Judicial Review, Irrationality, and the Limits of Intervention by the Courts

When exercising judicial review, the courts, on occasions, have intervened in circumstances where administrative decisions were not irrational. However, these low standards of judicial intervention are arguably constitutional, especially since the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). To this end, this article seeks to establish a zone of executive decision-making, for reasons of democracy, where the courts are clearly excluded. But it is unable to do so. Does this mean, therefore, that judicial intervention on the grounds of irrationality exists without limit? Assuming this to be the case, it is suggested that the courts should show greater respect to the administrative branch of the state where it has genuinely sought to engage with the legal process in arriving at its decisions

Where Philosophical Intuitions Come From

Little is known about the aetiology of philosophical intuitions, in spite of their central role in analytic philosophy. This paper provides a psychological account of the intuitions that underlie philosophical practice, with a focus on intuitions that underlie the method of cases. I argue that many philosophical intuitions originate from spontaneous, early-developing, cognitive processes that also play a role in other cognitive domains. Additionally, they have a skilled, practiced, component. Philosophers are expert elicitors of intuitions in the dialectical context of professional philosophy. If this analysis is correct, this should lead to a reassessment of experimental philosophical studies of expertise

Nuances in intensity deviant asymmetric responses as a biomarker for tinnitus.

Funder: Masonic Charitable Foundation; funder-id: http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/100014000Funder: Royal National Institute for Deaf People; funder-id: http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100020172We attempted to replicate a potential tinnitus biomarker in humans based on the Sensory Precision Integrative Model of Tinnitus called the Intensity Mismatch Asymmetry. A few advances on the design were also included, including tighter matching of participants for gender, and a control stimulus frequency of 1 kHz to investigate whether any differences between control and tinnitus groups are specific to the tinnitus frequency or domain-general. The expectation was that there would be asymmetry in the MMN responses between tinnitus and control groups at the tinnitus frequency, but not at the control frequency, where the tinnitus group would have larger, more negative responses to upward deviants than downward deviants, and the control group would have the opposite pattern or lack of a deviant direction effect. However, no significant group differences were found. There was a striking difference in response amplitude to control frequency stimuli compared to tinnitus frequency stimuli, which could be an intrinsic quality of responses to these frequencies or could reflect high frequency hearing loss in the sample. Additionally, the upward deviants elicited stronger MMN responses in both groups at tinnitus frequency, but not at the control frequency. Factors contributing to these discrepant results at the tinnitus frequency could include hyperacusis, attention, and wider contextual effects of other frequencies used in the experiment (i.e. the control frequency in other blocks)

Crowning glory: public law, power and the monarchy

‘New public law’ has a keen interest in the deployment of power and the shifting nature of the public and private. In this article, we argue that the historical legacy of the Crown has hindered the ability of public lawyers to respond to changes in modes of governance in the UK. The constitutional law textbook tradition has played a key role in limiting critiques of the Crown because of the obfuscation that surrounds the legal and political status of the Monarch. However, instead of discounting the significance of the monarchy, we use it as a resource for exploring governing power, the blurring of boundaries and constitutional renewal. Our starting point is the life, death and, most importantly, the funeral of Diana, Princess of Wales. The latter event exposed the political relevance of the ‘personal’ in a most dramatic way, generating claims about the ‘feminisation of the government’ and ‘emotions augmenting democracy’. We follow through on these claims in order to focus on the effects of adopting private, intimate-sphere norms in the public sphere, in particular public-sphere decision making. While aware of the risks associated with this ‘transformation’ of democracy, we conclude that the increasing centrality of the intimate merits onsideration in new public law’s search for progressive tools of modern governance