Search for gravitational-lensing signatures in the full third observing run of the LIGO-Virgo network

Gravitational lensing by massive objects along the line of sight to the source causes distortions of gravitational wave-signals; such distortions may reveal information about fundamental physics, cosmology and astrophysics. In this work, we have extended the search for lensing signatures to all binary black hole events from the third observing run of the LIGO--Virgo network. We search for repeated signals from strong lensing by 1) performing targeted searches for subthreshold signals, 2) calculating the degree of overlap amongst the intrinsic parameters and sky location of pairs of signals, 3) comparing the similarities of the spectrograms amongst pairs of signals, and 4) performing dual-signal Bayesian analysis that takes into account selection effects and astrophysical knowledge. We also search for distortions to the gravitational waveform caused by 1) frequency-independent phase shifts in strongly lensed images, and 2) frequency-dependent modulation of the amplitude and phase due to point masses. None of these searches yields significant evidence for lensing. Finally, we use the non-detection of gravitational-wave lensing to constrain the lensing rate based on the latest merger-rate estimates and the fraction of dark matter composed of compact objects

Search for eccentric black hole coalescences during the third observing run of LIGO and Virgo

Despite the growing number of confident binary black hole coalescences observed through gravitational waves so far, the astrophysical origin of these binaries remains uncertain. Orbital eccentricity is one of the clearest tracers of binary formation channels. Identifying binary eccentricity, however, remains challenging due to the limited availability of gravitational waveforms that include effects of eccentricity. Here, we present observational results for a waveform-independent search sensitive to eccentric black hole coalescences, covering the third observing run (O3) of the LIGO and Virgo detectors. We identified no new high-significance candidates beyond those that were already identified with searches focusing on quasi-circular binaries. We determine the sensitivity of our search to high-mass (total mass M>70 M⊙) binaries covering eccentricities up to 0.3 at 15 Hz orbital frequency, and use this to compare model predictions to search results. Assuming all detections are indeed quasi-circular, for our fiducial population model, we place an upper limit for the merger rate density of high-mass binaries with eccentricities 0<e≤0.3 at 0.33 Gpc−3 yr−1 at 90\% confidence level

Ultralight vector dark matter search using data from the KAGRA O3GK run

Among the various candidates for dark matter (DM), ultralight vector DM can be probed by laser interferometric gravitational wave detectors through the measurement of oscillating length changes in the arm cavities. In this context, KAGRA has a unique feature due to differing compositions of its mirrors, enhancing the signal of vector DM in the length change in the auxiliary channels. Here we present the result of a search for U(1)B−L gauge boson DM using the KAGRA data from auxiliary length channels during the first joint observation run together with GEO600. By applying our search pipeline, which takes into account the stochastic nature of ultralight DM, upper bounds on the coupling strength between the U(1)B−L gauge boson and ordinary matter are obtained for a range of DM masses. While our constraints are less stringent than those derived from previous experiments, this study demonstrates the applicability of our method to the lower-mass vector DM search, which is made difficult in this measurement by the short observation time compared to the auto-correlation time scale of DM

Hume, liberty and the object of moral evaluation

Hume's project concerning the conflict between liberty and necessity is ";reconciliatory";. But what is the nature of Hume's project? Does he solve a problem in metaphysics only? And when Hume says that the dispute between the doctrines of liberty and necessity is merely verbal, does he mean that there is no genuine metaphysical dispute between the doctrines? In the present essay I argue for: (1) there is room for liberty in Hume's philosophy, and not only because the position is pro forma compatibilist, even though this has importance for the recognition that Hume's main concern when discussing the matter is with practice; (2) the position does not involve a ";subjectivization"; of every form of necessity: it is not compatibilist because it creates a space for the claim that the operations of the will are non-problematically necessary through a weakning of the notion of necessity as it applies to external objects; (3) Hume holds that the ordinary phenomena of mental causation do not preempt the atribuition of moral responsibility, which combines perfectly with his identification of the object of moral evaluation: the whole of the character of a person, in relation to which there is, nonetheless, liberty. I intend to support my assertions by a close reading of what Hume states in section 8 of the first Enquiry.<br>O projeto de Hume em relação ao conflito entre liberdade e necessidade é ";reconciliatório";. Mas qual é a natureza do projeto de Hume? Resolve ele um problema que diz respeito à metafísica somente? E quando Hume afirma que a disputa entre as doutrinas da liberdade e da necessidade é meramente verbal, quer ele dizer que não há nenhuma disputa metafísica genuína entre as doutrinas? No presente trabalho eu argumento a favor de (1) que há lugar para a liberdade na filosofia de Hume, e não somente porque a posição é pro forma compatibilista, mesmo que isto tenha importância para o reconhecimento de que a preocupação maior de Hume em relação ao assunto é com a prática; (2) que a posição não involve uma ";subjetivização"; de toda forma de necessidade: ela não é compatibilista porque cria um espaço para a afirmação de que as operações da vontade são não-problematicamente necessárias através de um enfraquecimento da noção de necessidade como ela se aplica aos objetos externos; (3) que Hume sustenta que o fenômeno ordinário da causação mental não torna impossível a atribuição de responsabilidade moral, o que se adapta perfeitamente bem a identificação de Hume do objeto da avaliação moral: o todo do caráter de uma pessoa, em relação ao qual há, não obstante, liberdade. Eu pretendo embasar minhas assertivas através de uma leitura atenta ao que Hume afirma na seção 8 da primeira Investigação