Distance, Skill Deepening and Development: Will Peripheral Countries Ever Get Rich?

This paper models the relationship between countries' distance from global economic activity, endogenous investments in education, and economic development. Firms in remote locations pay greater trade costs on both exports and intermediate imports, reducing the amount of value added left to remunerate domestic factors of production. If skill-intensive sectors have higher trade costs, more pervasive input-output linkages, or stronger increasing returns to scale, we show theoretically that remoteness depresses the skill premium and therefore incentives for human capital accumulation. Empirically, we exploit structural relationships from the model to demonstrate that countries with lower market access have lower levels of educational attainment. We also show that the world's most peripheral countries are becoming increasingly remote over time.

Distance, Skill Deepening and Development: Will Peripheral Countries Ever Get Rich?

This paper models the relationship between countries' distance from global economic activity, endogenous investments in education, and economic development. Firms in remote locations pay greater trade costs on both exports and intermediate imports, reducing the amount of value added left to remunerate domestic factors of production. If skill- intensive sectors have higher trade costs, more pervasive input-output linkages, or stronger increasing returns to scale, we show theoretically that remoteness depresses the skill premium and therefore incentives for human capital accumulation. Empirically, we exploit structural relationships from the model to demonstrate that countries with lower market access have lower levels of educational attainment. We also show that the world's most peripheral countries are becoming increasingly economically remote over time.Economic Geography, Human Capital, International Inequality, International Trade

Distance, skill deepening and development : will peripheral countries ever get rich?.

This paper models the relationship between countries' distance from global economic activity, endogenous investments in education and economic development. Firms in remote locations pay greater trade costs on both exports and intermediate imports, reducing the amount of value added left to remunerate domestic factors of production. If skill-intensive sectors have higher trade costs, more pervasive input–output linkages or stronger increasing returns to scale, we show theoretically that remoteness depresses the skill premium and therefore incentives for human capital accumulation. Empirically, we exploit structural relationships from the model to demonstrate that countries with lower market access have lower levels of educational attainment. We also show that the world's most peripheral countries are becoming increasingly economically remote over time.

Comparative advantage and heterogeneous firms

This paper presents a model of international trade that features heterogeneous firms, relative endowment differences across countries, and consumer taste for variety. The paper demonstrates that firm reactions to trade liberalization generate endogenous Ricardian productivity responses at the industry level that magnify countries' comparative advantage. Focusing on the wide range of firm-level reactions to falling trade costs, the model also shows that, as trade costs fall, firms in comparative advantage industries are more likely to export, that relative firm size and the relative number of firms increases more in comparative advantage industries and that job turnover is higher in comparative advantage industries than in comparative disadvantage industries.

Putting Free-Riding to Work: A Partnership Solution to the Common-Property Problem

The common-property problem results in excessive mining, hunting, and extraction of oil and water. The same phenomenon is also responsible for excessive investment in R&D and excessive outlays in rent-seeking contests. We propose a "Partnership Solution" to eliminate or at least mitigate these excesses. Each of N players joins a partnership in the first stage and chooses his effort in the second stage. Under the rules of a partnership, each member must pay his own cost of effort but receives an equal share of the partnership's revenue. The incentive to free-ride created by such partnerships turns out to be beneficial since it naturally offsets the excessive effort inherent in such problems. In our two-stage game, this institutional arrangement can, under specified circumstances, induce the social optimum in a subgame-perfect equilibrium: no one has a unilateral incentive (1) to switch to another partnership (or create a new partnership) in the first stage or (2) to deviate from socially optimal actions in the second stage. The game may have other subgame-perfect equilibria, but the one associated with the ``Partnership Solution'' is strictly preferred by every player. We also propose a modification of the first stage which generates a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Antitrust authorities should recognize that partnerships can have a less benign use. By organizing as competing partnerships, an industry can reduce the ``excessive'' output of Cournot oligopoly to the monopoly level. Since no partner has any incentive to overproduce in the current period, there is no need to deter cheating with threats of future punishments.partnerships;common property;tragedy of the commons;cartels

An Examination of Effective Length in Moment Frames

The honors thesis project I have been working on is called An Examination of Effective Length in Moment Frame. When loaded axially in compression columns experience a failure mode in compression that axially loaded members don’t experience in tension. This failure mode, elastic column buckling, doesn’t involve yielding or rupture; the column changes shape and deforms to the side. In order to come up with a solution to this failure mode, Leonhard Euler developed the critical buckling load equation. However, this equation uses an effective length of columns, which is the distance between two points of zero moment, or inflection points. This is found by multiplying an effective length factor, K, by the column length. The K factor has been found using a nomograph that is strictly based off the columns section properties and only accounts for axial loads. In a moment frame however, patterned live loads can cause joint rotation, which the nomograph does not account for. Increased joint rotation would theoretically change what the effective length of the column is

Comparative Advantage and Heterogeneous Firms

This paper presents a model of international trade that features heterogeneous firms, relativeendowment differences across countries, and consumer taste for variety. The paper demonstrates thatfirm reactions to trade liberalization generate endogenous Ricardian productivity responses at theindustry level that magnify countries' comparative advantage. Focusing on the wide range of firmlevelreactions to falling trade costs, the model also shows that, as trade costs fall, firms incomparative advantage industries are more likely to export, that relative firm size and the relativenumber of firms increases more in comparative advantage industries and that job turnover is higher incomparative advantage industries than in comparative disadvantage industries.Heckscher-Ohlin, international trade, inter-industry trade, intra-industry trade, trade costs,entry and exit

Factor price equalisation in the UK

This paper develops a general test of factor price equalization that is robust to unobserved regional productivity differences, unobserved region-industry factor quality differences and variation in production technology across industries. We test relative factor price equalization across regions of the UK. Although the UK is small and densely-populated, we find evidence of statistically significant and economically important departures from relative factor price equalization. Our estimates suggest three distinct relative factor price areas with a clear spatial structure. We explore explanations for these findings, including multiple cones of diversification, region-industry technology differences, agglomeration and increasing returns to scale.

Factor Price Equality and the Economies of the United States

We develop a methodology for identifying departures from relative factor price equality across regions that is valid under general assumptions about production, markets and factors. Application of this methodology to the United States reveals substantial and increasing deviations in relative skilled wages across labor markets in both 1972 and 1992. These deviations vary systematically with labor markets industry structure both in cross section and over time.Factor Price Equality, Regional Wages, Neoclassical Trade Theory, Labor Market Areas