America in a Changing World

Commencement address given by William B. Saxbe, Ambassador to India, to the Spring 1975 graduating class of The Ohio State University, Ohio Stadium, Columbus, Ohio, June 13, 1975

Socially-mediated arousal and contagion within domestic chick broods

Emotional contagion – an underpinning valenced feature of empathy – is made up of simpler, potentially dissociable social processes which can include socially-mediated arousal and behavioural/physiological contagion. Previous studies of emotional contagion have often conflated these processes rather than examining their independent contribution to empathic response. We measured socially-mediated arousal and contagion in 9-week old domestic chicks (n = 19 broods), who were unrelated but raised together from hatching. Pairs of observer chicks were exposed to two conditions in a counterbalanced order: air puff to conspecifics (AP) (during which an air puff was applied to three conspecifics at 30 s intervals) and control with noise of air puff (C) (during which the air puff was directed away from the apparatus at 30 s intervals). Behaviour and surface eye temperature of subjects and observers were measured throughout a 10-min pre-treatment and 10-min treatment period. Subjects and observers responded to AP with increased freezing, and reduced preening and ground pecking. Subjects and observers also showed reduced surface eye temperature - indicative of stress-induced hyperthermia. Subject-Observer behaviour was highly correlated within broods during both C and AP conditions, but with higher overall synchrony during AP. We demonstrate the co-occurrence of socially-mediated behavioural and physiological arousal and contagion; component features of emotional contagion

Student Unrest, and the Law

Many people have recently expressed alarm about the student unrest in our universities and on our college campuses. I am delighted to have this opportunity to submit an article to The Cleveland State Law Review, for it provides a forum for me to express my views on the subject

Functions of the Office of Attorney General of Ohio

The office of the Attorney General of Ohio was established by the Constitution of 1851 in Article XII, Section 1. The duties of the Attorney General and the functions of the Office are prescribed by statute. That places the Attorney General as the last of our statutory officers in Ohio. The Attorney General, if there was any before the Constitution of 1851, served at the pleasure of the Governor as a legal advisor. And some of the things I shall say later reflect the importance of making this a Constitutional office, thus putting a different light on the function of the Office. Briefly, the Office acts as does any law office in representing its client as both Solicitor and Barrister the client being, of course, the State of Ohio. The Office gives legal advice and represents the State in Court when civil litigation becomes necessary

Application to the Court

This Application to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio Eastern Division by the Attorney General of Ohio, William B. Saxbe, pertains to the addition of Attorney Gertrude Bauer Mahon, as special counsel in the habeas corpus suit of Sheppard v. Maxwell

Cortisol coregulation in fish

Cortisol coregulation, which is the up- or down-regulation of partners’ physiological stress responses, has been described for individuals with strong attachment bonds, e.g. parents and their children, and romantic relationship partners. Research into moderating effects on cortisol coregulation suggests stronger covariation among distressed partners. Whether cortisol coregulation is unique to humans or can also be found in other species that share universal features of the vertebrate stress response remains unexplored. Using a repeated measures approach and non-invasive waterborne hormone analysis, we test the hypothesis that dyads of three-spined stickleback fish (Gasterosteus aculeatus) coregulate their cortisol levels in shared environments. Dyadic cortisol levels were unrelated when cohabiting (home tank), but significantly covaried when sharing a more stressful (as indicated by higher cortisol levels) environment (open field). Time-lag analysis further revealed that open field cortisol levels were predicted by partner’s cortisol levels prior to the shared experience. To our knowledge, this study provides the first evidence for coregulatory processes on cortisol responses in a non-human animal that lacks strong bonds and social attachment relationships, suggesting a shared evolutionary origin of cortisol coregulation in vertebrates. From an adaptive perspective, cortisol coregulation may serve to reduce risk in challenging, potentially threatening situations

Brief of Resondents

This Brief outlines the Respondents (State/Prosecution) side of legal support for why the Sheppard Case was conducted in a partial and Constitutional manner. The two questions they present include: DID THE PUBLICITY RELATING TO THE PETITIONER DEPRIVE HIM OF A FAIR TRIAL? and WAS THE PETITIONER DEPRIVED OF A PUBLIC TRIAL? Using precedent and examination of the Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961) case and the case of Rideau v. State of Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 83 S. Ct., 1417, 10 L. Ed. 2d, 663 (1963), (perhaps the two cases most favorable to petitioner\u27s position) reveal where the United States Supreme Court has drawn the boundaries for what constitutes a fair trial in the face of adverse publicity. These cases with such a pattern of facts reveals situations that caused the United States Supreme Court to reverse both convictions. Although slightly similar to Sheppard, various factors suggest that the deep-rooted prejudice that existed in the Rideau and Irvin cases did not exist in the Sheppard case–as noted by respondents. After an examination of the relevant factors surrounding the Sheppard jury and the publicity in the community, respondent finds that it can merely repeat the words of the United States District Court in United States v. Kahaner, 204 F. Supp. 921, 924 (1962): Publicity, in and of itself does not, foreclose a fair trial. The courts do not function in a vacuum and jurors are not required to be totally ignorant of what goes on about them. * * * In considering the mentioned complaints it is necessary to keep in mind the following legal principles: The mere fact of unfavorable publicity does not of itself raise a presumption of prejudice but prejudice must manifest itself so as to corrupt due process. Dennis v. U.S., 302 F 2d 5 (1962). Mere exposure to adverse publicity does not necessarily result in bias, prejudgment or other disqualification. U.S. v. Applegarth, 206 F. Supp. 686, 687 (1962). The mere fact that a juror has read newspaper accounts relative to a criminal charge is not in itself sufficient grounds for excusing a jury. Blumenfield v. U.S, 284 F. 2d 46, 51 (1960). Also, regarding the petitioner\u27s (Sheppard) assertion that the action of the trial court in setting aside the major portion of the courtroom for representatives of the news media was violative of his right to a public trial. Respondent contends that the trial court was justified in its actions. Equally, the respondent is aware that the petitioner is going to present statements to the effect that the trial judge expressed his belief in the guilt of the petitioner before the trial commenced. Accordingly, respondent invites the Court\u27s attention to the recent case of Hendrix v. Hand, 312 F. 2d (1962) wherein the Court of Appeals, in a habeas corpus proceeding held that the mere fact that a trial judge in a state criminal prosecution signed a statement in advance of trial relating to the judge\u27s belief that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged did not establish any infringement of defendant\u27s right to a fair trial

Brief of Respondent

Samuel H. Sheppard, on April 11, 1963, was granted leave to file his Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in forma pauperis. At the time of hearing Sheppard\u27s application for leave to file in forma pauperis, counsel for the petitioner propounded that the discretion which formerly reposed in Federal District Courts as to whether a writ of habeas corpus should or should not be granted no longer exists and that the writ must issue. Cases cited in support of this position were decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on March 18, 1963: Townsend v. Sain, No. 8, October Term, 1962, and Fay v. Noia, No. 84, October Term, 1962. This Court has directed that briefs be submitted dealing only with the question of whether it may exercise its discretion with respect to whether a writ of habeas corpus shall or shall not be issued. The Attorney General stated that these decisions had no application to the question at hand and did not in any way deny to the District Courts their long standing power to exercise sound judicial discretion; it merely elaborated certain rules which will be applied to the exercise of such discretion

Brief of Respondent

Samuel H. Sheppard, on April 11, 1963, was granted leave to file his Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in forma pauperis. At the time of hearing Sheppard\u27s application for leave to file in forma pauperis, counsel for the petitioner propounded that the discretion which formerly reposed in Federal District Courts as to whether a writ of habeas corpus should or should not be granted no longer exists and that the writ must issue. Cases cited in support of this position were decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on March 18, 1963: Townsend v. Sain, No. 8, October Term, 1962, and Fay v. Noia, No. 84, October Term, 1962. This Court has directed that briefs be submitted dealing only with the question of whether it may exercise its discretion with respect to whether a writ of habeas corpus shall or shall not be issued. The Attorney General stated that these decisions had no application to the question at hand and did not in any way deny to the District Courts their long standing power to exercise sound judicial discretion; it merely elaborated certain rules which will be applied to the exercise of such discretion