Players with limited memory

This paper studies a model of memory. The model takes into account that memory capacity is limited and imperfect. We study how agents with such memory limitations, who have very little information about their choice environment, play games. We introduce the notion of a Limited Memory Equilibrium (LME) and show that play converges to an LME in every generic normal form game. Our characterization of the set of LME suggests that players with limited memory do (weakly) better in games than in decision problems. We also show that agents can do quite well even with severely limited memory, although severe limitations tend to make them behave cautiously

A Single-Stage Approach to Anscombe and Aumann's Expected Utility

expected utility theory;decision analysis;revealed preference

Predicting how People Play Games: a Simple Dynamic Model of Choice.

We use the model developed in Sarin and Vahid (1999, GEB) to explain the experiments reported in Erev and Roth (1998, AER). The model supposes that players maximize subject to their "beliefs" which are non-probabilistic and scalar-valued. They are intended to describe the payoffs the players subjectively assess they will obtain from a strategy. In an earlier paper (Sarin and Vahid (1997) we showed that the model predicted behaviour in repeated coordination games remarkably well, and better than equilibrium theory of reinforcement learning models. In this paper we show that the same one-parameter model can also explain behaviour in games with a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium better than alternative models. Hence, we obtain further support for the simple dynamic model.Game Theory, Probability

Strategy Similarity and Coordination.

This paper introduces similarity among strategies in the payoff assessment model of choice (Sarin and Vahid (1999, GEB)). The assessments of strategies that are more similar to the chosen strategy are updated more similarly to the chosen strategy. We use this model to explain a recent experiment.Econometric analysis of experimental data; Adaptive learning; Similarity; Coordination games; Payoff assessments without probabilities

Revealed likelihood and knightian uncertainty

expected utility theory;uncertainty;revealed preference