545 research outputs found
Summer 2019 Internship at Reams Asset Management
STEP Category: InternshipsI completed a 12-week summer internship at Reams Asset Management, primarily working with their corporate credit investment team. Throughout the 12 weeks, I gained broad exposure to many fixed income investment vehicles. I also gained a much deeper understanding of interest rate environments and the central banking system. My primary role was to perform credit research on various potential credit investment opportunities. Companies I researched include Caterpillar Inc., United Technologies, Cummins Inc., AbbVie Inc., Allergan Pharmaceuticals, and John Deere & Co.The Ohio State University Second-year Transformational Experience Program (STEP)Academic Major: Financ
Vulnerabilità, concetto di diritto e approccio clinico-legale
Does a clinical legal approach tell us something interesting about the nature and the concept of law? Is it possible to re-think the relationship between law and morals starting from the legal clinics experience? Is the juxtaposition between doctors and jurists convincing? These are the main questions that will be addressed here. They are questions concerning legal epistemology and legal philosophy in the strict sense that seems not to be so interesting for clinical jurists. Indeed, clinical jurists above all emphasize the importance of legal clinics from the viewpoint of education and social justice, but neglect the contribution that a clinical legal method can offer with respect to the knowledge of law. Nevertheless, dealing with this latter question could be useful to strengthen contemporary legal clinical movement
La fine dell'età dei diritti
Norberto Bobbio’s introduced the expression “age of rights” to indicate the idea of an universal consensus on some values which can be interpreted as a signum prognosticum – in kantian terms – of mankind’s moral progress. The symbolic starting point of this age is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed in 1948. In this paper the expression “the end of the age of rights” is value free and it is used to sign the replacement of the model of social organization imagined by Bobbio and many others after the second world-war in favour of a different model according to which human rights become a sort of lingua franca. As a consequence, it is not paradoxically at all to decree the end of the age of rights in presence of a public discourse crowded with rights
Some introductory remarks on legal interpretation and legal reasoning. A philosophical approach
Due concezioni della ragione pubblica a confronto. Dissezione analitica della nozione rawlsiana di ragione pubblica
The idea of public reason — as well as the contraposition among public reason and private reasons — is strictly linked to the rise of pluralistic societies, societies in which the main problem is probably that of finding a lowest common denominator between different and often conflicting reasons. In a nutshell, the public reason is (or should be) just the core of principles and values shared by all the different philosophical and political doctrines. This paper is mainly focused on the very well-known conception of public reason developed by John Rawls as from the publishing of Political Liberalism.
The aim of the first half of this paper is that of pointing out some serious difficulties connected with Rawls’ originary defence of public reason. In particular, in Political Liberalism Rawls assumes, without looking after to find some compelling evidence, that in pluralistic societies like ours the only way for understanding each other is that of constraining public debates and deliberations within the boundaries fixed by public reason, renouncing to deploy the whole truth. In this way, Rawls lays himself open to the critics of not taking seriously the freedom of speech. Furthermore, I argue that public reason is not able to ban comprehensive doctrines, either philosophical or religious, from public debates.
In the second half of the paper, it will be argued for a "soft", more convincing, idea of public reason. In brief, the conception of public reason as "barrage" against all the reasons exceeding a political conception of justice will be replaced by the conception of public reason as "common denominator" or "translator" of these reasons
La fine dell’età dei diritti
Norberto Bobbio introduced the expression “age of rights” to indicate the idea of an universal consensus on some values which can be interpreted as a signum prognosticum – in kantian terms – of mankind’s moral progress. The symbolic starting point of this age is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed in 1948. In this paper the expression “the end of the age of rights” is value free and it is used to sign the replacement of the model of social organization imagined by Bobbio and many others after the second world-war in favour of a different model according to which human rights become a sort of lingua franca. As a consequence, it is not paradoxical at all to decree the end of the age of rights in presence of a public discourse crowded with rights
Volpi e ricci, ovvero: che cosa rimane del positivismo giuridico?
Sino alla prima metà del xx secolo tutti i principali giuspositivisti condividevano l’idea che il positivismo giuridico presupponesse necessariamente una meta-etica soggettivista e non-cognitivista. Il legame tra una meta-etica soggettivista e non-cognitivista e il positivismo giuridico ad un certo punto è stato reciso. Importanti giuspositivisti cominciano a mettere in discussione che il positivismo giuridico implichi una determinata prospettiva meta-etica. In questo saggio avanzo tre obiezioni al positivismo giuridico da cui che il positivismo giuridico può almeno in parte difendersi solo a condizione di rimanere fedele al soggettivismo e al non-cognitivismoUntil the middle of the last century all the most prominent legal positivists share the idea of a necessary connection between legal positivism and a subjectivist and non-cognitivist meta-ethics. At a certain point this close link was severed. Outstanding legal positivists start to question that legal positivism implies a certain meta-ethical perspective. In this paper I raise three objections to legal positivism to which it can at least partly reply only adopting a subjectivist and non-cognitivist meta-ethical perspective
Il c.d. neocostituzionalismo e la conoscenza del diritto
Da una prospettiva giusfilosofica, le tesi più interessanti del c.d. neocostituzionalismo sono quelle che sfidano il positivismo giuridico metodologico. Come approach al diritto, il positivismo giuridico presuppone la possibilità di distinguere tra il diritto qual è ed il diritto quale dovrebbe essere, tra diritto ideale e diritto reale, e, sulla base di tale distinzione, individua l’oggetto della scienza giuridica nel diritto positivo. L’attacco del neocostituzionalismo a questo modo di intendere la conoscenza del diritto ruota intorno a tre argomenti: a) l’argomento della pretesa di correttezza b) l’argomento legato alla impossibilità di distinguere nettamente l’osservatore dal partecipante e c) l’argomento della svolta interpretativa della scienza giuridica. Il mio obiettivo in questa sede è quello di mostrare che il giuspositivismo metodologico non è in grado di replicare in modo convincente ad una critica fondata su questi argomenti. Altra questione, che non affronto direttamente, è quella di stabilire se, a partire da queste critiche, sia possibile configurare una prospettiva giusfilosofica alternativa tanto al giusnaturalismo quanto al giuspositivismo. Per un verso, ritengo che si tratti di una questione leziosa, che rischia di arenarsi in dispute sterili il cui esito è pre-determinato dalle definizioni stipulative di partenza. Per altro verso, ritengo possibile e opportuno ricostruire, a livello concettuale, giupositivismo e giusnaturalismo come prospettive mutuamente esclusive. In questo caso, gli autori c.d. neocostituzionalisti potranno essere ricondotti ora all’una ora all’altra concezione del diritto a seconda che le critiche al giuspositivismo metodologico siano accompagnate da una prospettiva meta-etica oggettivista e cognitivista o, viceversa, soggettivista e non-cognitivista. Nel primo caso, ci troveremmo di fronte a concezioni del diritto anti-giuspositiviste (e, dunque, giusnaturaliste); nel secondo, di fronte a concezioni post-positiviste del diritto che, pur rinunciando alla purezza della scienza giuridica, mantengono fede alla massima auctoritas non veritas facit legem. In questo modo, si recupererebbe anche l’intuizione di giuspositivisti come Hans Kelsen ed Alf Ross che considerano il non-cognitivismo etico un elemento essenziale del positivismo giuridico.From a legal philosophical point of view, the most interesting theses of so-called neo-constitutionalism are those that challenge methodological legal positivism. As an approach to law, legal positivism presupposes the possibility of distinguishing between “law as it is” and “law as it should be”, between ideal law and real law, and, on the basis of this distinction, it identifies the object of legal science in positive law. The attack of neo-constitutionalism on this way of seeing legal knowledge revolves around three arguments: a) the argument of the correctness claim b) the argument relating to the impossibility of clearly distinguishing the observer from the participant, and c) the argument of the interpretive turn in legal science. My goal here is to show that methodological legal positivism is unable to reply convincingly to a critique based on these arguments. Another issue, which I do not deal with directly, is to determine whether, from these criticisms, it is possible to configure a legal philosophical perspective that is an alternative to both natural law doctrine and legal positivism. On the one hand, I feel that this is a futile issue, which is likely to run aground in sterile disputes whose outcome is predetermined by the starting stipulative definitions. On the other hand, I think it is possible and appropriate, at a conceptual level, to reconstruct legal positivism and natural law as mutually exclusive perspectives. In this case, the so-called neo-constitutionalist authors can be linked to the one or the other conception of law, depending on whether criticisms of methodological legal positivism are accompanied by an objectivist and cognitivist meta-ethical perspective or, conversely, by a subjectivist and non-cognitivist one. In the first case, we would be looking at anti-positive-law ideas of law (and, therefore, at natural law ones); in the second, at post-positivist conceptions of law that, despite foregoing the purity of legal science, remain faithful to the maxim auctoritas non veritas facit legem. In this way we would also recover the intuition of legal positivists like Hans Kelsen and Alf Ross, who consider ethical non-cognitivism an essential element of legal positivism
超越宣告性模式和判决主义模式* ———麦考密克对“法律推理和法律理论”的重新思考
This paper offers a diachronic reconstruction of MacCormick’s theory of law and legal
argumentation: In particular,two related points will be highlighted in which the difference between the perspective
upheld in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory and the later writings is particularly marked. The ? rst point concerns
MacCormick’s gradual break with legal positivism,and more speci? cally the thesis that the implicit pretension to
justice of law proves legal positivism false in all its different versions. The second point concerns MacCormick’s
acceptance of the one-right-answer thesis and the consequent thinning of the differences between MacCormick’s
theory of legal reasoning and that of Ronald Dworkin and of Robert Alexy. The intent,however,is not only to
describe this change in MacCormick’s thought,but also to attempt a defence of the original view that we ? nd in
Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory
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