Economists on Deregulation of the American Legal Profession: Praise and Critique

Both law professors and economists are discussing deregulation of the American legal profession, often without consulting each other. This symposium essay reviews the book length deregulation argument entitled First Thing We Do, Let’s Deregulate All the Lawyers. The essay argues that Let’s Deregulate is a tremendous addition to the literature: it disregards laws various professional shibboleths and offers a crisp and persuasive argument that the current barriers to entry are very, very costly to law students, clients, and society at large. Let’s Deregulate estimates the 2004 lawyers’ earning premium at $64 billion. The estimation is high, but well supported. Even if the absolute figure is rejected, the finding that barriers to entry have raised lawyer salaries is patent and inescapable. There are two notable weaknesses to Let’s Deregulate, however. First, while the supply side argument (entry barriers result in fewer lawyers, reduced competition, and higher prices) is outstanding, the demand side argument is much less persuasive. Let’s Deregulate asserts that a raft of recent laws and regulations (including various environmental, class action, consumer protection and intellectual property laws) are inefficient and more costly than beneficial. This claim is difficult enough to prove empirically, but Let’s Deregulate piles on by claiming that the legal profession has been a prime mover in the creation of these laws. These two claims add an unnecessary degree of controversy and difficulty to an already unlikely mission. Critics of deregulation can thus characterize the entire effort as a politically motivated assault on disliked law, rather than an even-handed attempt to quantify the costs and benefits of lawyer regulation. Second, and more understandably, Let’s Deregulate misses some of the unique nuances of the market for lawyers. For instance, it suggests that state legislatures control lawyer regulation, and state supreme courts actually do. This is a critical distinction for any reform effort. The analysis also treats the market for lawyers as a monolith, and there is much evidence that there are two private markets for legal services: big law firms who compete internationally for large scale corporate work and everybody else – small firms and solo practitioners working for smaller businesses and individuals. Despite the critiques, the essay concludes that Let’s Deregulate is a tremendous addition to the literature and encourages more lawyer/economist cross-pollination on the topic

Modelling of a Two-Signal SFQ Detection Scheme for the Readout of Superconducting Nanowire Single Photon Detectors

We present a two-signal single flux quantum (SFQ) detection scheme for the purpose of reading out two pixels of a superconducting nanowire single photon detector (SNSPD). The circuit is based on a coincidence buffer element which is able to output a signal when both of its input lines are triggered. The circuit model for the SNSPD element is simulated in SPICE and optimized to match the experimental SNSPD response data. The two-signal detection scheme is simulated using JSIM which allows for the simulation of Josephson junction elements in a circuit. We demonstrate a model of the two-signal circuit operating with two simulated SNSPD pixel inputs and investigate the response of the scheme when a phase shift is applied to one of the inputs. The scheme shows potential as a useful coincidence detector of single photons. We also present preliminary experimental results of nanobridge-based Josephson junctions to be used in the realization of the coincidence detector circuit. Evidence of the nanobridges exhibiting Josephson behavior (SQUID modulation) are presented

The Law of Society: Governance Through Contract

This paper focuses on contract law as a central field in contemporary regulatory practice. In recent years, governance by contract has emerged as the central concept in the context of domestic privatization, domestic and transnational commercial relations and law-and-development projects. Meanwhile, as a result of the neo-formalist attack on contract law, governance of contract through contract adjudication, consumer protection law and judicial intervention into private law relations has come under severe pressure. Building on early historical critique of the formalist foundations of an allegedly private law of the market, the paper assesses the current justifications for contractual governance and posits that only an expanded legal realist perspective can adequately explain the complex nature of contractual agreements in contemporary practice. The paper argues for an understanding of contracts as complex societal arrangements that visibilize and negotiate conflicting rationalities and interests. Institutionally, contractual governance has been unfolding in a complex, historically grown and ideologically continually contested regulatory field. Governance through contract, then, denotes a wide field of conflicting concepts, ideas and symbols, that are themselves deeply entrenched in theories of society, market and the state. From this perspective, we are well advised to study contracts in their socio-economic, historical and cultural context. A careful reading of scholars such as Henry Sumner Maine, Morris Cohen, Robert Hale, Karl Llewellyn, Stewart Macaulay and Ian Macneil offers a deeper understanding of the institutional and normative dimensions of contractual governance. Their analysis is particularly helpful in assessing currently ongoing shifts away from a welfare state based regulation (governance) of contractual relations. Such shifts are occurring on two levels. First, they take place against the backdrop of a neo-liberal critique of government interference into allegedly private relations. Secondly, the increasingly influential return to formalism in contract law, which privileges a functionalist, purportedly technical and autonomous design and execution of contractual agreements over the view of regulated contracts, is linked to a particular concept of sovereignty. The ensuing revival of freedom of contract occurs in remarkable neglect of the experiences of welfare state adjudication of private law adjudication and a continuing contestation of the political in private relationships. The paper takes up the Legal Realists\u27 search for the \u27basis of contract\u27, but seeks to redirect the focus from the traditional perspective on state vs. market to a disembedded understanding of contractual governance as delineating multipolar and multirational regulatory regimes. Where Globalization has led to a fragmentation, disembeddedness and transnationalization of contexts and, thus, has been challenging traditional understanding of embeddedness, the task should no longer be to try applying a largely nation-state oriented Legal Realist perspective and critique to the sphere of contemporary contractual governance, but - rather - to translate its aims into a more reflexive set of instruments of legal critique. Even if Globalization has led to a dramatic denationalization of many regulatory fields and functions, it is still not clear, whether and how Globalization replaces, complements or aggravates transformations of societal governance, with and through contract