The Cotton and Sugar Subsidies Decisions: WTO's Dispute Settlement System Rebalances the Agreement on Agriculture

Agricultural and Food Policy, International Relations/Trade,

Leptogenesis after Chaotic Sneutrino Inflation and the Supersymmetry Breaking Scale

We discuss resonant leptogenesis arising from the decays of two nearly-degenerate right-handed neutrinos, identified as the inflaton and stabiliser superfields in a model of chaotic sneutrino inflation. We compare an analytical estimate of the baryon asymmetry $\eta_B$ in the Boltzmann approximation to a numerical solution of the full density matrix equations, and find that the analytical result fails to capture the correct physics in certain regions of parameter space. The observed baryon asymmetry can be realised for a breaking of the mass degeneracy as small as $\mathcal{O}(10^{-8})$. The origin of such a small mass splitting is explained by considering supersymmetry (SUSY) breaking in supergravity, which requires a constant in the superpotential of the order of the gravitino mass $m_{3/2}$ to cancel the cosmological constant. This yields additional terms in the (s)neutrino mass matrices, lifting the degeneracy and linking $\eta_B$ to the SUSY breaking scale. We find that achieving the correct baryon asymmetry requires a gravitino mass $m_{3/2} \geq \mathcal{O}(100)$ TeV.Comment: v2: 25 pages, 4 figures; version published in NPB, minor corrections. v1: 24 pages, 4 figure

The \u3ci\u3eCotton\u3c/i\u3e and \u3ci\u3eSugar\u3c/i\u3e Subsidies Decisions: WTO\u27s Dispute Settlement System Rebalances the Agreement on Agriculture

As far back as David Ricardo\u27s shattering insight as to comparative advantage in 1817, agriculture has enjoyed special favor in trade. The unique place of farming was so well established by the time the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ( GATT ) was negotiated that GATT\u27s tight disciplines on government interference with free trade not only exempted government protections to growers, but in fact were drafted to be fully consistent with the agricultural policies of the major signatories. While it would be an exaggeration to argue that GATT\u27 s first half century was without impact on agricultural benefits, the sector at any rate took center stage during negotiations to create the World Trade Organization ( WTO ) because by the time these talks began in 1986, subsidy-induced overproduction had led to widespread displacement of efficient producers from their traditional markets. Many felt this result was far from realization of David Ricardo\u27s compelling economic case for the smallest possible government intervention. While widely hailed for bringing agriculture, at last, under the GATT/WTO umbrella, 1995\u27s Agreement on Agriculture ( Agreement on Agriculture ) more than lived up to the promise of Article 20 that substantial ... reductionsin support and protection resulting in fundamental reform is an ongoing process.\u27\u27 Both as to export subsidies -- those contingent upon export performance and, thus, with the most direct impact on export prices and trade --and the remaining domestic subsidies, the Agreement on Agriculture\u27s ambitions are so modest that many experts believed its generous exemptions and undefined terms rarely would permit successful reining in by dispute settlement panels of the nearly $1 billion a day developed nations provide to their farmers. Two decisions issued by WTO dispute settlement panels on September 8, 2004, belie that prediction. Brazil, an agricultural superpower in its own right, was a complainant in both cases. In the first case, a Panel found United States subsidies to upland cotton were sufficiently in excess of those granted by the UNITED STATES during the baseline 1992 marketing year to be actionable under the Subsidies Agreement, despite the protection of the Peace Clause of the Agreement on Agriculture. The Cotton Panel went on to find that these subsidies caused serious prejudice to Brazil\u27s cotton growers within the meaning of the Subsidies Agreement. In the second case, which involved the EU\u27s Common Agricultural Policy, a Panel held that the EU had exceeded its agreed commitments on sugar in both the amount of exports and the level of subsidies. This paper will analyze the major holdings of the Sugar and Cotton decisions from both a legal and an economic perspective, assess the WTO implications of those holdings on other crops and on Doha Round agriculture negotiations, and examine the effects on other United States exports of the failure of the United States to implement the decisions separate from Doha Round negotiations

The \u3ci\u3eCotton\u3c/i\u3e and \u3ci\u3eSugar\u3c/i\u3e Subsidies Decisions: WTO\u27s Dispute Settlement System Rebalances the Agreement on Agriculture

As far back as David Ricardo\u27s shattering insight as to comparative advantage in 1817, agriculture has enjoyed special favor in trade. The unique place of farming was so well established by the time the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ( GATT ) was negotiated that GATT\u27s tight disciplines on government interference with free trade not only exempted government protections to growers, but in fact were drafted to be fully consistent with the agricultural policies of the major signatories. While it would be an exaggeration to argue that GATT\u27 s first half century was without impact on agricultural benefits, the sector at any rate took center stage during negotiations to create the World Trade Organization ( WTO ) because by the time these talks began in 1986, subsidy-induced overproduction had led to widespread displacement of efficient producers from their traditional markets. Many felt this result was far from realization of David Ricardo\u27s compelling economic case for the smallest possible government intervention. While widely hailed for bringing agriculture, at last, under the GATT/WTO umbrella, 1995\u27s Agreement on Agriculture ( Agreement on Agriculture ) more than lived up to the promise of Article 20 that substantial ... reductionsin support and protection resulting in fundamental reform is an ongoing process.\u27\u27 Both as to export subsidies -- those contingent upon export performance and, thus, with the most direct impact on export prices and trade --and the remaining domestic subsidies, the Agreement on Agriculture\u27s ambitions are so modest that many experts believed its generous exemptions and undefined terms rarely would permit successful reining in by dispute settlement panels of the nearly $1 billion a day developed nations provide to their farmers. Two decisions issued by WTO dispute settlement panels on September 8, 2004, belie that prediction. Brazil, an agricultural superpower in its own right, was a complainant in both cases. In the first case, a Panel found United States subsidies to upland cotton were sufficiently in excess of those granted by the UNITED STATES during the baseline 1992 marketing year to be actionable under the Subsidies Agreement, despite the protection of the Peace Clause of the Agreement on Agriculture. The Cotton Panel went on to find that these subsidies caused serious prejudice to Brazil\u27s cotton growers within the meaning of the Subsidies Agreement. In the second case, which involved the EU\u27s Common Agricultural Policy, a Panel held that the EU had exceeded its agreed commitments on sugar in both the amount of exports and the level of subsidies. This paper will analyze the major holdings of the Sugar and Cotton decisions from both a legal and an economic perspective, assess the WTO implications of those holdings on other crops and on Doha Round agriculture negotiations, and examine the effects on other United States exports of the failure of the United States to implement the decisions separate from Doha Round negotiations

Throw the Book at Them: Why the FTC Needs to Get Tough with Influencers

The Federal Trade Commission is an administrative agency that has traditionally been aggressive when deploying its delegated authority. At the core of these actions is the FTC’s interpretive definition of deception as based upon a reasonable consumer standard. Specifically, the commission has regularly used Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, in tandem with its interpretive definition of deception, as a sword in a variety of contexts, including enforcement actions for deceptive advertising, endorsements, and claim substantiation against a range of industries. These include successfully brought actions or consent decrees obtained in enforcement proceedings against powerful economic entities, including Google and Facebook. Yet, in one area, the FTC has been reluctant to engage in the hard tactics it regularly deploys in other areas. The Commission has struggled to employ a coherent enforcement strategy for deceptive practices by Social Media Influencers. The Commission has taken significant steps towards deception and disclosure enforcement for influencers, including publication of a set of guidelines for disclosure. However, with the exception of a series of warning letters sent to high profile influencers in April of 2017, the Commission has not engaged in a significant enforcement action—choosing instead to launch an inquiry in February 2020 to review the disclosure guidelines. As empirical research demonstrates that consumers do not understand the nature of the influencer process, this Article argues that the FTC should employ a commitment to a robust enforcement stance. The FTC’s failure to “make an example” of high-profile influencers or to take a hardline approach with influencers, as the Commission did with native advertising online, represents a parting with the manner with which the Commissions has traditionally enforced the deception standard in endorsement ads. This departure, this Article argues, is undermining the FTC’s consumer protections

Noise reducing screen devices for in-flow pressure sensors

An acoustic sensor assembly is provided for sensing acoustic signals in a moving fluid such as high speed fluid stream. The assembly includes one or more acoustic sensors and a porous, acoustically transparent screen supported between the moving fluid stream and the sensor and having a major surface disposed so as to be tangent to the moving fluid. A layer of reduced velocity fluid separating the sensor from the porous screen. This reduced velocity fluid can comprise substantially still air. A foam filler material attenuates acoustic signals arriving at the assembly from other than a predetermined range of incident angles

U-Pb Zircon Dates from North American and British Avalonia Bracket the Lower–Middle Cambrian Boundary Interval, with Evaluation of the Miaolingian Series as a Global Unit

High-precision U-Pb zircon ages on SE Newfoundland tuffs now bracket the Avalonian Lower–Middle Cambrian boundary. Upper Lower Cambrian Brigus Formation tuffs yield depositional ages of 507.91 ± 0.07 Ma (Callavia broeggeri Zone) and 507.67 ± 0.08 Ma and 507.21 ± 0.13 Ma (Morocconus-Condylopyge eli Assemblage interval). Lower Middle Cambrian Chamberlain’s Brook Formation tuffs have depositional ages of 506.34 ± 0.21 Ma (Kiskinella cristata Zone) and 506.25 ± 0.07 Ma (Eccaparadoxides bennetti Zone). The composite unconformity separating the Brigus and Chamberlain’s Brook formations is constrained between these ages. An Avalonian Lower–Middle Cambrian boundary between 507.2 ± 0.1 and 506.3 ± 0.2 Ma is consistent with maximum depositional age constraints from southwest Laurentia, which indicate an age for the base of the Miaolingian Series, as locally interpreted, of ≤ 506.6 ± 0.3 Ma. The Miaolingian Series’ base is interpreted as correlative within ≤ 0.3 ± 0.3 Ma between Cambrian palaeocontinents, although its exact synchrony is questionable due to taxonomic problems with a possible Oryctocephalus indicus-plexus, invariable dysoxic lithofacies control of O. indicus and diachronous occurrence of O. indicus in temporally distinct δ13C chemozones in South China and SW Laurentia. The lowest occurrence of O. indicus assemblages is linked to onlap (epeirogenic or eustatic) of dysoxic facies. A united Avalonia is shown by late Early Cambrian volcanics in SW New Brunswick; Cape Breton Island; SE Newfoundland; and the Wrekin area, England. The new U-Pb ages revise Avalonian geological evolution as they show rapid epeirogenic changes through depositional sequences 4a–6

À la Carte Cable: A Regulatory Solution to the Misinformation Subsidy

Although “fake news” is as old as mass media itself, concerns over disinformation have reached a fever pitch in our current media environment. Online media outlets’ heavy reliance on user-generated content has altered the traditional gatekeeping functions and professional standards associated with traditional news organizations. The idea of objectivity-focused informational content has primarily been substituted for a realist acceptance of the power and popularity of opinion-driven “news.” This shift is starkly visible now: mainstream news media outlets knowingly spread hoaxes, conspiracy theories, and the like. This current state of affairs is not some freak accident. The Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence has led us here. For example, the Court’s decision in Reno v. ACLU subjects government regulation of online speech to strict scrutiny review, hamstringing nearly any attempt at regulation (much less censorship) of online speech by the government. Similarly, content regulation of televised media is covered by the First Amendment’s capacious protections. And while broadcast media was once heavily regulated for content, the FCC’s adoption of deregulation resulted in the eventual repeal of a range of content limitations and requirements for licensees. Designing a content-neutral scheme to regulate media content directly is not only a complex legal problem, but it is also likely a non-starter. State actors are (rightly) unable to censor or remove content based on the ideological leanings of the content, and media disinformation directly implicates political speech about controversial topics. In an era where cross-platform news media is ubiquitous, the legal status quo has effectively ensured media platforms have near-total discretion to control—or more accurately, not control—the truthfulness of disseminated content. However, a market-based, bottom-up approach to content regulation could end-run the problems that plague government regulation of cable media. Industry research has suggested that cable “news” outlets generate more revenue from per-subscriber fees applied by cable companies than from advertising carried by those channels. In terms of cable news, per-channel costs are the highest costs in a monthly cable bill. This means that more than eighty million cable subscribers subsidize content that attracts fewer than two million viewers daily, including misinformation. This paper posits “à la carte” cable packaging as a solution to the subsidy of disinformation. Currently, cable subscribers are forced to buy programming channels even when they would rather not. This is particularly troubling in the case of news information because subscribers who wish to receive some programming are forced to subsidize other news content that may be objectionable. The resulting system of reverse compelled speech means that news organizations keep their subsidy while advocating against the interests of those footing the bill. Eliminating this involuntary subsidy flips the status quo on its head by making trustworthiness part of the bottom line, incentivizing prudent news self-regulation in an entirely content-neutral manner