Buchanan and Russel Powell as inclusivist forms of moral progress. According to these authors, inclusivist moral progress is featured by the transformation of moral judgments, motivations, and norms guided by the rejection of “group-based restrictions on moral standing and moral status” (2018).
The work of Buchanan and Powell is fundamental for the argumentation developed in this work since they have pioneered a more complex debate in the field of evolutionary social sciences and philosophical anthropology. In brief, these authors have inquired how human nature, conceptualized by the advances in evolutionary thinking and the empirical sciences, is related to our moral convictions and the possibilities that we have to establish certain forms of social and moral progress.
The work of Buchanan and Powell contributes to the debate on moral progress by incorporating empirically-informed concepts and arguments. With this objective in mind, they develop their discussion around a generalized tension between exclusivist and inclusivist forms of moral progress. This tension revolves around the question of whether and to what extent human moral concerns, motivations, and norms, are limited or bounded by social identities, group thinking, or collective values. This question is at the center of this work. In other words, I aim to answer whether and to what extent the nature of our social and moral cognition hinders or enables the development of inclusivist forms of morality and moral progress.
As I mentioned so far, the distinction between exclusivist and inclusivist forms of morality has a practical implication and facilitates the reflection on the mechanisms and feasibility of concrete forms of progress based on the precept of human equality, which is the road to progress that we should follow according to most ethical theories. The distinction between exclusivist and inclusivist morality is not used here as a form of summarizing highly divergent descriptive approaches to morality, but as a way to address the practical implications of morality research, particularly around the question of the feasibility of social forms of progress based on the precept of equality and tolerance.
My objective then has less to do with offering a conceptualization of human morality or with the proposition of a new ethical perspective. Instead, I aim to identify, from an empirically informed perspective, what enables the achievement of egalitarian forms of social progress, to subsequently offer a normative reflection about what we should do if we want to accomplish such inclusivist forms of progress.
This task is of great relevance, having in mind that some theoretical proposals on the matter have claimed that human prosocial behavior and morality are constrained by exclusivist fixed tendencies as a product of our evolutionary history. According to these views, human morality is a group-centered cognitive and behavioral expression that has severe limits in its scope and extent, which hinders in the end the emergence of inclusivist forms of moral concerns and behaviors. These claims align with the philosophical intuition about the ‘dissociation of empathy’, or the fact that human individuals tend to express empathy and sympathy preferably for members of their group whereas their empathic and moral concern and recognition for outgroup individuals tend to be reduced or eliminated in real-life social interactions.
Multiple theorists have expressed, however, that these assumptions are wrong for empirical and philosophical reasons, which results in a serious challenge to the conception of human morality as exclusivist by nature. Furthermore, simple intuition and practical experience constantly show us that human individuals can develop and endorse a broad spectrum of moral considerations and adopt an arguably inclusivist stance concerning the kind of persons or agents that deserve moral concern.
Moreover, and adopting a historical perspective, the expansion of cultural and commercial exchanges, the consolidation of democracy, the development of welfare states, or the emergence of institutions based on the concept of universal human rights, have partially driven human progress based on the impartial concern for the well-being of persons. These historical instances of cultural evolution and institutional design have shown that it is feasible to promote behaviors and attitudes grounded in impersonal prosocial and inclusivist principles.
This optimistic perspective, however, still begs the question of the exact relationship between social, cultural, and historical contexts, and the emergence of certain behavioral expressions of inclusivist morality. This is crucial since a great number of human individuals around the world still do not make part of these instances of social progress, and some authors have suggested that such instances of social and moral progress are particularly favored by the contexts of the WEIRD world, that is the world of Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic societies .
Some of these approaches consider moral inclusivity a ‘luxury good’ and follow the ‘dependency thesis’ according to which the expression of moral inclusivity depends on the presence of very concrete material conditions that trigger inclusivist and impersonal prosocial tendencies that human beings are not able to express in threatening contexts without physical security. This thesis is problematic for various reasons and has led to incomplete explanations about the enabling and causal factors of inclusivist moral progress, as well as unsatisfactory suggestions about what we should do to foster the accomplishment of more generalized instances of progress based on inclusivist concerns.
In an attempt to contribute to this debate, the main objective of this thesis is to offer an alternative proposal about the nature of human morality and a more detailed reflection on what we should do if we want to further accomplish such instances of progress. More precisely, this work adopts a particular developmental and constructivist vision of human morality to answer the question of how feasible it is to reach generalized forms of social progress based on the precepts of moral inclusivity. Furthermore, it offers some ideas about what are the most adequate and favorable conditions to foster such progress both at the individual and the collective level.
At this point, a preliminary clarification of some starting points is necessary. In the first place, and contrary to what other authors have proposed when debating moral progress from an empirically-based approach, my perspective adopts a radical developmental and constructivist perspective, following particularly the conceptual and empirical ideas of the social-domain theory in moral psychology.
From this perspective, morality is a domain of normative and social knowledge that develops and emerges in human interactions. Moral concerns, judgments, and norms are not only the result of the expression of innate adaptive intuitions, nor the product of social conformity and a simple process of mirroring the normativity that communities have established to organize their social life. Human individuals, instead, construct moral concerns and judgments during their situated interactions.
More specifically, the constructivist tradition claims that we need to research how moral concerns, judgments, and reasons emerge in social interactions and how human beings construct the content of their moral knowledge in the first place. Based on these ideas, morality is defined here as the result of a constructive process through which human individuals, by the means of constant interactions on a background of mutual respect and recognition, develop evaluative concerns about how we ought to treat others, and how to ‘care’ and ‘respect’ others’ well-being, needs, and vulnerabilities.
This developmental-constructivist theory of human psychology contributes to an alternative understanding of the origins of moral variability and informs a very particular normative stance about the most desirable contexts needed for the urgent accomplishment of inclusivist forms of morality in contemporary societies. This is so given that the very same definition of morality adopted presupposes the feature of inclusivity. The main objective of this work is then to argue, based on a developmental perspective, what are the most favorable conditions to foster the development of moral inclusivity and what we should do to accomplish concrete instances of moral progress that truly help us to overcome our most urgent moral challenges.
The whole thesis is organized as follows. In part I, I show how received visions about human social evolution have informed conceptions of morality as an adaptive function evolved to solve the challenges of cooperative life. Based on these assumptions, some theories argue that human morality is limited by the boundaries of group thinking, and always obeys the mandates of collective interests and the will of the majority. However, this conception has problematic implications from a normative and ethical perspective. The aim of Chapter 1 is to present this introductory debate in detail.
In chapter 2, I consider a relevant amount of scientific evidence that helps to consolidate a more optimistic and inclusivist perspective about the starting conditions of human prosocial behavior. Later, I will summarize some ideas offered to explain the possible evolutionary mechanisms that led to the consolidation of these inclusivist capacities. However, I will also show how evolutionary theories that share the same adaptationist foundations but initially seem relevant to explain the feasibility of moral inclusivity, result incomplete when considering the complexity of moral behavior and its ethical implications.
Part II is devoted to presenting a developmental alternative to the adaptationist versions around the starting conditions of morality. In this section, I first summarize the epistemological, conceptual, and empirical basis of a constructivist perspective already proposed by several authors in the last decades. This is the goal of chapter 3. More precisely, I adopt the conceptualization of morality established by the social-domain theory school and clarify its conception of the situated development of moral concerns, motivations, and norms. All these ideas are essential for my argumentation on the feasibility of inclusivist moral progress offered later. Chapter 4 provides a more detailed idea of constructivist thinking about moral development, by analyzing one particular dimension: the development of moral concerns for fairness and the sense of justice in distributive dilemmas.
In Part III, I assume a constructivist perspective on morality to contribute to the philosophy of moral progress. In particular, I discuss the implications of such a perspective for the conceptualization of human moral nature and discuss what are the most favorable conditions for moral inclusivity to emerge. Answering that question is of enormous relevance since favoring the transition of human societies towards more inclusivist forms of moral concern and behavior supposes a more generalized accomplishment of our most urgent moral convictions.
Previous developmental or culturally-sensible attempts to explore this issue are already on the market. As mentioned before, most authors have approached the topic by situating the cultural evolution and development of (inclusivist) moral progress in the WEIRD world. For instance, some of these authors claim that very concrete material conditions (mostly present in the Western World) have been necessary for triggering inclusivist and impersonal prosocial tendencies that human beings are not able to express in threatening contexts without physical security.
Despite their interest in explaining inclusivist morality and the feasibility of inclusivist forms of progress following a naturalistic and culturally situated approach, these theories are problematic for two main reasons. In the first place, most of the authors that explain moral progress tend to focus exclusively on the consolidation of liberal values in the Western world and the underlying adoption of laws, social-epistemic practices, and public narratives about tolerance and inclusivity, as unequivocal signs of inclusivist morality. Nevertheless, there is an enormous distance between the institutional and public support of inclusivist moral values or the construction of public images of tolerance and inclusivity, and the real materialization of impersonal moralities in situated social interactions.
Secondly, the variability of human moral behavior is far bigger than most of the theories in moral psychology and moral progress tend to assume. Accordingly, inclusivist and exclusivist forms of morality may develop simultaneously in similar or divergent geographical and socio-ecological environments, including those with harsh conditions such as competition for scarce resources, potential intergroup conflict, and risks of disease transmission. In addition, harsh environmental conditions are usually present in almost all societies around the globe, and the presence of socio-ecological conditions such as physical security and prosperity, predominant in highly resourced populations, do not prevent the existence of exclusivist moral tendencies.
My model explores a different perspective on the relationships between cultural, institutional, and historical factors, and the situated development of human morality. This supposes a clear distinction from previous approaches to the matter since it offers a different view on what we should do to pursue further instances of inclusivist social progress.
In the fifth chapter, I first analyze the proposals of some defenders of the ‘dependency’ theory. The attention is focused on the ‘Evolutionary Developmental Model’ proposed by Buchanan and Powell (2018). Based on a critique of this approach, I will argue that to explain the evolution and development of human morality in its multiple manifestations, it is essential to put focus on social interactions. This also involves a different perspective on human-environment relations that in line with a constructivist worldview makes an innovative contribution to the philosophy of moral behavior and moral progress.
Later, in the sixth chapter, I will define my alternative relational view of inclusivist morality and I will offer my view on how to establish favorable conditions that make inclusivist morality possible. Complementing the constructivist approach, my conception is based on the essential role of equality and individuality and on how moral inclusivity is favored if moral concerns do not develop driven by the accomplishment of group-centered, binding, and communitarian concerns and values. In brief, my relational model suggests that the accomplishment of moral inclusivity not only depends on the overall achievement of certain levels of physical security or economic prosperity. Instead, its development is favored by transforming the interactional contexts in which moral concerns towards autonomy and individuality emerge.
In arguing so, I will need to start with a critique of contemporary situated and embodied approaches in ethics. Then, I will show how societies guided by the accomplishment of group-centered values of power, dominance, and relational inequality tend to express exclusivist moral behaviors, while individualistic societies tend to be more inclusivist. Starting from this diagnosis, my final attempt is then to reflect on which are the best conditions for the moral valuation of individuality to emerge and what we should do to promote the accomplishment of moral inclusivity at the societal level
Glaciological characterization of Chile
Se realizó una caracterización glaciológica de Chile, la cual incluyó la determinación del número, superficie y el equivalente en agua contenida en los glaciares a nivel nacional (Incluidos los glaciares rocosos y campos de hielo patagónicos). La caracterización glaciológica de Chile se realizó mediante datos extraídos del Inventario Nacional de Glaciares de la Dirección General de Aguas (DGA) con actualización al año 2014, generación de información en base a procesamiento del inventario de glaciares e información bibliográfica. Dentro de los resultados, se pudo establecer que Chile posee un total estimado de 24.114 glaciares con una superficie de 23.641 km2. No obstante, esta cantidad de hielo se manifiesta con grandes diferencias regionales a lo largo del país, aumentando de norte a sur. El equivalente en agua contenida de todos los cuerpos de hielo a nivel nacional corresponde a un total
estimado de 3.175 km3.An analysis of Chilean glaciers was carried out which included determining the number, surface and water content of glaciers across the country (including rock glaciers and Patagonian ice fields). Chile’s glaciological depiction was performed with data obtained from the National Inventory of Glaciers of the General Directorate of Water (Dirección General de Aguas - DGA) and bibliographic information. From the results, it was established that Chile has an estimated total of 24,114 glaciers with a surface of 23,641km2. Nevertheless, this surface of ice has great regional differences across the country, covering more surface area in the south. The equivalent water content of all ice bodies in the country has been estimated at 3,175 km3
Reflexiones sobre la explicación evolutiva en ciencias cognitivas: el origen de la cognición social humana como estudio de caso
Desde el planteamiento original de la teoría de la selección natural por Charles Darwin, han sido múltiples las disciplinas científicas que han incluido explicaciones evolutivas en sus dominios de investigación. Sin embargo, es común encontrar una adhesión íntegra e irrevocable a las ideas de la síntesis evolutiva moderna en estas disciplinas, particularmente en las ciencias humanas y cognitivas que se sustentan biológicamente. En este trabajo se presentará una discusión breve sobre las posibles falencias que los argumentos evolutivos tradicionales presentan a la hora de construir hipótesis sobre la evolución social humana. En un primer momento, fue relevante el planteamiento de un mecanismo diferencial, adquirido como adaptación cognitiva, que permitía al ser humano representar los estados mentales de otros individuos y con base en ello predecir su comportamiento. Avanzaremos en la explicación del comportamiento social sugiriendo más alternativas explicativas que surgen de la crítica a la tradición adaptacionista y genética en ciencias biológicas, y al individualismo metodológico de las ciencias cognitivas. Se discutirá de forma breve y comprimida en qué medida los estudios sobre la crianza cooperativa parecen mostrar una relación entre este fenómeno natural de parentalidad y la emergencia de conductas sociales sofisticadas que posee el género humano desde etapas tempranas del desarrollo, y que el resto de ejemplares homínidos existentes sólo desarrolla dependiendo de complejas variables ambientales. Sistemas de desarrollo donde convergen herencias morfológicas, capacidades motoras y factores socio-ecológicos, serían el escenario explicativo ideal para los cuestionamientos revisados.Since the original approach to natural selection of Charles Darwin, several disciplines have included evolutionary explanations in their research fields. However, it is common to find in them an integral agreement to the ideas of modern evolutionary synthesis, particularly in biologically oriented human and cognitive sciences. In this work it will be presented a brief discussion about possible shortcomings that evolutionary arguments show when constructing hypothesis about social evolution. In a first moment, it was relevant the proposition of a differential mechanism, acquired as cognitive adaptation, that allowed humans to represent others’ mental states in order to predict their behavior. We will advance in the explanation of social behavior suggesting additional explanatory alternatives that arise from the critics to the ideas of adaptation and genetic inheritance in biological and cognitive sciences.
It will be briefly discussed to what extent the studies about cooperative breeding seem to show a relation between parental behavior and the emergence of social skills that human possess since birth, and the rest of great apes only develop depending on complex environmental variables.
Developmental systems where morphological inheritances, motor skills and socioecological factors converge would be the ideal explanatory scenario to the reviewed problems.Asociación de Antropología Biológica de la República Argentina (AABRA
- …